Earl Howe:

Moved by Earl Howe

46: Clause 8, page 14, line 17, at end insert—“(iii) seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma;”

My Lords, as well as moving Amendment 46, I will speak also to Amendments 47, 53, 54 and 95 in this group. These amendments have one central aim in common, which is that of maximising the therapeutic benefit of being cared for in a secure mental health unit. That aim should be common to all mental health patients, young or not so young, but it is largely the concerns of younger mental health patients which have prompted these amendments.

Blooming Change is a small independent charity whose membership is comprised of children and young people who have experienced detention in mental health in-patient units in England as children. It is at their urging that I have tabled Amendments 46 and 47. I have done so after hearing some first-hand accounts of incidents in which children in mental health settings have been treated in a fashion that is the very opposite of therapeutic, by which I mean treated with a lack of understanding, with an obvious vindictiveness, sometimes, and sometimes even with outright cruelty.

It is perhaps hard to imagine this happening when we know how professional and caring most staff in mental health units are, but I am absolutely persuaded that it does happen, and not just rarely. Medical interventions such as nasogastric feeding or sedation are threatened and used as punishments. Patients who have raised concerns with their parents have been silenced by their parents being told by staff that they should take no notice of the concerns, because the child was either unwell or lying.

One young person reported as follows: “Young people on section were essentially incarcerated, yet still not able to voice views or share how they felt or generally engage with their treatment. This would lead to overuse of medical interventions or the threat of this, leading to young people living in fear and not having a way to raise concerns. Many of these things had a long-lasting impact on me. Had this coercion not occurred and medicalisation not been used as punishment, I would have been able to access treatment and recover, instead of the treatment compounding my illness and in many ways contributing to me being stuck in the cycle”.

Blooming Change has pointed out the significance of childhood trauma as a factor underlying a large number of mental health admissions involving young people and the challenging behaviour that they then exhibit. The problem is that, all too often, the link between childhood trauma and the way that a patient behaves is not recognised or understood. As a result, someone with autism or a severely troubled and traumatised young people person going into meltdown —as was well described, incidentally, by my noble friend Lady Browning during our first day in Committee —is simply viewed as wilfully disruptive or downright disobedient, with punishments doled out in response.

What can be done about this? The Minister will not thank me if all I do is come up with problems without suggesting answers. The best answers must surely lie in promoting greater transparency and greater patient empowerment. Alongside that, we must find ways of fostering that vital degree of understanding on the part of mental health staff as to the root causes of certain challenging behaviours, to enable them to respond in the right way.

As far as greater transparency goes, part of the remedy may lie in the lap of the CQC. In part to assist the CQC, I suggest in Amendment 95 that, after discharge from hospital, there is a place for a debriefing process, whereby children in particular are given an opportunity to feed back their experiences during their time as in-patients—first, as a way of holding institutions accountable and, secondly, to enable those individuals to heal from those experiences by being listened to and taken seriously.

This debriefing process need not be resource intensive. There is a clear case for using technology as much as possible to facilitate the feedback. However, the hospital management then needs to assimilate the feedback in whatever way it sees as appropriate, and on the back of that to instigate necessary change. What often gets lost in hospitals is institutional memory. This would be one way of building an institutional memory and protecting it.

There is a need for such a process. Again, Blooming Change quotes one of its members as saying:

“I’ve never felt more unsafe than when I’ve been on wards. I think they’re the most scary place that a child or young person could ever be. It’s a catchphrase, ‘hospital makes you worse’ … Everyone makes jokes about going into hospital with one problem and then leaving with trauma, new behaviours, new diagnoses, assaults, PTSD – it’s awful”.

It is depressing to put this on the record, but there is research that shows that the experiences of in-patient care from children and young people are consistently poor. A survey conducted by Mind in 2023 found that 69% of young people surveyed said that their experiences in hospital had not been positive. The Children’s Commissioner has uncovered similar stories.

One part of the story, as I have indicated, is children receiving poor therapy; the other part is children receiving no therapy—or no therapy that is appropriate. Blooming Change has told me that it has members who have been child patients in mental health in-patient units who had no access to therapy of any kind. One said: “In the wards I’ve been on, they just drugged us and restrained us … we left with even more trauma and no help in place, so then we would end up back in hospital and the cycle would repeat. So much pain could have been prevented had the wards had better things in place”. Another put it even more succinctly: “Without therapy, mental health unit become prisons”.

Hence my Amendment 53, which proposes that, where suitable therapy is available to a particular patient, there should be a duty on the part of the hospital to offer the treatment to that patient, without any compulsion for the patient to accept and receive it. Therapy should not be used coercively. The best safeguard against this happening is the presence of psychologists in the in-patient unit as the professionals best placed to ensure that the environment of the unit is genuinely therapeutic.

In that same spirit, I am proposing in my Amendment 54 that, for a patient with autism or a learning disorder, there should be a higher hurdle than usual to allow any departure from the patient’s wishes as to a preferred treatment, as expressed either in an advance choice document or by the patient’s nominated person. The hurdle should be a requirement that two appropriately qualified clinicians would need to agree that such a departure was right for the patient.

There could, of course, be circumstances in which two clinicians might conclude in good faith that a patient’s express wishes should be overwritten—for example, where there was a doubt over the bona fides of the patient’s nominated person. But the point of the amendment is to add an extra layer to patient autonomy when the morale and mental equilibrium of the patient is so very shaky. I hope the Minister can provide some words of reassurance on these very troubling and sensitive matters. I beg to move.

My Lords, my Amendments 50 and 51 are both about the importance of non-drug-based interventions. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, this group is all about maximising therapeutic benefit. I am very supportive of all the amendments in this group and my amendments are complementary to those just introduced very powerfully by the noble Earl.

I am the first to admit that I am not a clinician, and it is, of course, vital that individual decisions about treatment are made by qualified clinicians. But I am firmly of the view that, in the right circumstances and where clinically appropriate, non-drug-based interventions can be highly beneficial.

New Section 56A establishes a clinical checklist. An approved clinician will be required to go through this checklist when making treatment decisions to ensure that any given treatment is appropriate. Amendment 50 would make it clear that non-drug-based interventions are included in the alternative forms of medical treatment available, which must be identified and evaluated as part of the checklist. In short, it will establish beyond doubt that clinicians must consider and evaluate the use of non-drug-based interventions when they make decisions about treatment.

Non-drug-based interventions can cover many things, such as psychological and talking therapies, counselling, occupational therapies, art and creative therapies, physical exercise, physical activities—the list goes on. It is vital that evidence-based non-drug-based interventions are thought about, identified and considered equally when treatment decisions are made.

As I said in our discussions on Monday—this point was also just made in the introduction to this group—autistic people and people with a learning disability are too often overmedicated in hospital settings. Again, although medication may be appropriate in many places, people cannot and should not be left on their wards with little to no other meaningful therapeutic input other than that medication.

People must be seen as human beings in the round when these treatment decisions are made. That should be reflected in the type of treatment offered, including non-drug-based interventions, such as talking therapies, which are adapted to the individual and have a real prospect of offering therapeutic benefit, either in place of or in addition to medication. I readily acknowledge that treatment can involve either. That judgment is for a clinician to make.

I was very encouraged that the Joint Committee on the Bill recognised in its report the importance of non-drug-based treatment and recommended that the code of practice makes clear that appropriate treatment includes non-drug-based treatment. However, to ensure the Bill aligns with the principle of therapeutic benefit, it is important that this emphasis on non-drug-based interventions is reflected in the Bill.

It is well known that the transition from children’s services to adult services can be particularly difficult when it comes to overmedication and failing to adequately deliver non-drug-based interventions. This has included cases where young autistic people on children’s wards have been provided with some level of speech and language therapy, arts and crafts, and general help with establishing a routine. However, when the transition is made to post-18 adult services, the quality of care can drop off markedly, with no non-drug-based therapeutic treatment delivered, leading to a decline in well-being. In many ways, as has already been said, this is little different from being held in a cell.

Having a wide range of these interventions means that in-patients can have greater choice and control over their care—another key principle of the Bill. The use of non-drug-based therapies in hospital is important, not only to provide a therapeutically beneficial environment during detention but to ensure some essential continuity of support after discharge.

My Amendment 51 differs from Amendment 50 in that it would apply only to autistic people and those with a learning disability detained under Part III. It would ensure that the clinical checklist is followed when treatment decisions are made when making those decisions includes specific consideration of whether non-drug-based interventions are more appropriate in place of, or in addition to, medication.

As we have already discussed, one of the most significant changes in this Bill is the change to the detention criteria in Part II, Section 3. This means that autistic people or people with a learning disability cannot be detained under Section 3 unless they had a co-existing psychiatric disorder. However, this is not being applied to Part III patients—that is, those detained through the criminal justice system. This means that autistic people and people with a learning disability can continue to be detained for “treatment” in mental health hospitals under Part III, even if they do not have co-existing psychiatric disorders. One of the concerns about the Bill, as we have heard, is that a consequence of poor implementation could mean that more autistic people and people with a learning disability are diverted into the criminal justice pathway to get round, frankly, the new detention criteria for Section 3.

It could well be the case that Part II patients who are autistic or have a learning disability will exhibit behaviours that challenge, for which certain psychotropic medications can be prescribed. These medications can include anti-depressants, anti-seizure or anti-psychotic medications, sedatives or stimulants. NHS England’s website states:

“People with a learning disability are thought to be 16 times more likely and autistic people 7 times more likely to be prescribed an antipsychotic than the general population”, despite existing guidance that people should be given psychotropic medication for only the right reasons, in the lowest dose and for the shortest time.

I simply conclude by saying that the focus on non-drug-based interventions in these amendments is not about saying that medication should not be used. Indeed, it can be highly beneficial in many cases. It is about ensuring that other factors that contribute to therapeutic benefit are always considered and put on an equal footing.

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 148, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hollins. I also support all the amendments in this group. Indeed, on the ones introduced by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I very much support the stories that we have heard and which he spoke about at Second Reading. I also note the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, about non-drug therapies, which relate very much to what I will talk about.

I will make one general point: a generational change in the whole field of mental health is happening globally, with a shift towards more social interventions and preventions. This wider context needs to be recognised a bit more in the Bill. Amendment 148, which is about withdrawal from dependency-building drugs, is part of that context. I also agree very much with the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, just made that drugs are needed, and with the powerful points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in the last day in Committee on the real pressures and problems that people within the NHS and beyond face in working with some of the people they end up having to work with, and on the conditions that they are working in. This emphasis on social interventions, therefore, is not at the expense of other aspects of mental health.

Some of these interventions do harm. I will come on to the point about withdrawing from drugs. On reducing prescribing and supporting withdrawal, I do not understand why this Government, through the Bill or otherwise, are not making changes that could help to reduce costs and improve services, which would take pressure off all services and, indeed, improve people’s economic position by enabling them to be fit to work.

The highest-profile issue here is antidepressants because, very sadly, of recent tragedies that have been very much in the news. I shall talk about antidepressants, where it seems the best evidence is available. Over the past 12 years, antidepressant prescriptions alone have almost doubled in England, from 47 million to 89 million last year. Nearly one in five people over 18—adults—in England is now prescribed them annually and, sadly, nearly 450,000 children and young people, almost 4,000 of them under 10, were prescribed antidepressants in 2022-23.

I am going to talk not about unnecessary prescribing and the tragic deaths associated with some of these prescriptions but withdrawal. The figures that we have managed to obtain show that up to one-quarter of adults on these drugs report their withdrawal, their coming off the drug, as being severe, and a significant proportion—while there are no particularly accurate figures here, the best estimates are about 10% of them—will experience withdrawal that is both severe and protracted. If one takes that as a minimum, we are talking about something like half a million people. What we mean by protracted withdrawal is withdrawal that lasts many weeks or months or longer as they try to come off these drugs. They are often in mental and physical pain and unable to work. Of course, this is a largely hidden crisis affecting patients one by one in the privacy of the home and often known only to relatives, close friends and service providers.

Focusing not just on antidepressants, reviews by the previous Chief Pharmaceutical Officer and others show that possible reductions in the use of dependency-forming drugs, not just antidepressants, could save £500 million in drugs alone, without taking any account of other savings to the NHS and the contribution that people could make to the economy.

This is a very practical amendment. Its purpose is what I have described so far. There is evidence now of what works in helping people to withdraw from these services. The amendment calls for four things. First, integrated care boards should provide local withdrawal services based on this evidence. Secondly, they should ensure that relevant professionals know about and are trained in these services. A number of GPs have talked to me about how individuals have had to try to manage without support, and the GPs feel without support as well. Thirdly, there needs to be reporting to Parliament on progress with this. Fourthly, at the national level, there needs to be a 24-hour helpline to provide support to patients.

I suspect that the Minister and the Government understand and support the intention behind this amendment but, in the language of your Lordships’ House, will be minded to resist it. I do not think this issue is going to go away. The prescription of antidepressants, as I have already said, has become far more high-profile in recent weeks, and the Government may yet find themselves forced to act. This amendment provides the opportunity to do precisely that. This is a story of both human tragedy and an unnecessary financial drain on the country.

A final point I shall make is that it is strange that there is no requirement on the NHS to deal with problems that have been caused by drugs that have been, with the best intentions and often successfully, administered to patients, but have led to harm thereafter. With cytotoxic drugs in cancers, I believe the NHS does a lot to support people with their impact. Why is it that in this particular case, in mental health, when we know that these drugs cause a significant problem for a significant number of people, we do not recognise that there is a responsibility for the NHS to help people to come off them in the appropriate way?

If the Minister is minded to resist the amendment, can she tell the House how the Government propose to deal with these massive problems of withdrawal? I am very happy to receive a letter or to have a meeting to discuss this. I commend the amendment to the House.

I support Amendment 148 from the noble Lord, Lord Crisp. I have just arrived back from a three-day event with Professor Brian Cox in Northern Ireland, where we had been bringing together the NHS, schools, the business community and the public sector around a whole programme on innovation and how we think about the future with regard to these matters, taking the principles that we originally developed at the Bromley by Bow Centre in the East End of London, now nationally across the country.

If I look like I am in recovery, it is because I am—I have literally just landed trying to get back here. I apologise that I could not take part in the Second Reading, because being a working Peer, sometimes it is not very easy to fit all this into the diary. One does one’s best.

I am very aware of the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, is raising. Indeed, I tabled a number of Written Questions this week about this very matter. I support the amendments because we have a very serious problem out there. My GP colleagues are telling me, as the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, has said, that one in five adults in England is on antidepressants; it is one in four in Scotland. This is a really serious problem.

As a country, we need to return to a discussion and a conversation, as the Health Secretary—I hope, in the spring—prepares to help us rethink the future of the NHS. We need to return to the question that we asked 40 years ago in the East End of London, the fundamental question: “What is health?” What we see happening here is serious for hundreds of thousands of people and is driving a culture. We also need to start to worry about what is happening within the machinery of the NHS and the state, as it drives these sorts of cultures.

Finally, as I put down in one of my Written Questions, we need to be asking, practically, “How much is it costing the taxpayer to drive these kinds of cultures?” It is serious, but the problem is also an opportunity, if interest is raised in the work of those of us who have been doing stuff on the front line for many years with our GP colleagues. I see the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, there: we have rebuilt a street together, with a £40 million school, a £60 million health centre, 600 homes and now a primary school, exploring this, in what when we began was a dysfunctional housing estate.

There is a real opportunity out there, but we now need to get real about antidepressants.

My Lords, I have some points I would like to probe in this group.

I especially welcome Amendment 95 and the proposed new clause:

“Ascertaining and learning from patients’ experiences of hospital treatment”.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, made very powerful and moving points; we could really take those on board. I have some reservations, however: we live in a complaints culture. I am concerned that this important notion of learning from patients’ experiences does not become a way of stigmatising hospital staff and psychiatrists, with people queueing up to point the finger. There are many people I know who have experiences of hospital who will, at a particular time, tell you it was a terrible experience, and then, at another time, acknowledge that it saved their life. It depends on what phase they are in, in relation to their illness, in some ways—it is about their perspective. So I both welcome it and challenge it.

I am very keen, as we all are, that treatments are taken seriously, whether administered in hospital or in the community. As the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, note in Amendment 148—for me, the most important amendment in this group—we need to be alert to when, for example, the use of psychiatric medication as a treatment creates a problem of dependency. We all know that this is a growing problem. We must consider that.

On the tenor of Amendments 50 and 51 from the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, on non-drug-based forms of medical treatment, I am less convinced by the emphasis here. I am worried about simply giving a wholly positive view of psychological and therapeutic treatments, because it perhaps misses some of the changes in today’s culture that lead to the overprescription of, for example, antidepressants.

When I was working in community mental health many moons ago, the fashion among progressives in the therapeutic community was often anti-psychiatry, anti-hospital and most definitely anti-pharmacological interventions, with a huge hostility to the pharmaceutical industry. I did not always go along with it, but that was the kind of mood. Peculiarly, I would argue that, today, it is therapeutic experts, counsellors and psychological practitioners who, by becoming diagnostically trigger-happy in labelling people as ill, are creating a huge demand both for third-party interventions, as I have discussed in previous speeches, and for treatment. That often leads to a clamouring, especially among younger people, for pills to help them to cope with the travails of life, and it has been egged on in some ways by therapeutic practitioners.

I had my attention drawn to this when, at the Academy of Ideas, I organised a debate on young people, mental health and those kinds of issues. The audience was largely young people, who said that the problem was that psychiatrists, GPs and doctors would not listen to them and would not believe that they were mentally ill. They demanded treatment and were quite aggressive. It was young people saying, “Where are my tablets?”, and I thought, “Oh, life’s changed slightly”. The psychiatrists in the room were trying to hold the line and gently suggest that maybe they were not ill, but that led to an even more hysterical reaction: “How dare you say I’m not ill?” They went on to explain how they had had a chat with their school counsellor, and they were sure they were ill, and they wanted the tablets.

If we can take a popular example that I appreciate might get me into the heart of an argument that I do not want to be in regarding the slippage between autism and mental illness, I am going to talk about ADHD. ADHD is the fashionable disorder of the day. Huge numbers of students and school pupils are demanding that their neurodevelopmental disorder is recognised and catered for. In my view, it is often diagnosed promiscuously and that is leading to huge demands that are detrimental to education and likely to make councils go bankrupt and schools collapse—but that is for a different debate and a different Bill. ADHD is also leading to a demand for tablets.

I go along with those who were warning about overdiagnosis. The Times reports that 278,000 people in England are on central nervous system stimulus to treat ADHD, and there was an 18% hike in prescriptions for ADHD drugs between April 2023 and March 2024. In the US, the figures are startling, and we should be wary of them, with 7 million American children who are said to have ADHD. As the New York Times has said, there is a danger that we are using stimulants to suppress

“all spontaneous behaviour in normal children” by pumping them with Ritalin and other calming drugs and sedating normal children. In a broad sense, that is a worry.

Talking of treatments, I think the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, made the point that a social problem is being created of people feeling that if they are ill, they cannot go to work and of over-giving them drugs. All sorts of problems go along with that. Is it not tragic that so many people want to have these drugs, either for themselves or for their children, in order to feel that they can cope, when they are really not that ill or not ill at all, but they have the label? I am wary of inappropriate treatments, but perhaps the problem needs to be looked at differently, as stemming from inflated and expansive diagnostic criteria often deployed from within the therapeutic community rather than psychiatry.

We should not be naive in thinking that non-drug-based therapeutic interventions are virtuous per se. Counselling, for example, has extended its reach into British society so much that it is now a rare family that has no experience of the phenomenon. I am sure that we all know that going to a therapist or counsellor is, to say the least, a mixed bag when, ironically, they end up saying that you need to have third-party intervention or medical intervention. It is bad for the nation’s health.

My Lords, I will be brief, but in following the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, I have to note that I do not believe that a complaints culture is a problem in the contexts covered by this Bill. There is, perhaps, a lack of listening to patients and those affected, and a lack of action rather than a problem with listening to complaints. In that context, I commend the noble Earl, Lord Howe, who cited extensive testimony from Blooming Change. One thing that struck me when looking back over the previous days of Committee was that it would have been good to hear, perhaps even more than we did, direct testimony and the voices of those who are experts by experience. The phrase “nothing about us without us” really stuck in my mind and it is important that we keep that in mind throughout Committee. Again in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, I think it is important not to seek to downplay the mental health crisis that we are seeing across our society. There is a huge shortage of services meeting people’s very clear and acute needs, and acute needs are what we are largely covering in this Bill.

I attached my name to Amendments 50 and 51 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, which address non-drug-based interventions. In essence, I agree with everything the noble Baroness said; I just want to stress her points. When we talk about non-drug-based therapies, we are tempted to think we mean talking therapies and psychological therapies. Those are tremendously important, but this is where we also need to take the broader public health context. I mentioned on an earlier group digital treatments such as Avatar for those who hear voices. They are the kind of new, different ways of looking at things that people may not have been trained in, and it is important that they are considered. I also talked a fair bit about the gut-brain axis and dietary interventions such as green prescribing, in which we have seen great advances across the medical fields in recent years—exposure to green spaces and the chance to get exercise in green spaces. That makes me think that we need to think about facilities and how we make sure there is provision within them, which, in some ways, this amendment would help to cover.

As a noble Lord said earlier, we are talking about making sure we are treating the whole person and not a condition with a drug. I thought the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, was very important, as is his amendment. I am not sure whether it needs to be in the Bill, but it would be interesting to have the Minister’s comments on making sure that consideration of withdrawal symptoms is part of prescribing practice. That is absolutely key and central. I note a report from the universities of Berlin and Cologne out last year which showed that the second-most prescribed antidepressant in the UK, venlafaxine, also has the second-highest rate of problem withdrawal symptoms. We need to make sure that is carefully considered pre-stage—before we get to the withdrawal stage, are we going to create that problem? I do not know whether it could be incorporated in the amendment, but it is something to think about anyway.

The other amendment—slightly oddly—in this group in my name is Amendment 154, which again, as on a previous group, I put down at the request of the Law Society. It is about mental health tribunal pilots for challenges against treatment decisions. To some degree, we have already discussed this in the earlier group, but I would be interested in whether the Minister has any comment on the amendment. I think that it is fairly self-explanatory, so I will not go through it further.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 54A and 54B in my name, which are on a very narrow part of the treatment plan for individuals. Before I do that, let me say that I support the amendments in this group, particularly the general thrust of what been said; that is, that the automatic medical model must no longer be the default position and a much more social model must be added on to the medical model so that they complement each other.

Having said that, I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but found it very difficult to understand what was required. She argued against the use of medication but then argued against quite a lot of the non-medicated issues. Her intervention was a bit confusing in terms of understanding what the importance was.

My amendments are predominantly about Clause 18, which is about the use of ECT. The clause allows for the emergency use of ECT based on a second medical opinion. The element I wish to speak to is the very wide Henry VIII power that the Government wish to give themselves in regulations to do away with the second medical opinion in an emergency. The Bill says:

“The appropriate national authority may by regulations amend this Act to provide for circumstances in which functions of a second opinion appointed doctor in relation to treatment falling within section 62ZA(1) may or must be carried out instead by the approved clinician in charge of the treatment in question”.

New Section 62ZB(3) then says:

“Regulations under this section may make … (a) provision subject to specified exceptions; (b) different provision for different cases; (c) transitional, consequential, incidental or supplemental provision”.

That is quite a wide Henry VIII power.

To prove that I really am Billy No-Mates and do not get out often on a cold night, I read the wonderful 10th report of this Session from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which makes exactly the same points but in more eloquent language. This is a very wide Henry VIII power, and the committee does not really understand why the Government are seeking—even though it is through the affirmative procedure—such wide powers in such broad language.

The committee said that it would expect the power to be drafted with significant limitations and a framework for when it could be used. My amendment seeks to do exactly that. It would not prevent the clinician in change from using ECT in an emergency case without referring to a second practitioner in certain circumstances, but the regulations would be within a framework laid out in Amendment 54B, that

“the treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life … obtaining a second opinion would cause a delay that places the patient at a significant and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm, and … the treatment is reversible”.

The regulations would have to be written so that

“Any amendment made under subsection (1) must specify the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the second opinion may be dispensed with”.

A report to Parliament on subsection (1) dispensations would also have to be made.

I believe, from reading the wise words of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report, that it is important that the regulations have a framework, so that the Minister still has flexibility but is constrained by what is in the Bill. That is why I have spoken to this amendment.

My Lords, I feel I must poke my nose in on these of amendments, even though I do not have an amendment. I support the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and his various amendments. I particularly like the amendment that would require children and their families to be asked the month after how it all went.

We are hearing described the appalling nature of many mental health services. It is not just children’s services. Although they may be a very good example, as many of them are not fit for purpose, we would get the same complaints and the same appalling state of affairs if we went around other mental health services across the country. It is heartbreaking. I truly believe that services have deteriorated since I practised in hospitals. People, including my former colleagues who are still practising, say that services are completely disorganised and not fit for purpose. We have known for 50 years that the social model of care was an appropriate model, and that you need psychological and social psychotherapeutic interventions, as well as any drugs that might be helpful. They are not going on because there is no availability anywhere.

We have known since at least the 1960s that patients with schizophrenia, for example, can benefit by being taught, one-to-one, about how to interact with people when they are recovering from an episode. That never happens, because we do not employ teachers in the NHS—we just do not do it. We do not employ the right sort of people and we do not have the right sort of facilities. When people are employed, there are so few of them that it is simply impossible to do what is necessary. I am not defending this, because there are some very good units—I am sure that there are some very good children’s and young people’s units—but they are not the norm anymore, and that is a very sad state of affairs.

Sadly, legislation through mental health Bills will not, unfortunately, solve the problem. What we are talking about is not only a fundamental change of culture and getting on with all the things that we know should be done; there needs to be investment and a totally different approach to mental health. All the things that we know should be done cannot be delivered by mental health legislation alone. I say that because we are trying to shove too much into the Bill and hoping for the best, but I do not think that it will work.

Later in the debate on these amendments, noble Lords moved away from talking about people who were very unwell and who need in-patient care to talking about this vast mass of people who are diagnosed with conditions where they cannot work. That is a whole new ball game. I agree with almost every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, because there is no doubt that there is a massive overdiagnosis of things that are called “mental disorder”, when they are in fact distress and need a different sort of approach.

A young friend of mine—a gentleman who is now in his final years training as a maxillofacial surgeon—had a period of great distress because of family circumstances. He sat down on his own one evening and went to a website, “Diagnose yourself”. He rang me and said, “I’ve been diagnosed as having ADHD”. I cannot imagine anybody who is less likely to have ADHD than this young man, who is the most socially competent young man I know. This morning, my husband and I had a go on the website together—he did one test and I did another—and we both came up with the same result: “You probably have ADHD”. Well, maybe I am, folks, but I am not going to go on the Ritalin yet. There are a lot of websites that are utter rubbish and encourage people to pay money to see psychotherapists and other counsellors to see what the matter is with them, so that other people can put money in their pockets for doing not much.

That is the different end of the spectrum. When we are thinking about these things, we have to think about what the patient has. Is it something that can be diagnosed—heaven knows that colleagues here were very keen that we should have a diagnosis—or something at the other end of the spectrum? With the Mental Health Bill, we are talking about when you can detain people, take away their rights and say, “We are detaining you”, to treat them, and protect them from wrong treatment, bad doctoring and bad staff. That is what the Mental Health Act is for.

But I am afraid that it is not to do with any of this other stuff. We have to think through what really has to be in the Bill to protect the patients and the staff and what cannot go in there because it is not relevant to these issues.

I want to ask the noble Baroness a question. I agree that this Mental Health Bill should be confined to and is about the people who are very poorly and could be in danger of being detained—I understand that. However, all the time when we have these discussions, we are talking about a problem with a lack of resources. In the noble Baroness’s experience, is the broader mental health crisis taking away resources and focus, not in this Bill but in society, from giving that acute mental health care the resources that it needs—because it is being spread far too thinly across ever greater numbers?

Yes, I would say that indeed it was. That year when they gave an extra £400,000 to spreading psychotherapy around was the same time when we were having incredible crises in acute hospital services, and I thought that it was not justified. But the mental health crisis that we have in this country is the same one that they were complaining about in 1860, 1870 and 1880; every generation believes that it is worse off than the generation before, but there is not much evidence that it is.

My Lords, having just heard the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I shall be extremely cautious about what I look at on the internet. I want to say just two or three words. I have experience from my own family and from my friends of two sets of drugs—anti-depressants and Ritalin—and they really should be used a great deal more cautiously.

My Lords, now is not the time to have the extensive debate that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, has opened up. I said right at the outset that we are talking about legislation that comes into play when a person is going to be detained because they are very ill and at risk of harming themselves or somebody else. But I would say to the noble Baroness that the Wessely review looked at this issue at considerable length, and I was among the Peers who listened to Sir Simon Wessely when he came to present his findings. One thing that has stuck with me is the person who gave evidence to his review who said: “I was very ill. I had to have treatment. Why did it have to feel so awful?”—I am using parliamentary language there. Does the noble Baroness accept that mental health legislation debates such as this might be limited, but they do an important thing in sometimes challenging the prevailing orthodoxy among the professions, and they are an occasion where the experience of patients, which have built up over many years, gets a chance to change practice? That is why we should look at all the amendments in this group, and in particular those of the noble Earl, Lord Howe.

I agree with everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has said. She is absolutely right that professions should be challenged, and that is partly what legislation can do, particularly in debates such as this. But we are losing the very important amendments from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about young people and what we can do to improve circumstances through the Bill, and I want not to lose them, because they are very important.

Very briefly on the question that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised, the notion of supply-induced demand is a well-known phenomenon across health services. However, I have to say to her that I think that we are a long way off that being the problem that is principally confronting children and young people’s mental health services. We have a massive gap between the need for effective therapies for children and young people and their availability.

When the process of trying to expand children and young people’s mental health services kicked off several years ago, the goal was that we would get to a situation where one in three children and young people with a diagnosable mental health condition would get some form of specialist mental health support. That number has now been exceeded. I was just looking at the stats published last week and, although I do not see the most up-to-date number for it, I would be surprised if more than one in two are currently getting specialist mental health support for a diagnosable mental health disorder, not just distress. So, we are a long way off confronting this problem of supply-induced demand, whatever broader cultural or therapeutic labelling questions that she rightly points to may be in the ether. Fundamentally, we are going to need more services to benefit the children and young people who need them, not pretend that this is somehow all vapourware, imaginary or a cultural deformity, unlike our predecessors in the Victorian era.

I thank noble Lords for their contributions on this important set of amendments. I say at the outset that I note the various observations that are outside the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, pointed out, but I have noted them and I am sure we will discuss them on a number of occasions.

First, I turn to Amendments 46 and 47, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe. I have heard how many noble Lords are in support not just of those two amendments but all the amendments in the group. I am sure noble Lords will not be surprised to know that I understand where people are coming from and I will be pleased to go through the response to them.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, spoke about “troubling and sensitive matters” and about being inspired by testimonies that came through the charity Blooming Change—I express my thanks to that organisation for the work it does. Officials in the department have met the group and it made a very helpful contribution. Hearing from those with lived experience is crucial to making sure that this is the best Bill, and I know that many noble Lords have done that, so I thank the noble Earl for bringing that into these amendments.

Amendments 46 and 47 would change the definition of appropriate medical treatment to include treatment which

“seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma”.

Childhood trauma can of course have a devastating impact on psychological well-being. Effective and compassionate in-patient care must be informed, as I have said, in co-production with people with lived experience and be trauma informed. NHS England’s Culture of Care Standards for Mental Health Inpatient Services certainly underlines this.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, and other noble Lords raised concerns around in-patient settings and how appropriate they are, which I understand. I hope it will be helpful to say in answer that the new definition of “appropriate medical treatment” introduces the requirement that treatment has to have a reasonable prospect of benefiting the patient. We would expect the setting in which someone is going to be detained to be considered as part of this. Of course, I am more than aware—without wanting to go into the generics in this group or any other group—that the place in which we start, in terms of the suitability and availability of the right settings, is not where I am sure any of us would want to be.

We also know that the sensory environments in settings can cause difficulties for people with sensory sensitivities. To support NHS services to address sensory aspects of the environment, which the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to, NHS England has published a sensory-friendly resource pack, which outlines 10 principles to improve the sensory environment and signposts other resources.

The clause in the Bill that defines “appropriate medical treatment” already requires decision-makers to take into account the nature and degree of the disorder and all other circumstances, which could include childhood trauma, when considering whether medical treatment has a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit. The definition of medical treatment is unchanged and is indeed broad, including nursing care, psychological therapy and medication. All these interventions could include an overall aim to minimise distress and promote psychological well-being.

Amendments 50 and 51, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Bennett, aim to ensure that the clinician considers non-drug-based interventions as part of the new “clinical checklist”. The checklist requires clinicians to identify and evaluate alternative forms of medical treatment when deciding whether to give a particular medical treatment to a patient. As I have already mentioned, the definition of medical treatment under the Act is broad. As well as non-drug-based interventions, it includes specialist mental health rehabilitation and care. On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, which is an important one, it does include the therapeutic environment or setting. This requirement, as outlined, would apply to all patients falling under Part IV of the Act. It includes patients with a learning disability and autistic patients who are detained for assessment under Section 2 and patients detained for treatment under Part III.

With specific regard to those with a learning disability and autistic people, I recognise the concern that they are more likely to be prescribed an antipsychotic than the general population. I emphasise that psychotropic medication should only be given for the right reasons, in the lowest dose, for the shortest time. NHS England has a national programme of work to stop overmedication and the inappropriate prescribing of these medications, which is aimed in particular at people with a learning disability and autistic people. Noble Lords will be aware of the STOMP programme. Alongside it is a national supporting treatment and appropriate medication in paediatrics programme called STAMP—the two are not to be confused. These programmes work particularly closely with those with lived experience, families and carers organisations, and a wide range of health and social care professional bodies.

Amendment 53, in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, would require the approved clinician to offer a patient any treatment that is appropriate, having applied the new clinical checklist. The reference to medical treatment in that checklist should already be read in accordance with Clause 8, which inserts a new definition of appropriate medical treatment to enact the principle of therapeutic benefit.

The clinician must also support the patient to participate in decision-making to make sure that they do not simply offer their preferred treatment to the patient, with no discussion or consideration of alternatives. The Bill also requires clinicians and, where relevant, the second opinion appointed doctor to provide a written record that the treatment being administered meets the definition of appropriate medical treatment. Therefore, it is felt that the Bill already meets the intention of this amendment. Furthermore, if the intention is to ensure that a range of treatments is being considered by the responsible clinician, I can reassure noble Lords that this is already the case, because, as I have said, the definition of medical treatment is broad.

Amendment 54, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, seeks to ensure that, where a patient has autism or a learning disability, the approved clinician, having applied the clinical checklist, must secure the agreement of two professional clinicians before any treatment could be given which departs from the patient’s preference, as expressed by either the patient’s nominated person or the patient’s advance choice document. While we recognise that this amendment may help ensure that preferences are more central to clinical decision-making, we do not feel that this additional safeguard is necessary on top of the protections already introduced by the Bill. For example, the clinical checklist and the new rules that limit the use of compulsory treatment and require the earlier involvement of a second opinion appointed doctor achieve a similar objective. Furthermore, sometimes a patient’s preferences, or those of their nominated person, may not be clinically appropriate or practically achievable. In that situation, the amendment would create a new burden on staff, with little benefit in return. Therefore, we feel it would be better to rely on the discretion of the treating clinician in this circumstance.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, made an important point about the need for transparency and empowerment. We certainly agree with that aim and there are a number of measures in the Bill to make improvements: for example, the clinical checklist, the compelling reason criteria and the increased oversight by the second opinion appointed doctor. I hope that this will deal with the point about transparency and empowerment.

Amendments 54A and 54B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, relate to the Secretary of State’s power under Clause 18 to set out in regulations the circumstances under which the requirement for a second opinion appointed doctor’s certification of urgent and compulsory electroconvulsive therapy may be dispensed with and seek to limit those circumstances. We have received a recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee to limit the extent of the delegated power. I can assure the noble Lord that we are considering this recommendation carefully and will reflect closely on the views that he has brought before the Committee today. I aim to clarify the Government’s position on Report.

Amendment 95, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, would require an independent mental health advocate to consult with people on their experience of in-patient hospital treatment after discharge and report this to the hospital managers, who must then publish a report each year on lessons learned and actions taken.

We feel that there are already mechanisms in legislation that serve a similar purpose, which I well understand. For example, under the CQC’s statutory duty to monitor the Mental Health Act, the CQC visits and interviews detained patients. Insights from these interviews inform the findings of the CQC’s annual monitoring of the Mental Health Act. The findings from this monitoring may also result in the CQC requiring action statements from providers on what they will do to improve services. Where providers do not take the necessary action, they may ultimately be subject to sanctions under the regulatory powers of the CQC.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, raised concerns about the debriefing process after discharge from hospital. The code of practice provides guidance on the provision of information about the complaints process. The Bill will put this requirement on a statutory footing and place a duty on hospital managers to supply complaints information to detained patients, community patients and conditionally discharged patients, as well as their nominated person.

We have been clear that improvements are needed to make healthcare regulation and oversight more effective, and the CQC is already making improvements following independent reviews. Beyond legislation, it is the responsibility of trust boards to ensure that feedback is gathered to improve services. The patient and carer race equality framework, now part of the standard NHS contract, requires that visible and effective ways for patients and carers to feed back are established, as well as clear processes to act and report on that feedback.

Lastly on this amendment, while we are committed to expanding access to independent mental health advocacy, we are also mindful of not overburdening the workforce. This amendment is likely to be resource intensive, as well as resulting in a significant deviation from the IMHA’s current role: to support people to understand and access their rights when detained.

The Minister has reeled off a very good list of what is already in place. Have the Government done an assessment to see exactly how that learning is ingrained and how effective it has been in changing mental health provision and mental health services? If not, could she please go back to her department to try to find that, and write to Members of the Committee so we can see that in writing?

I would be very pleased to look into it further, but, as I have described, this is a rolling programme. I emphasise that the CQC has that duty both to monitor but also to make the relevant bodies subject to sanctions if needed—in other words, more immediately. So I am concerned that through this amendment we could be creating a structure which is actually less flexible and responsive than the one we have now.

Amendment 148, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, would impose on integrated care boards—ICBs—a legally binding duty to provide local, in-person, specialist withdrawal treatments for patients on psychiatric medication prescribed during the course of their treatment by services under the Mental Health Act. In addition, there would be a duty on each ICB to send to the Secretary of State an annual report on the availability, uptake and outcomes of this support. Under this amendment, the Secretary of State would be obliged to lay these reports before Parliament. ICBs would also be subject to a requirement to provide a 24-hour helpline and online platform to support patients to receive withdrawal treatment.

Let me say at the outset that I recognise the difficulties that withdrawal can pose. I recall that the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, spoke on this very point in the Chamber last month and was also good enough to speak directly to me. It is, I agree, an issue that will not go away and, per the noble Lord’s request, I would be happy to arrange a meeting. I feel there is a whole area here to which we today, considering amendments, cannot do justice, so I would be pleased to do that. To the noble Lord, Lord Mawson, who has tabled Written Questions, I say that I look forward to answering them, and I hope that he will look forward to reading my Answers.

Where relevant, we would expect the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan to include a tapering plan and put in place whatever additional support is needed to enable a patient’s recovery and effective discharge. On the requirement to provide support in the community and report on availability, this is the responsibility of local health commissioners. In 2023, NHSE published a framework for ICBs and primary care boards on how to optimise personalised care for patients prescribed medicines associated with dependence or withdrawal symptoms. With regard to the requirement in the amendment for a 24-hour helpline, this would not seem proportionate, given the relatively low numbers of people who might need this service, who should already have a support plan in place, including access to relevant local support services.

Finally, Amendment 154, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations giving people detained in hospital and those subject to community treatment or guardianship orders the ability to have certain care and treatment matters considered by a mental health tribunal.

This is a very complex area, as I am sure the noble Baroness is aware. The amendment seems to draw on the recommendation made by the independent review to give patients a new right of appeal to a single judge of the mental health tribunal regarding compulsory treatment. I recall that the previous Government publicly consulted on this new right, and the majority of respondents raised major concerns in this regard. The consultation was followed by further long and careful consideration with stakeholders, which led the then Government to the conclusion that this safeguard is just not viable. A solution could not be found that provided an efficient and effective route of appeal for patients while avoiding the risks of the tribunal intervening in clinical decision-making, alongside significant resource burdens. Many of these concerns were reflected in the report of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, which also acknowledged the complexity of the issue.

We believe that the other provisions in the Bill will better achieve the same objectives of providing patient choice and autonomy, so while we do not support introducing a new role for the tribunal, I assure your Lordships that the emphasis on therapeutic benefit within the detention criteria will mean that whether care and treatment are proving effective will play a role in the tribunal’s consideration of whether or not detention should continue to be upheld. With these explanations, I hope that the noble Earl feels able to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate in such compelling ways, and I think we can see that when it comes to the experiences of children and young people in mental health units, we are dealing with a story that is a lot more substantial than mere anecdote. From briefing I have received, I am afraid I have been left in no doubt that the therapeutic environment in a number of mental health hospitals around the country—not all, of course—is, to put it mildly, a lot less than optimal.

Clearly, it is unacceptable for any patient, of whatever age, to be detained compulsorily without being offered treatment. It is unacceptable that drugs or restraint should be used as punishments. Challenging behaviour can be difficult to deal with, but staff should be trained to deal with it in a way that demonstrates that they understand the root causes of the behaviour. Those causes can be extremely complex.

To pick up another strand of the debate, I am in no doubt that medication has a place in mental health therapy. It can often be the treatment of choice. It is one tool in the toolbox. However, I very much agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Crisp, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, had to say about social prescribing. It can not only be clinically effective but save costs if it is delivered, for example, by local charities that work in the fields of music, drama or art. Incidentally, it can help budding musicians, actors and artists in their downtime to train as music, art or drama therapists, which is an added bonus.

I am very grateful to the Minister for her response, which is helpful on a number of fronts. I am glad that she and her officials have met with representatives of Blooming Change to listen to their important perspective. I hope that some good has come out of that in so far as policy-making is concerned. Between now and Report I shall reflect on whether the issues that I and other noble Lords have raised merit further debate. From the contributions around the Committee, I think that they almost certainly do, but for now I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn.

Amendments 47 and 48 not moved.

Clause 8 agreed.

Clause 9 agreed.

Clause 10: Nomination of the responsible clinician

Amendment 49 not moved.

Clause 10 agreed.

Amendment 49A not moved.

Clause 11: Making treatment decisions

Amendments 50 to 54 not moved.

Clause 11 agreed.

Clauses 12 to 17 agreed.

Clause 18: Urgent electro-convulsive therapy etc

Amendments 54A and 54B not moved.

Clause 18 agreed.

Clause 19: Capacity to consent to treatment