National Security Bill - Committee (4th Day) – in the House of Lords am 6:00 pm ar 16 Ionawr 2023.
Moved by Lord Wallace of Saltaire
84: Schedule 13, page 175, line 33, at end insert— “(3A) Condition 2A is that the foreign power contributes, directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the annual revenue of the person.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment adds an additional condition to determining if a person is controlled by a foreign power. It is intended to further increase transparency.
My Lords, some of my colleagues will probably feel that further discussion on Part 3 is, in a sense, almost redundant. The clear sentiment of the House is that Part 3, as it exists, is unfit for purpose, and that we need to pause the Bill to consult more widely and, in the light of those consultations, revise very considerably. That being the case, I merely wish to flag in my probing amendment some of the sheer difficulties of defining “foreign control”, and what is controlled by a foreign entity, using indicators of how far or otherwise it is indeed influenced by a foreign power or owner.
Noble Lords who read the football pages, as I occasionally do, will have noted the current controversy as to who actually owns Everton Football Club. The question is whether the real owner, carefully disguised, is a sanctioned Russian oligarch. If you cannot tell who actually owns Everton Football Club—the idea that you can carefully discover the foreign company based in Panama, itself owned by a controlling company that is partly in the Bahamas and partly in the Cayman Islands—it is not entirely clear how we might define who owns what.
The UK contributes a great deal to the confusion over who owns what. Our overseas territories and, to a certain extent, our Crown dependencies, and the way in which Companies House operates, often make it very difficult to discover even that companies registered in this country may be owned by a chain of other owners; the ultimate owner therefore becomes extremely unclear.
When dealing with authoritarian states, other complications come in. I hope the Minister will contribute a response on this. In dealing with authoritarian states, one is dealing with allegedly private companies that are almost unavoidably close to the power. Central Asian states are very similar to Russia and, previously, Ukraine, in this respect. You are very successful only if you are “in” with the current power centre. Dealing with Gulf states, south-east Asian states and others, you are often dealing with partly state-owned companies, sovereign wealth funds and others, many of which are now quite deeply invested in Battersea, in British ports and so on. These are real, existing contributors to this economy but with complicated political backgrounds.
The question is: how do we identify this, and how much are we putting on the—often small—businessman, whoever he may be, to try to discover who really owns the company with which he is dealing? Who is the source behind the people to whom he is talking? If the Government are putting that absolutely on the individual in Britain, whose political antennae for what is happening in Malaysia, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan may not be as high as they might be, then this will be a very difficult Act to implement. I beg to move.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has raised an interesting but complicated question to answer. He has given various examples of the complications involved in trying to identify the owners of companies. From my own experience as a part company owner and director, I did not know who the shareholders in my own company were, once the ownership was traced back. This is a very difficult and involved question, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
I thank both noble Lords for their contributions; it is indeed a complex issue. Amendment 83 seeks to provide that, where an entity receives 25% or more of its revenue from a foreign power, it can be considered as subject to control from a foreign power and eligible to be specified under the enhanced tier of the scheme. I commend the spirit with which this amendment has been made. The noble Lord’s aim of increasing transparency supports the objectives of the scheme, but it is vital that we strike the balance of proportionality.
It is important that we maintain a distinction between funding, or donations, and control. However, I hope the noble Lord will be reassured that where, in practice, funding does result in a foreign power directing or controlling the activities of the entity, a condition for foreign power control already given in Schedule 13 will still be met. Where this condition is met, it will be possible to specify the entity under the enhanced tier.
We recognise that it is imperative that this scheme maintains the flexibility to adapt, should a foreign power seek to take action to evade the scheme’s scope and requirements. Part 3 of Schedule 13 provides this necessary flexibility by allowing for the conditions of control to be amended for permitted purposes by regulation. For these reasons, the Government cannot accept the proposed amendment and invite its withdrawal.
My Lords, I foresee yet another bout of litigation over who really owns what as this is implemented. We have seen a fair amount of argument among different Russian oligarchs about who owns what, and what political influence may or may not have been involved, in the London courts. This is one of the many ways in which the Bill, in its current form, is not proportionate. This is, again, why we need to move slowly, carefully and cautiously as we complete our scrutiny of the Bill.
We must not put too much of a burden on the individual business man and woman, or the individual customer, but, at the same time, we must do our utmost to ensure that foreign money, as it comes into British politics and British political life, is identified as vigorously as possible. Incidentally, I am not convinced that the Bill does that, as I said in an earlier session. That is one of the ways in which the Bill needs to be strengthened rather than weakened. This will, I hope, form part of the discussions that we will have off the Floor, during the process in which the Government will produce their promised policy statement, and before we come to Report. I beg leave to withdraw.
Amendment 84 withdrawn.
Schedule 13 agreed.
Clause 64 agreed.
Clause 65: Requirement to register activities of specified persons