Baroness Scott of Bybrook:

Moved by Baroness Scott of Bybrook

16: Clause 27, page 18, line 8, at end insert—“(ca) in section 23 (agreements excluding or modifying rights of tenant), in subsection (2)(b), omit the words from “or any provision” to “or any part of it”;”Member's explanatory statementThis amendment would prevent a landlord and tenant agreeing to a restriction on the tenant making a repeated enfranchisement or extension claim.

My Lords, to be clear, the Bill already removes the automatic 12-month bar on leaseholders that stops them making another enfranchisement claim, should an earlier claim have been withdrawn. My Amendment 16 supplements this by removing the right for a voluntary 12-month agreement to be made between parties to restrict further enfranchisement claims for a leasehold house. Removing the ability for a voluntary 12-month restriction makes sure leaseholders are not put under undue pressure to withhold their claims. This is an important protection for leaseholders and makes it clear that they can make fresh claims as needed.

I look forward to hearing from noble Lords as to how they think that our enfranchisement reforms can be further improved. I beg to move.

My Lords, our Amendment 17 would enable the Secretary of State—or, in Wales, Welsh Ministers—to change the description of premises that are excluded from collective enfranchisement rights. Such a change would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, for all his time in discussing the Bill with me, and I acknowledge his expertise in this area.

Clause 28, which our amendment targets, makes changes to the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement claims. At present, Section 4(1) of the 1993 Act excludes from the right to enfranchise buildings in which 25 % or more of the internal floor area, excluding the common parts, can be occupied or are intended to be occupied for non-residential use. The clause increases that non-residential use percentage to 50%. We welcome the change, which enacts recommendation 38 of the Law Commission’s final report on leasehold enfranchisement and was supported by the National Leasehold Campaign, among others.

Of course, if the purpose of the non-residential limit is to confine enfranchisement to predominantly residential blocks, the Law Commission determined that the existing 25% limit does not achieve that purpose. There is a significant amount of evidence that, instead, it regularly prevents leaseholders from undertaking collective freehold acquisitions because a sizeable proportion of buildings fall slightly above it and that 25% is a significant bar to the ability of leaseholders to undertake a collective freehold acquisition. The Law Commission further argued that

“the arbitrary nature of the limit makes the bar to enfranchisement a source of considerable frustration for many leaseholders”.

We accept that there is no easy or non-arbitrary way in which to determine where that bar should be. However, it is the stated intention of the Bill to bring as many leaseholders as possible into enfranchisement, and it is therefore questionable as to whether limits under 50% would feel inherently fair. We would hope that a 50% non-residential limit would mean that the number of genuine cases excluded would be small and would remove the opportunity for developers to play the system, because only a genuine split between commercial and residential would apply.

Our main concern on this clause is that there is no flexibility built into it, and we are keen to probe whether a review after a period of time to determine whether the non-residential policy as set out is working in practice could be undertaken, or another mechanism used, so that changes for the limit in respect of collective enfranchisement rights do not require primary legislation but can be enacted through regulations. Enacting small but necessary changes that may occur in relation to the Government’s proposed limit—for example, whether that relates to individual cases that fall just above the limit, or a change in the criteria on using internal floor area to determine the rights, or changing altogether the criteria on which the limit is based—may need alternative mechanisms to resorting to future primary legislation. That is the purpose of our amendment.

I will comment briefly on the other amendments in this group. We understand the reasons for the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Thurlow, and look forward to hearing the comments of the Minister on those amendments. In relation to the Question on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill, to be put by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, we understand the Church position as a landholder, but we feel it would go against the spirit of increasing the enfranchisement through the Bill to retain the 25% limit.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 17A. I am sorry that I was unable to speak at Second Reading. I should also say that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, who is unavoidably detained, has added her name to that amendment. We therefore have her support as well. Amendment 17A is directed at Clause 28 on mixed-use premises with substantial proportions of business and residential tenants. Currently, collective enfranchisement and lease renewal is not permitted where more than 25% of the premises are business premises. That figure is going to be changed to 50%, thereby making it easier for residential tenants to go down the collective enfranchisement route.

That will introduce management issues—I do not say that they are necessarily problems, but they are certainly management issues. The Bill proposes that, if 50% of the occupants are residential, that will be enough. That will mean that, unless more than half of the building is occupied by business premises, all residential tenants will be entitled to be enfranchised. That will create issues for management and, in particular, problems where some of those residential tenants are overseas companies. We know that there are increasing numbers of those, particularly in London.

Mixed-use buildings pose greater management challenges than purely residential ones. Freeholders need to be responsive and active property managers. Business tenants require swift responses so that they can manage their businesses. If they want changes to the premises and so on, they need their landlord’s consent so that they can go ahead. If there are difficulties with obtaining that consent because, for example, some—or possibly a large number—of the residential tenants are overseas companies, then one can see how unattractive such premises will become as business premises for the business occupiers.

Issues already arise where enfranchised leaseholders are on a corporate basis, where they are offshore companies and not British domestic companies. Many leaseholders have encountered difficulties seeking to hold overseas companies to account for building remediation works. It can be very challenging to identify the ultimate decision-maker and to secure consent to even modest alterations. It should be noted that Amendment 17A would not change the rights of individual lease extensions for such overseas owners. They would retain those, but they would not be allowed to go down the collective enfranchisement route.

In short, I suggest that non-UK registered companies should be excluded from all mixed-use collective enfranchisement claims. This will leave intact the Government’s objective of benefiting genuine individual residential owner-occupiers. It will address issues arising due to the opaque ownership of UK properties, it will encourage greater transparency, and it will mitigate against what are called “zombie freeholders”—non-UK companies that become the freeholder of complex, mixed-use buildings and stymie the day-to-day management of the non-residential elements of a building because they are unresponsive and challenging for the tenants to contact.

It is important to remember in this particular context that leasehold properties owned by non-UK registered companies are concentrated in prime properties in central London. My amendment would provide protections for those properties and the businesses that occupy them, and for streetscapes and high streets of particular national importance, by securing long-term single ownership which is not fractured and does not deteriorate. As part of the reform, the Bill should mitigate this by introducing the additional requirement that, to qualify as a leaseholder entitled to go down the collective enfranchisement route, the property cannot be held by a non-UK registered company or any type of company structure.

My Lords, I will speak in support of my right reverend friend the Bishop of Manchester, who is unable to be in his place today and who has asked me to speak to his opposition that Clause 28 stand part of the Bill. This is linked to a similar stand-part debate, in the name of my right reverend friend, relating to Clause 47, to be debated later in Committee.

I declare my interest as a beneficiary, as is my diocese, of the Church Commissioners. I thank the Minister for her engagement with the charities affected by the legislation so far: the Church Commissioners, John Lyon’s Charity, Portal Trust, Campden Charities, Merchant Taylors’ Boone’s Charity, Dulwich Estate and the London Diocesan Fund. I hope she will continue to engage with my right reverend friend to find an amicable solution.

The Church Commissioners for England are the freeholders of the Hyde Park Estate. If we are looking back a long way, the Church can look back longer than most. The Church has had a long relationship with that part of London, starting in 1550 when the Bishop of London was granted the manor. The first leases were granted in 1795, and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners became responsible for the estate in 1868. Like the other charities mentioned, the Church Commissioners have long relationships with their estate. The money generated from the estate beyond the local is used for the betterment of the whole of our society, by the levelling up of communities and the lowest income parishes across the country, including in the diocese of Derby.

Like the other charity freeholders of large estates, the Church Commissioners manage the whole area, focusing not only on the residential properties themselves but on the whole environment, for those who live in, work on and visit the area. Their freehold ownership includes approximately 100 commercial units on the estate, where independent cafés, specialist boutiques and restaurants are mixed alongside amenities for local residents. This by no means affects the Church Commissioners alone; other large freeholders across London and beyond use their mixed freeholdings to ensure that areas have what local residents need, such as a dry cleaners, a pub, a hardware store—I could go on.

I thank the Minister for her letter to my right reverend friend the Bishop of Manchester, received today. However, concerns remain that Clause 28 threatens the ability of freeholders in large estate areas to ensure mixed areas that have all the amenities that people need. If the threshold for collective enfranchisement and the right to manage claims is lowered so that more mixed blocks can initiate a claim, there is a risk of the degeneration of these areas. There is no guarantee that newly enfranchised blocks will have the wherewithal or even the desire to maintain the make-up of the estate area. Leaseholders may not even live permanently in the area, may be foreign-owned companies or may have no active stake in the community. What need would these companies or corporations have to ensure the maintenance of a community? My right reverend friend the Bishop of Manchester said at Second Reading of this Bill that:

“We would lose all the shops that really matter to those who live perhaps not just in that block, but”—[Official Report, 27/3/24; col. 737.]

in the locality.

The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, which would mean that right to manage and collective enfranchisement rule changes would apply only where 50% of the leaseholders are permanent residents in a block, would certainly be a step in the right direction. At least there would be a guarantee that those managing mixed blocks would have an active stake in maintaining community resources, including shops. Could the Minister tell us whether the Government could make proposals to ensure that great estate areas, such as the Hyde Park Estate and others, are not adversely affected? Nobody wants to see local shops, amenities and community hubs closing as an unintended consequence of the Bill.

My Lords, I turn to my Amendment 18 in this group. I begin by declaring my interests as both the owner of two buy-to-let investment flats and the occupier of a flat, all on leases. I stand to benefit under the Bill in both situations, which is quite patently wrong.

I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby for articulating my amendment with greater ability than I can. I want to turn specifically to mixed-use buildings and the proposal to move from a 25% threshold for enfranchisement to 50%, and build on the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. Mine is a straightforward proposal: simply that lessees who are not occupiers living there as their primary residence should not benefit from the great wealth transfer that is going to take place through the enfranchisement process. It cannot be an intended consequence of the Bill.

My amendment requires that at least 50% of leaseholders should satisfy the residence occupancy condition for any collective enfranchisement to apply. I remind the Committee that I am thinking of mixed-use buildings. A very complex management expertise is required in looking after mixed-use buildings; the skills are not the same for commercial property as for residential property, and the scope for mistakes and delay is huge. The potential to improve and curate an environment through single ownership of an expansive area has been very clearly described. To expect such behaviour to continue responsibly is almost impossible under the Bill as it stands.

We have also heard that, in London and the south-east, some 50% of tenants are not residents but foreign nationals living elsewhere, with ownership registered abroad. Are they taxpayers? This group often do not want to be identified. They shroud their property in ownership interests in offshore companies, as we have heard. They are very slow to respond, doing so from time to time, let alone to offer up money when required. If the Government do not agree that 50% of leaseholders in a block should be permanent residents, can I have an informed estimate on how many billions of pounds is expected to be paid in compensation to this cohort of wealthy foreign nationals, should they pursue this new enfranchisement entitlement?

My Lords, I declare an interest as a long-standing leaseholder of some 30 years. I have been a leaseholder in apartment blocks in London, Kent and Somerset, and a right-to-manage director in two apartment blocks.

I support His Majesty’s Government’s Clause 28, which seeks to raise the non- residential limit on collective enfranchisement claims from 25% to 50%, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage. I consequentially oppose the proposal of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, to vote against Clause 28.

Your Lordships have heard how giving more say to leaseholders in mixed blocks of residential and commercial units would be a bad idea and negatively impact on investment and the effective running of these blocks. It has been said that reform would only help some foreign leaseholders and investors and would result in fewer homes being built. That is far from the case. I have lived in two blocks of mixed developments: one was controlled by a residents’ right-to-manage company, with a NatWest bank in the basement, and another contained a number of commercial units and was 100% controlled by the freeholder. I can say categorically that the right-to-manage block was run better and with cheaper service charges. The freeholder-run block exploited the residents, cross-subsidising the commercial units at their expense and giving them no effective say over how the block was run. I point out to the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, that the difference was that the RTM block was actually run by the residents, who were managing their own money, whereas the freeholder block was run by a managing company and the freeholders were profligate with the use of residents’ cash.

Let us be frank: maintaining the 25% cap is about the freeholders retaining control and not about fairness or efficiency. If anyone lives or invests in a flat in a block, they should have a say over how it is run. For that reason, I oppose the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Thurlow and Lord Sandhurst, which would restrict enfranchisement and further strengthen the position of freeholders by limiting the number of leaseholders who can vote on and manage their own blocks of residents. RTM directors are perfectly capable of managing mixed blocks of developments.

Freeholders are keen to take leaseholders’ money but do not want to relinquish control. That can result in a situation where leaseholders represent 95% to 99% of the investment in a building but have no control. In contrast, the freeholder, who has an investment of just 1% to 5%, is deemed to own the building and run it for their profit, while appointing a property management company that proceeds to rip off the leaseholders via excessive service charges and insurance commissions. As I said, because it is not the freeholder’s money, they do not care—that is the difference. Any leaseholder’s attempt to challenge that is fraught with risk and a potentially ruinous cost, so this aspect also needs reform.

I am aware of a major lobbying effort by the great estates to protect their feudal privileges built up over hundreds of years—I was invited to dinner by one, but I did not go. Following the contribution of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby, I refer to the proposal in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who was refreshingly frank at Second Reading. He said that the system could be described as “feudal” and that some of the Church property he dealt with dated back to the 11th century. The property portfolio of the Church of England is valued at £2 billion—it is a business. It has assets of at least £6.7 billion. As we all know, the Church of England does a lot of work with charities and works with the poor, but some have already questioned whether its 105,000 acres of land could be better used, in part, to provide the social housing so badly needed by the needy and homeless.

With the great estates, the story is also about retaining their wealth, not about losing it. I have no problem with that, I just do not think that it should be at the expense of leaseholders. They need to move with the times; the old ways of fleecing leaseholders are increasingly untenable.

I was thrown by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester not being here, as we were going to talk later about marriage value, but that is a different part of the debate.

We in Parliament have a greater duty than just to the freeholders and their interests: we have a duty to the over 5 million leaseholders to reform the fleecehold system and, preferably, abolish it altogether. We heard again at Second Reading how some freeholders seek to hide behind property rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, but leaseholders also have rights, which are being deliberately supressed.

On ground rents—again, as mentioned at Second Reading—the Competition and Markets Authority said that there was no legal or commercial reason to justify ground rents. I have just had a bill for £300 for my ground rent, for which I receive absolutely no service. Everyone involved knows full well that ground rents provide no service, are purely rent-seeking and are a legalised scam. If pension funds are invested in ground rents, as some are, they should find a better use for their money; for example, by investing in British companies. Our pension companies invest less in our own country’s companies and stock market than any of their international competitors—shame on them.

My Lords, I will speak to this group, as the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, mentioned my name, although I have not yet spoken. He represents one viewpoint and the noble Lords, Lord Thurlow and Lord Sandhurst, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester represent another. They are often portrayed as being mutually exclusive but, in property terms, that is not necessarily the case. Clearly, there are perfectly good managers who look after not only their residential tenants but their commercial tenants, and there are some are rotten managers. Some are good corporates while others are rotten—some are good resident management operations while others are pretty poor—so it is very difficult to make a standard rule for them all.

If one looks at the large urban estates across London, it is evident that there is a clear sense of purpose in trying to preserve the value, appearance and general amenity represented by the running of that estate. That inevitably comes at a cost, but I hope that that helps not only the commercial activities but the amenity of the residents.

Let us look at what happens if things start going wrong and getting fragmented. First, there becomes a distinction, if one is not very careful, between the purposes of long-term management in the view of the residents and the purposes of long-term management in the view of the commercial operator or landlord. Under the purposes of this Bill, if the enfranchisement of a 50% commercial ownership block goes ahead, there will be an enforced leaseback to the original freehold owner. Straightaway, you have an enforced leaseholder, whose business model was not quite hypothecated on that basis, who is none the less obliged to take it on but does not need to have the primary amenity and visual appeal functions that might be relevant to the residents.

I have seen that happen in historic high streets, where ownership has become fragmented in this way. We tend to find that when a shop becomes vacant, and if there are difficulties in the letting market, it will be let to a charity shop, a slot machine operator, a tanning shop, or some other type of operator, because the person who has it needs to move it on quickly. There is not that fat on the bone associated with having the larger estate, nor is there the fat on the bone to take on some assignee, as I have had to deal with in the past, who really runs a rather low-grade sort of business but is well funded. Therefore, you have to work out whether you can afford to fight an appeal, or fight a case, on an assignment of a lease in order to see off that person and their particular trade. If you cannot, there is a general deterioration of the area. It might be a fast-food takeaway that opens late at night; the police might be around every now and again; there might be people congregating there because it is late at night, and that sort of thing affects residents. If one is not careful, things like emptying bins and delivery of incoming goods to a retail operation can start being operated at times that are not that helpful to the interest of residents, who once might have been part of this overall concern. I can see both sides of this, and we have to be careful not to make standard rules about things where the decision is much more nuanced and difficult. It really depends on where one is starting from, the circumstances, and everything else.

As I said earlier, my interest is in consumer protection. I do not want to see degraded environments; I want to see environments that are lively and looked after and where everybody has confidence in them being managed. Fragmented management very seldom achieves that. The issue is about management being a slightly different issue to ownership. It is a big issue that we need to address, because it will not be dealt with by a local authority. That has no function there. Beyond the planning functions of a change of use, or licensing for some premises that needs it, it has very few powers of control. If overarching control is needed, and there may be an argument that ecclesiastical, heritage or possibly other environments do need it, we should very careful that we are not chucking out that baby with the bathwater and ending up with a slow process of attrition that suits nobody and ends up degrading the value not only of the freeholders, who can look after themselves by and large, but of the area and its appeal, which is ultimately to the detriment of residents. I do not want to go down that road without being clear about what we are doing, and making sure that there is some way we can pick up on processes of deterioration before they take root.

My Lords, this is my first intervention today—I spoke at Second Reading. I regret that this is yet another Bill that was heralded with robust rhetoric from the Secretary of State which has now come face to face with reality. I regret that some of that reality is from those with vested interests and therefore we are getting a watered-down Bill. We certainly believe on these Benches that it is a missed opportunity.

I turn to the group of amendments on enfranchisement. We on these Benches support the Government in Amendment 16. We need to see as many restrictions as possible on leaseholders’ ability to enfranchise removed by the Bill. After all, they have bought a home and should be able to extend their lease and buy their freeholds in a way that is easy and affordable, to use the Government’s own words.

It is perhaps no surprise that we also support Amendment 17 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, in so far as it would allow the Secretary of State to give more leaseholders rights to collective enfranchisement, and we note the detail of the noble Baroness’s reasons. However, the power cannot and must not be used to narrow the qualifying criteria or to exclude more leaseholders from freehold purchase. We are pleased that it would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, as this includes public consultation and the involvement of both Houses.

However, we know that cohorts of leaseholders will still not even qualify to buy their freehold under the Bill. For example, MPs in the Public Bill Committee in January heard from experts and campaigners that there really is a problem with leaseholders in mixed-use buildings—from our debate today, I would say we have a problem with mixed-use buildings that needs to be sorted out. The Government are admirably using the Bill to try to liberate leaseholders in mixed-use blocks by, as we have said, moving the 25% rule on non-residential premises to 50% and introducing mandatory leasebacks on commercial space to slash the cost of collective enfranchisement, but—and I find this strange—they have not lifted the restrictive regulations in the 1993 Act that mean that shared services, such as a plant room, would disqualify leaseholders from buying out their freehold. Apparently, there is even a regulation stipulating that the mere existence of pipes, cables or other fixed installations connecting residential and commercial premises in a mixed-use building would block leaseholders from buying their freedom. That means that many leaseholders who would otherwise stand to benefit from the changes on mixed use will be blocked from securing collective enfranchisement and being in control of their buildings. I ask the Minister whether we can discuss this aspect before Report.

Turning to what I will call the three “tricky” amendments, I noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, wisely hedged her bets on these. I suspect that it is because, like me, she knows that the intentions of the noble Lords speaking on them are based on good experience and a genuine wish to see the measures agreed, but she worries whether, in fact, they are just another means of putting commercial interests before residential interests and not getting that balance right.

Instinctively, like the noble Lord, Lord Truscott—I was relieved when he made his comments—we oppose these three amendments, because in our view they seek to row back. But I have listened attentively to what has been said and I am completely changing what I was going to say: I genuinely believe that there are some serious areas that need looking at. There is much experience in the Committee, but I am concerned that we have been subject to special pleadings.

In particular, on the pleading from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, with regard to overseas owners, I do not see why we should be bending over backwards to placate overseas owners who are absent, will not do their duty and are hard to contact—and lots of other phrases that all noble Lords have used. I do not see why we should pander to that. Surely we should try to solve the problem to bring them into the fold. Phrases such as “management difficulties” were used, but we should be able to solve them. Clearly, there are issues.

It is worth saying that the rest of the world manages just fine under resident-controlled commonhold systems, with some truly remarkable mixed-use developments including cinemas, shopping centres, train stations and all sorts of facilities and infrastructure. They are not asking to adopt our leasehold arrangement.

Although I accept from the noble Lords who spoke in the debate that there are issues that need to be probed further, spoken about and listened to, perhaps in a round-table discussion before we get to Report, our instincts are that these are shoring up the interests of commercial leaseholders because, let us face it, freeholders are where the money is.

My Lords, the descriptions that have been put forward—the right reverend Prelate described these thriving communities, which sounded idyllic, and the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, talked about making sure that we understood that there might be some bad players but that there are also some very enlightened players—made it sound as though this is really just a question of having the right people in charge, whereas I think it is a systemic problem.

One of the reasons why I am anxious about this is that although it is always nicer to have friendly, non-rip-off freeholders—that is genuinely a positive thing—we should not be grateful that we are not being ripped off in the homes that we live in. The system problem is that people lack autonomy and control over where they live and their destiny. I just throw in that a successful community depends on people retaining their autonomy rather than being grateful that they are being looked after.

What the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, pointed out is incredibly important; the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, also made an excellent speech laying some of this out. There are thriving communities with mixed-use abilities all over the world that do not use leasehold. We are now getting to a point where we are saying, “If we don’t have leasehold here, we’ll never have a local swimming pool and there will be no community centres. What will happen to all the shops?” That is mythological. Although I agree that one needs to look at the complexities, and I for one am actually all for nuance in relation to this and not just blunderbussing away, we should also stop myth-building about the wonders of the system, when in fact the reason why we want enfranchisement in the first place is that when our citizens buy a house they should have control over it. It is their home, and they can work collectively on building the community. At the moment they are denied that, which is why we are trying to tackle the problem of leasehold in the first instance.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions, and I start by thanking especially the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Stevenage, for Amendment 17, which seeks to amend the description of premises that are excluded from collective enfranchisement rights, where leaseholders would otherwise qualify. I know the amendment is well intentioned, with the aim that there is flexibility to amend the description of exceptions without new primary legislation. The amendment introduces a broad power for Ministers to change fundamental elements of the structure of the regime, which are substantive areas of policy. The Government are already making changes to primary legislation by increasing the non-residential limit from 25% to 50%, following extensive consultation, which is right and proper. The powers in this amendment would affect the very core of the regime and how it is structured rather than amending mere procedural changes.

To make sure that stakeholders have certainty as to how the law will work in practice, changes to the fundamental structure of the statutory regime should be clear and stable. Although the intention behind the amendment is noble, the Government are not able to accept it as it is not proportionate or reasonable for the proper functioning of the regime. It would be a sweeping power to change the fundamental structure of the enfranchisement regime after it has been approved by Parliament.

This amendment would introduce uncertainty into the new system, meaning that both leaseholders and landlords would need to second-guess whether changes may be made at relatively short notice, introducing volatility to the regime. This could potentially lead to undesirable outcomes, such as undermining confidence in long-term investment decisions for mixed use-premises, or lead to irregular design of floor-space in anticipation of future changes. I want to make it clear that the Law Commission has spent years considering qualifying criteria and assessed different options in its consultation process before putting forward its recommendations to increase the non-residential threshold to 50%.

The amendment could also remove rights of leaseholders or landlords in a disproportionate way and create unnecessary uncertainty and divergence likely to complicate the overall regime, with consequential effects on the behaviour of different stakeholders in different ways. Therefore, I hope that I have convinced the noble Baroness that the amendment is not proportionate, and that it is not moved.

I thank my noble friend Lord Sandhurst for Amendment 17A, which would exclude long leases held by overseas companies from being qualifying tenants for the purpose of collective enfranchisement. The Government’s aim is to improve leasehold as a tenure and address the historic imbalance of power between freeholders and leaseholders. The Bill does not confer different rights on leaseholders by how their leases are held. The Government do not think that implementing such a definition, in respect of which leaseholders have rights and which do not, is workable or desirable.

Amending the definition of a qualifying tenant for collective enfranchisement will make it harder for other leaseholders in a building to meet the numbers required to enfranchise, should they so wish. Attempting to restrict some leaseholders may well disenfranchise others, meaning that many leaseholders up and down the country could lose the opportunity to exercise their rights. Furthermore, it would remove the existing rights of some leaseholders and complicate the system overall, contrary to the aims of the Government.

I understand that the intention of the amendment may be to safeguard against circumstances in which non-resident or overseas companies do not take an active interest in the management of a building or are slow to respond. However, we expect that most multi-occupancy buildings will be managed by professional management companies on behalf of freeholders, as they are now.

I thank my noble friend again for the amendment, but I cannot accept it because it runs contrary to the aims of the Government and may restrict leaseholders’ rights. I therefore hope that he is content not to move his amendment.

I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Derby for speaking on behalf of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, with whom I have had a number of meetings about this issue. I am happy if the right reverend Prelate takes back the fact that I will continue that discussion if the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester so wishes.

I thank my noble friend Lord Moylan for his clause stand part notice. Clause 28 increases the non-residential limit for the collective enfranchisement claims to proceed in mixed-use buildings from 25% to 50%. The clause implements a Law Commission recommendation that has been subject to comprehensive consultation by the Law Commission and the department. I note the right reverend Prelate’s and my noble friend’s concerns, which have been raised through various consultations with freeholders and landlords.

The Bill’s impact assessment considers the impact of increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement claims, including the potential impact on freeholders, high streets and businesses. The increase to 50% strikes a fair and proportionate balance and will ensure that leaseholders are not unfairly prevented from claiming the right to manage in respect to buildings that are majority residential. It protects the freeholders and commercial leaseholders in buildings that are majority commercial. Freeholders can also protect their commercial interests by taking a leaseback of the commercial unit, securing their interest with a 999-year leaseback at a peppercorn rent.

We recognise the importance of the responsibility of building management and, as I have said, would expect that those who exercise their right to take over their buildings will employ professional managing agents—ensuring that the building is managed with the appropriate expertise, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Truscott, about the issues that he is aware of.

The Government consider that this increase is proportionate, and I ask the right reverend Prelate and my noble friend to support Clause 28 standing part of the Bill.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, for Amendment 18, which seeks to apply a residency test to the collective enfranchisement claims in buildings with more than 25% non-residential floorspace. As we have discussed, Clause 28 amends the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 to increase the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement claims from 25% to 50%.

Clause 28 implements a Law Commission recommendation that seeks to broaden access to collective enfranchisement for leaseholders living in mixed-use buildings where the non-residential elements constitute up to 50% of the floorspace. The existing qualifying criteria require leaseholders representing at least 50% of the flats in a building to participate in a collective enfranchisement claim. When combined with these existing criteria, the noble Lord’s amendment would allow claims only in mixed-use buildings with more than 25% non-residential floorspace, where at least 25% of the flats are owner-occupied.

For leaseholders in mixed-use buildings where less than 25% of the flats are owner-occupied but more than 25% of the floorspace is non-residential, this new clause would have the effect of removing all the benefit of Clause 28. This would leave leaseholders unable to collectively buy the freehold of their building because of how their neighbours chose to use their properties. It would also complicate all claims in buildings with over 25% non-residential floorspace, as participating leaseholders would be required to demonstrate that they are owner-occupiers. This could lead to claims taking longer and costing more, and would provide freeholders with another opportunity to frustrate leaseholders’ right to buy their freehold. This is counter to the Government’s aims in this area to broaden access to collective freehold ownership for all leaseholders, and to simplify, not complicate, the system leaseholders use to do so.

The noble Lord, Lord Thurlow, asked why we were not introducing a residency test. The Government are committed to broadening access to collective enfranchisement and making it cheaper and easier for leaseholders to buy their freehold. As I have said, any residency test would complicate this system. The noble Lord also asked about compensation. Our reforms to enfranchisement valuation ensure that sufficient compensation is paid to landlords to reflect their legitimate property interests. For these reasons, I ask the noble Lord to not move his amendment, and move my own.

Amendment 16 agreed.

Clause 27, as amended, agreed.

Clause 28: Change of non-residential limit on collective enfranchisement claims

Amendments 17 and 17A not moved.

Clause 28 agreed.

Amendment 18 not moved.

Clause 29 agreed.

Schedule 3: Eligibility for enfranchisement and extension: specific cases