My Lords, I rise to address the amendments that stand in my name. The purpose of these amendments can be briefly stated. It is to try to achieve a measure of justice for those on whom IPPs were imposed during the limited period 2005 to 2012. It is important to bear in mind what Lord Lloyd of Berwick, then Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and then Lord Judge all did to try to right the problems that had been caused by this sentence. It was a sentence that Lord Judge described as the most draconian on the statute book, apart from a discretionary life sentence. I am extremely grateful for all that the Lord Chancellor and the Minister have done to try to deal with these issues, but we are side- stepping a fundamental issue: the way in which we release those who are subject to this sentence. We should not do that, and this House has a responsibility.

Of the amendments that stand in my name, in the time available, I wish to speak to only one: Amendment 149A. It is an attempt to compromise; to do at least something to give hope and provide justice. It leaves the release test as it stands but requires the Parole Board to take into account the concept of proportionality and other factors in making its determination. It is designed to give hope and a sense of justice to those who are behind bars under IPPs, and their families. There are three reasons I wish to highlight.

First, although a few were given IPPs who might have been given the most draconian sentence—a discretionary life sentence, under pre-2003 legislation, as a result of decisions of the Court of Appeal in the Kehoe and Wilkinson cases—the vast majority would have been given determinate sentences if the IPP sentence had not been put on to the statute book, or would have been released long ago without any risk assessment. The way our system worked historically and works today is what would have happened to them. Given that the vast majority of those under IPPs would have had that, how can it be just that, eight years later, we have done nothing—that is, in effect, what has happened —to revise this and put the Parole Board in a position to permit their release?

Secondly, if one looks at those who were sentenced in the period up to 2008, some were imprisoned who would have received a sentence of under four years. It is incredible to think that we are now releasing prisoners who have been sentenced to under four years because the prisons are overcrowded. Why can we not have regard to that? Again, this is unjust.

The third reason is that there can be little doubt— I referred to the evidence when I spoke in Committee—that the mental health of many of those who are still detained or have been recalled has suffered as a result of this sentence. The evidence is very strong and the effect on them is a matter on which we ought to reflect. The vital factor here is state responsibility—and, fortunately, we are beginning to live up to our responsibilities as a state. The position can be very briefly explained.

There is significant agreement that, if you do not know when you are going to be released, a long period of detention causes huge mental health problems. It is quite different for those who receive discretionary life sentences for the most serious crimes, described by Lord Bingham as sentences of a

“‘denunciatory’ value, reflective of public abhorrence of the offence, and where, because of its seriousness, the notional determinate sentence would be very long, measured in very many years”.

Such sentences are deserved in those cases—you can understand why people receive them—but how can it be just to keep in prison those who, during this specific eight-year period, committed something for which, before and today, they would have had a determinate term? It is no wonder that they and their families feel injustice.

I am sure that, if this point were put properly to the British public, as it is now being put in the media, they would understand. Therefore, I find it difficult to follow why people cannot go along with a measure of reform.

The crux of this amendment is to require the Parole Board to take into account proportionality—that is, looking at the length of term served as proportionate to the original offence, and some of these offences were not that serious—together with other factors, when determining whether the test of public safety has been met. It is vital to appreciate that the overwhelming majority of these people would have been released without any risk assessment. Looking at the position today, how can it be just that they should be kept there?

Now, the Minister might say that there is a provision in the Act that could be relied on. It is difficult to know precisely what the Minister will say, because he has not said it, but I am sure that is no answer to what I have said, because the difficulty is that what is in the current Bill does not require the Parole Board to do what this amendment requires it to do, which is to have regard to proportionality and other factors that affect the position. To my mind, there is a very simple question. It is 11 years after the abolition and I pay particular tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who has led on, and accepted responsibility for, dealing with this. It is a great shame that others will not do the same. We should, as a state, accept responsibility and bring about at least one step towards reform. It is not what I believe we should do, but I put this forward and support it as a measure of compromise.

If you were to ask the British public whether they believe in justice, the answer would be yes. Do they believe in being protected? The answer is yes. But should you balance protection against other factors, such as proportionality? The British public are wiser than to think that they won a one-horse race; they believe in justice as well. You can see that from what we have always had as our system—a determinate sentence for anything but the most serious offences—and most prisoners who are detained did not commit the most serious offences. Therefore, it seems clear to my mind that this proposal is one that would command the support of the public, properly explained and properly understood.

That is all I think I can say at this stage, except to say that it seems to me that this is an issue of such fundamental importance that I wish, in due course, to test the opinion of the House on the matter, as a matter of justice and of reflecting our values in the United Kingdom—or should I more technically say in England and Wales?—and also to remove a stain from our statute book. We can do no less and we must accept the state’s responsibility.

I do not wish to take up more than the few seconds that are left to me on the other amendments standing in my name, so I will simply say this. First, it seems to me that I need say nothing about Amendment 138; what the Government propose deals with it. I have left Amendments 134 to 136, which stand in my name, requiring an annual review; from what I have been able to gather, there is no resource impediment to an annual review. It is plainly just that the prisoners should have an annual review; they had one and it was taken away. It seems to me incredible that the Government will not accept that, but that is their position. I hope we can find salvation in the Parole Board adopting this as I believe, from what I understand, that it is not unsympathetic and feels that it has the resources to be able to do it.

The last of my amendments, Amendment 139, is a simple, technical amendment. I hope there is no risk that anyone will try to do it, but it is to stop the statutory power to alter the minimum period of the licence being moved up as opposed to down. But those are not the critical amendments: Amendment 149A is, and on that, as I have said, I will wish to seek the opinion of the House in due course.