Lord Sandhurst:

Moved by Lord Sandhurst

59: Clause 13, page 28, line 26, at end insert—“(3A) Where a court imposes a driving prohibition requirement under subsection (3) the court must be satisfied that suitable arrangements exist for the practical monitoring of compliance with the requirement.”Member’s explanatory statementThis new clause would add a general practicability condition to the imposition of driving prohibition requirement, ensuring they may only be imposed where compliance can realistically be monitored.

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie. We on these Benches welcome the underlying principle of Clauses 13 to 16, which relate to new community order requirements that can be imposed on offenders as part of their suspended sentences and community orders that can be imposed on offenders as part of their sentences. However, as I asked at Second Reading, the big question is: how are these going to be made a practical reality?

There is a commendable aim here: to equip the courts with additional tools that will both enhance public protection and steer offenders towards genuine rehabilitation. It may surprise noble Lords to hear that we on these Benches do not oppose suspended sentences as a concept or in application. It has been abundantly clear, I hope, that we take issue with Clauses 1 and 2 as they are currently drafted because we believe that there should not be such an indiscriminate provision for criminals to serve their sentences in the community. However, for those offenders who should serve their sentences on a suspended basis, these clauses are a welcome measure. They will improve the regime—or, at least, they have the potential to improve the regime, if properly drafted.

Many noble Lords have spoken of their support for suspended sentences in favour of short-term custodial ones, arguing that the short-term benefits of serving such sentences in prison are largely outweighed, if not entirely negated, by the effects of custody. Although we recognise this argument and, in many cases, agree with it, I would respectfully point out that this is just one side of the coin. Of course, the outcomes for prisoners themselves are an important consideration in this debate—because, if successful, the Bill will prevent or reduce the rate of recidivism—but we must recognise the wider public. They also have an interest in recidivism—namely, that it does not occur—as well as a legitimate interest in seeing the right people be positively punished.

If we are to give support to the broader aim of this Bill, it will hinge entirely on the Government’s ability to ensure—in fact, to guarantee—that those on suspended sentences will be managed in a manner that drives towards public safety, not just the term of the sentence. If it cannot be shown that those being released into the community cannot be managed in a safe and effective way, we will fail the public by allowing this Bill to pass into statute. Noble Lords may wish to point to statistics that claim that reoffending rates are lower for those on suspended sentences, but the reality is that the statistic is not nothing. If we are to allow offenders on to the streets, we must do so in a way that does not increase the danger to citizens going about their lives and does not increase the crime rate.

A higher number will receive suspended sentences than do at the moment. It must be common sense that, when imposing suspended sentences, judges have striven, at least to date, to impose them on those for whom they think there is a lower risk of breach. But if it is to be, in effect, for everybody, inevitably there will be those for whom there is a higher risk of breach.

On day one in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, spoke in Opposition to exemptions we suggested from the suspended sentence provision in Clause 1. She said she had thought:

“If there is a real danger to the general public, we probably wouldn’t be looking at a sentence of less than 12 months”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1342.]

The reality is that there is a range of crimes for which offenders are routinely sentenced to immediate custodial terms of 12 months or less. It is a matter of fact that certain sex offenders come within that category. The noble Baroness may not consider such people a real danger to the public, but we on these Benches do. Further, the Minister has confirmed that, in reality, this presumption will extend to sentences up to 18 months once guilty pleas are accounted for; in other words, 18 months discounted to 12 because of a prompt and early guilty plea, and then suspended.

We must be very clear about this: sentences of up to 18 months’ imprisonment apply to categories of people who are certainly violent and certainly dangerous. They may not be dangerous to a particular identified individual, meaning that the exemptions in the statute will not apply. Instead, we are at the mercy of court orders to keep the public safe.

The Amendment proposed on day one to exempt those involved in terrorist or associated offences from the suspended sentence provision was also met with resistance. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked:

“If an offender commits a terrorist act, is he looking at 12 months or less?”.—[Official Report, 26/11/25; col. 1350.]

Under the Terrorism Act 2000, a person who wears an item of clothing or displays an article related to a proscribed organisation will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment “not exceeding six months”. This means that an offender wishing to fly an al-Qaeda or a Nazi flag on the street will, in this case, now receive a suspended sentence. They are not putting a particular individual at significant risk of harm, but I am sure noble Lords will agree that they are a risk to the public and the behaviour of the public generally. Such behaviour winds people up. Yet will they not be exempt from this presumption, as currently drafted?

We will never support this measure, but if we must resign ourselves to the possibility that this will soon be the reality, we on these Benches will strive to do everything we can to lessen the risk to the public. That is why the amendments in this group have been tabled, and I will now briefly outline the practical aims of each.

Amendments 59, 64, 69 and 72 would add a general practicality condition to the imposition of the new community order requirements. This has been suggested to ensure that they may be imposed only where compliance with such requirements can realistically be monitored. Imposing these new orders will be meaningless if we cannot ensure that they can and will be enforced in practice. It is of no practical benefit to ban an offender from a particular type of public event if there is no meaningful way of ensuring that he or she will in fact not attend such events when released into the community. Likewise, there is little value in placing a driving prohibition on an offender who feels no deterrent from getting back on the road as a result of an order that he knows is fruitless in practice.

These amendments touch on a point of the utmost importance. If the Government oppose them, they are saying that they are willing to allow the courts to impose orders which they know will not be upheld in practice. This was the exact justification for the removal of the rehabilitative activity days in Clause 12; namely, that the maximum thresholds are rarely upheld in practice and so they needed reform. Will the Government follow the same logic for the new powers they are giving the courts, or will they allow conditions of suspended sentence to be given out in the full knowledge that they are just token gestures?

We make this point not only to expose the inconsistent arguments that the Government have set out in the Bill. This is not simply a matter of an ineffective law that is likely to waste the already stretched resources of our judiciary; failure to get this right will lead to more crime. It will result in more sexual offences, assaults, thefts and knives on our streets. If offenders cannot be practically managed under the new community requirement conditions, they should not be allowed to return straight to society.

Likewise, Amendments 62, 67 and 73 seek to ensure that the appropriate supervising authority enforces the relevant community requirement imposed by the courts. The principle here is straightforward: conditions that are not enforced are not conditions at all; they are simply lip service that sounds good and reassuring in this Chamber but means nothing to the victims who meet their offender in the pub or the shopkeeper who finds the man who robbed him standing outside his door in breach of a supposed restriction zone.

If the Government oppose these amendments, they must defend the following position: that the courts should be allowed to impose requirements that in reality will not be policed. That would not merely be poor lawmaking; it would be dangerous. We have already seen where unenforceable orders lead. The chaos that surrounded criminal behaviour orders and football banning orders, where breaches have gone undetected or unenforced for months, shows that if you design a system without the basic infrastructure for compliance, you do not get rehabilitation or simple obedience; you get contempt. You get offenders who learn that nothing happens when they ignore the rules and victims who lose faith in justice altogether, and our society falls apart. Public confidence is not an abstract principle; it is the foundation of the rule of law. Every time an offender in breach of their conditions walks past a victim with impunity or conducts themselves in other similar breaches, we erode that foundation of the rule of law and of our society.

Finally, Amendments 63 and 64 would ensure that when conditions relate to a specific public event or premises, the relevant organisation is informed. Again, there is no point in a prohibition on attending a named public event or entering a particular bar if the people responsible for admission at the gate are unaware that the order exists. For those who argue that breaches will be rare, I argue that, rather than speculate, we should make sure that the system has the data and notification mechanisms to prove it.

If this House is to support the Government’s drive to release more offenders into the community rather than impose custodial sentences, the very least we must insist on is a system that checks whether or not it works. Anything else is reckless and unwise. Opposing these amendments is not only undemocratic, because it strips Parliament and the public of transparency; it is positively dangerous. It tolerates avoidable risks to the public. The Government cannot say that community sentences will reduce reoffending and improve public safety while at the same time resisting the very mechanisms that would allow us to monitor and enforce them. If Ministers are so confident that this approach works, they should have nothing to fear from accountability, enforcement or data.

I urge the Government to accept these amendments as the minimum necessary safeguard. If not, they must be willing to explain to the British people why they believe that offenders should be released with conditions that are unmonitored, unenforceable and unknown to those who in reality have to uphold them. That is a position that we on these Benches will never support. I beg to move.

My Lords, I have been struggling to find the amendments that I was speaking to, to which the noble Lord referred when he talked about my Opposition. I remember querying terms such as “associated offences” and offences which have “a connection to terrorism”, but I think that the context was a little more nuanced than the noble Lord suggests.

I agree with the noble Lord about enforceability, but to have a particular officer responsible for enforcing each prohibition does not seem to me practicable—if I have understood the proposal properly. I have points to make about enforceability in the next group; the answer may well be electronic monitoring.

I wish to raise a point that comes a bit from left field. I am sure that I am not the only Member to have received an email invitation today to a meeting to be told about “alcolocks”, which are, apparently, programmed mechanisms installed in cars, which can detect whether the driver has been drinking. The Minister is nodding. I thought that I would use this opportunity to see whether he knows anything about this. How does the car know whether you have had six brandies or half a pint of shandy? I do not know—but it seems quite intriguing. I shall not hold him to it if he does not know.

My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Sanderson, I have more qualms about these particular prohibitions, broadly from a civil liberties point of view. The problem with the idea of bringing in endless surveillance and state bodies to keep their eye on people, banning people and prohibiting people on the basis that this is necessary because it will allow people to avoid prison is that it turns the community into something with prison-like conditions. I do not feel easy with that in terms of there being a ban on public events and entering drinking establishments, with new restriction zones and so on.

Where I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sanderson, is on how on earth it will work, practically. How will probation cope with monitoring these prohibitions? I cannot understand how it would be feasible. We keep discussing the problem of probation not having enough resources and we are then assured that more resources will be made available; we are now asking probation to do even more than they were doing before. Resources always implies money, but this is about a lot more than money. I would have thought that a lot of the new things that this Bill is asking probation officers to do will require a lot more training.

The Minister will know that, for example, because of the huge case loads that probation officers have, the last thing that they want to be dealing with are IPP prisoners, who are at the very least challenging. We know that, in many instances, in order to get them off the books, they adopt a risk-averse attitude, which means that anyone who even just technically breaks a licence condition—maybe they are a late for a meeting, or something like that—suddenly gets recalled into prison. So there are all sorts of complications around saying simply that probation will do it.

I know that when I raise problems with probation, immediately there is a rush with people saying how brilliant probation officers are; this is not a slight on them as individuals but a problem with the service. In fact, if anything, it is probation officers themselves who feel frustrated and are tearing their hair out because they are expected to do so much with so little. There is a real reason why there is a difficulty in recruiting new trainee probation officers and where there are insufficient staff numbers.

What I do not understand is how we would monitor this. Let us say that there is, for example, a prohibition on going to the pub or a drinking establishment—I cannot remember what they are called now. Are probation officers going to be standing outside the pub? How will they know whether someone is entering a pub or not? That is why I think that the amendments in this group are quite useful. Is this just a box-ticking exercise? If it is a practical thing, someone will have to let the drinking establishments know and monitor whether anyone goes into them. I also think that there is a whole paraphernalia, and there are potentially quite difficult issues when restriction zones are put in place. Who decides where they are and what they are based on, and who is going to monitor them?

There is a wide range of new restrictions and prohibitions that are only being put in place because of the move to remove people from prison. Community probation officers do not have the resources; this will be not just technically bureaucratic to enact, but it will not keep the public safe or enable them to keep an eye on efficacy. Consequently, I would like to tighten up the whole notion of these orders via amendments such as these, but I am not even convinced that they are the way to go or that they are anything other than a problematic example of why there is a prior problem of letting everybody out of prison too early when you do not have the resources in the community.

My Lords, one of the three key principles behind David Gauke’s Independent Sentencing Review was to expand and make greater use of punishments outside prison. The new community requirements introduced by Clauses 13 to 16 are designed to implement that principle. They are intended to give the courts a wider range of options to punish offenders in the community, from stopping them from going to watch their favourite football team to imposing a restriction zone that requires them to stay within a particular area.

The Amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has quite rightly raised questions about how these are to be enforced and monitored. Their amendments would prevent the court from imposing these requirements if there are not arrangements for enforcement in place or the court did not believe they can be enforced, and they seek to ensure that the relevant authority supervises requirements imposed by the court.

I hope that it will help noble Lords if I begin by explaining how these orders will be monitored and enforced. It is very important to remember that community and suspended sentence orders are already a well-established part of the justice system. This Bill simply expands the range of options available to judges when they pass a sentence.

As with all current community requirements, probation staff will monitor an offender’s compliance with their order; they use a range of tools to do that, such as intelligence from partners, including the police. This includes electronic monitoring, where appropriate, and probation staff are already skilled in using these tools to enforce community orders. If probation staff learn about non-compliance, they have a range of options. They can return the offender to court, which can result in even more onerous requirements; they can impose a fine; and, in more serious cases, they can even send the offender to custody.

I hope that an example will help to illustrate this. Let us imagine that Harry, an ardent supporter of Sheffield United Football Club, is banned from attending football matches under one of the new community requirements. To enforce this order, the court has ordered that he must wear an electronic tag. Harry breaches his community order by going to a game. His probation officer learns about this from the data from his tag. In other circumstances, a breach may be identified through intelligence sharing between agencies. They decide that the breach is serious enough to return Harry to court, where he receives a further fine.

In short, these new requirements will be enforced by probation staff who are skilled and experienced in enforcing similar requirements. This Government are making sure that the Probation Service has the capacity to do this vital job and keep the public safe through recruitment, increased funding and investing in technology, including even more alcohol tags. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to a new sort of alcohol test, which I am unaware of but sounds interesting. I also emphasise that the Bill does not require the courts to use these requirements. Critically, the court must determine that any requirements imposed are the most suitable for achieving the purposes of sentencing. For all the reasons I have set out, the Government’s view is that these amendments are not necessary.

The noble Lord has also tabled amendments requiring venues to be notified of any ban. I appreciate what this amendment is trying to achieve but gently say that it is unnecessary. The duty to comply rests with the offender, and enforcement rests with the Probation Service. We do not believe it would be appropriate to place, even by implication, a burden of enforcement on hard-working businesses. As I have already noted, probation officers are responsible for supervising offenders serving their sentences in the community and taking enforcement action where necessary, and they are skilled and experienced in doing so. I am glad that we have had the opportunity to discuss these amendments today. I hope I have given noble Lords greater clarity about how these amendments will be both imposed and enforced, and I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Before the noble Lord sits down, he mentioned alcolocks. It is a system of measuring one’s breath, and if one is deemed to have drunk it stops the car ignition. It has worked very successfully in other countries.

I thank the noble Baroness. That is very interesting, and I will take it back to the department.

My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation given by the Minister, but the issues at stake here are not theoretical; they are practical questions about how these conditions will actually work. Will they be real, meaningful and enforceable? The Government have repeatedly asserted confidence in suspended sentences and the expanded use of community-based requirements. If that confidence is well placed, these amendments should be entirely uncontroversial; they do nothing more than ensure that what is ordered by a judge can be delivered in reality.

We are not seeking to impose obligations to enforce on the licensee of a public house, for example, but they should know so that they are then free to pass the information on to the police or the Probation Service, because they will not want someone there who is the subject of an order. It will be a public house order, for example, because the offender has a particular issue with behaviour in such places—so too with football grounds or other specified events. The host, if that is the right word, should be informed and should know that a particular individual, if recognised, should not be on his premises and can be turned away.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, with her usual acuity, pointed to the civil liberty aspects of this as well. I will not embark on those, but she also identified practical and policy issues underlying these provisions in Clauses 13 to 16. We on these Benches suggest that these amendments insert a simple and reasonable test. They do not impose a condition unless compliance can realistically be monitored in practice by the Probation Service, and the Probation Service will need help from the hosts. It is not radical to say that orders issued by a court should carry weight. A prohibition that in practice cannot and will not be checked is not a deterrent. A restriction that cannot and will not be enforced is not a restriction. Without these safeguards, we will create orders that are performative rather than protective. They will offer only the illusion of safety to communities and to victims.

The Government themselves use this precise standard when justifying reforms elsewhere in the Bill—for example, removing rehabilitative activity days because the system “did not operate effectively in practice”. The provisions in Clauses 13 to 16, if they are to be enforced, must be enforceable in practice and must be effective. If a condition is imposed but nobody has a duty to enforce it, it is not a condition at all. The Probation Service is not going to have time to run around the pubs, football grounds and so on; it is going to have to rely on information from other people.

These amendments would simply ensure that the supervising authority has responsibility for enforcement and is given the means to do so, rather than the vague hope that somebody may intervene if they happen to notice a breach. Without this duty, we repeat here that the failures seen with criminal behaviour orders and football banning orders, where thousands of breaches each year go unpursued and offenders learn that compliance is optional, will be repeated. Public confidence will not be restored by rhetoric; in fact, it will be damaged. It will be damaged by visible consequences, namely failures to enforce.

The Government propose to release more offenders into the community under suspended and community-based regimes. That is a political choice. Having chosen that path, they must choose the responsibility to ensure that it works and that it is safe. We should not be asking the British Government to accept greater risk while refusing the safeguards that would mitigate that risk. Ministers who believe that this strategy will reduce reoffending should have no objection to tests of practicability, enforcement duties and notification requirements. To oppose these amendments, they must be justified as to why they will be unenforceable, unmonitored, unaccountable conditions. That is a hard case to make to the victims, to police officers on the street or to the public whose safety is being traded away.

The amendments we put forward are not obstructive but supportive. They would help, indeed allow, the Government’s policy to function in the real world, not just on the printed page. If we are to put offenders back in the community who might not otherwise have been there—indeed, probably would not have been—the very least we owe the public is confidence that these conditions will be monitored and enforced, so I urge the Government to look again at these amendments and to reflect. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

Clause 13 agreed.

Clause 14: Public event attendance prohibition requirement