Baroness Ludford:

Moved by Baroness Ludford

76: Schedule 7, page 137, line 14, at end insert—“(2A) The requirement under paragraph 1(2)(c) must not exceed a 14-hour period.”Member's explanatory statementThis amendment is based on a recommendation of the JCHR. It is designed to ensure that rights under Article 5 of the ECHR are not infringed, and therefore it sets a 14-hour limit on the time that the subject of Prevention and Investigation Measures could be required to remain in their residence.

My Lords, in moving Amendment 76, I will also cover the other three amendments in my name—I am afraid I dominate this group 1, which is all concerning proposals made by the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Part 2 of the Bill introduces state threats “prevention and investigation measures”. I am not sure whether we are calling them STPIMs or just PIMs. Anyway, these are a set of restrictive measures that the Secretary of State could place on individuals who they reasonably believe are involved in foreign-power threat activity. Failure to comply with the measures imposed would be a criminal offence. Of course, these measures largely mirror the legislative scheme of the TPIMs—terrorism prevention and investigation measures—that can be imposed on those suspected of involvement in terrorist-related activity. There is an awful lot of experience, particularly on the Benches opposite, on that subject.

The intention behind the measures is that they should be applied to people believed to pose a significant threat but who could not be prosecuted. In fact, according to the Explanatory Notes, PIMs would similarly represent

“a measure of last resort” applicable to those cases that, despite the wide range of new offences introduced by the Bill,

“cannot be prosecuted or otherwise disrupted.”

Clause 37 grants the Secretary of State the power to impose PIMs, while Schedule 7 sets out a wide range of requirements and restrictions that can be included, such as

“a requirement to reside at a specified residence”,

overnight curfews, exclusion from certain places or buildings, restrictions on travel, work and study, contact with others, use of phones and computers, et cetera. There is also daily reporting to a police station and GPS monitoring. So far so familiar, really, and there is a clear parallelism with TPIMs.

Amendment 76 specifically concerns the worries about the right to liberty guaranteed by Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is the same, familiar range of concerns regarding ECHR and HRA rights—especially Articles 5, 6 and 8. Amendment 76 focuses particularly on Article 5, where concerns arise from the imposition of curfew measures. It has been established over many years of litigation arising from TPIMs—and, before that, control orders—that requiring a person to remain in their home for more than 16 hours per day is, rather unsurprisingly, likely to amount to a deprivation of liberty under Article 5. Curfews that last 16 hours or less could still engage Article 5 when coupled with other restrictive measures, particularly those causing social isolation such as separation from family.

The ECHR memorandum accompanying the Bill recognises the potential for Article 5 to be violated by a PIM, but it states that

“there are protections in place” to prevent this, specifically the obligation on the

“Secretary of State … to act compatibly with the Convention rights” and the same obligation applying to the courts. It is asserted that the judicial review process built into the Bill should serve as a protection against unjustified deprivations of liberty. Such protections, however, depend on the Human Rights Act which, under the Bill of Rights Bill as introduced, will be repealed and replaced. Many of us fear that the Bill of Rights Bill threatens to weaken the courts’ ability to hold public authorities to that Article 5 obligation.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the simplest way of introducing

“A more effective protection against interference with Article 5 rights would be to include within the National Security Bill a strict limit on the number of hours for which a subject of Prevention and Investigation Measures could be required to remain in their residence”.

This amendment reflects the JCHR report’s suggestion of a maximum of 14 hours per day. The Government may have other ideas, which will be interesting to hear.

I will now speak to Amendment 77. The conditions in Clause 38, which focus on “foreign power threat activity” are defined broadly and include some behaviour which may not currently even justify arrest. In these circumstances, none the less, this Bill proposes the imposition of potentially long-lasting highly restrictive measures on an individual. While the measures are called “prevention and investigation measures”, the investigation element appears extremely limited. Clause 44 would require the Secretary of State to

“consult the chief officer of the appropriate police force” regarding whether a prosecution is possible before imposing a PIM and for the police to “keep under review” the investigation of the individual’s conduct with a view to their prosecution for the duration of the PIM—which can be renewed for up to five years. But the Bill would place no obligation on the Secretary of State to take, or refrain from, any particular action after consulting with the police, so it appears to have no real consequences. It also does not specify any duty on the police to take action beyond keeping investigation under review; it does not actually require investigation.

Amendment 77 proposes that, given the intention for these measures to be used in cases that cannot be prosecuted or otherwise disrupted, it seems reasonable to put in a requirement that, having consulted with the police, the Secretary of State gets confirmation from them that prosecution is not realistic or feasible before a PIM is imposed. That appears to be consistent with the policy justification of this clause.

The conclusion is that the JCHR recommends that the Bill is amended to include such a provision. My other two amendments in this group are consequential, so I will close here. I am very interested to hear other views. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendments 76, 77, 78 and 79, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, enable us to discuss the state threats prevention and investigation measures. As she outlined, Amendment 76 seeks to set a 14-hour limit on the time that someone subject to such a measure has to remain in their residence. Amendment 77 would require the Secretary of State to receive confirmation from the police that prosecution is not realistic, rather than requiring only consultation before a measure is imposed, as outlined in Clause 44(1). These are simple but important amendments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, outlined, and the Government need to respond to them logically, particularly as they are recommended by the JCHR. In Committee last time, we all referred to the importance of the JCHR recommendations that come before us. It is particularly important that questions such as these are asked because, although we accept that STPIMs are a useful tool to have available, they impose intrusive restrictions on an individual, outside the criminal justice process, as civil measures.

In view of Amendment 76, if there is no time limit, what is acceptable? Are 20 or 21 hours acceptable? As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, pointed out, these are essentially curfews on an individual. Although they may be justified—no one is questioning the fact that sometimes they may be necessary—some thought from the Government about what we actually mean by the imposition of time limits or curfews on an individual, and how that might be arrived at, is important. Secondly, should we not always seek to prosecute, as Amendment 77 seeks to do? The police confirming that it is not possible is a real protection, while not compromising national security; again, that is the aim of all of us.

On the more general question of STPIMS, legal aid will be available to individuals but, if they are to challenge effectively, will individuals subject to such an order be fully aware of the reasons why it has been imposed and able to challenge the imposition of such measures? Who will oversee the use of these powers? Can the Minister reassure us that, in making such a decision on application by the Secretary of State, the courts will be given all the information that they need to properly inform their decision, and that they will not be used arbitrarily, out of frustration that a criminal prosecution cannot be pursued? That was a really important point from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford: this is not a substitute for prosecution but something to be used where, for whatever reason, it is simply not available. But we need some reassurance that criminal prosecution will always be pursued as the first option.

We accept that there is a potential need for such measures, but, given their civil nature and the very real impacts on the liberties of individuals, even if necessary for national security reasons, they demand of us the need to be ever more vigilant when it comes to freedoms and human rights within a democracy. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

My Lords, I will first address Amendments 77, 78 and 79. These amendments would create a requirement on the Secretary of State to receive confirmation from the police that there is no realistic chance of prosecuting an individual before imposing a state threats prevention and investigation measure—an STPIM—on an individual under Part 2. It is our view that the current drafting would already achieve that aim. STPIMs are a tool of last resort in cases where prosecution is not possible. It is always the Government’s preference and priority to seek a prosecution against those engaged in foreign power threat activity, and where we can prosecute, we will.

Clause 44 reflects our commitment to prosecution and requires prior consultation with the police, before the imposition of a STPIM notice, in relation to

“whether there is evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes of prosecuting the individual for an offence” relating to state threats. The police must consult the relevant prosecuting authority before responding to the Secretary of State. The requirement to consult mirrors that in terrorism prevention and investigation measures—TPIMs—to which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred. Our experience of the TPIM regime is that, wherever it is apparent in the consultation that there is evidence available that means that a prosecution is feasible, such a prosecution is pursued over the imposition of a TPIM. We expect the same principle to apply in the STPIM context. I hope that that addresses some of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.

Furthermore, as set out in Clause 44(5), while an STPIM is in force, the police must ensure that the investigation of the relevant individual’s conduct is kept under review, consulting the prosecuting authority with a view to pursuing a prosecution if possible. Consultation is all about exploring whether there is available evidence that could realistically be used to prosecute an individual. However, the proposed amendments require the police to confirm that there is no available evidence. Changing the threshold in that way would mean that, in the event that there is limited evidence, but not enough feasibly to prosecute, we would limit our ability to use the STPIM as an alternative measure to protect the UK against individuals involved in state threats activity.

Although I understand the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the consultation is meaningful. In each case where an STPIM is in force, the prospect of prosecuting that individual will be kept under review by the police, consulting the prosecuting authorities as necessary. The outcome of that review will be reported by the police to the Home Secretary, in accordance with their statutory duty. In some sense, that answers the point about oversight raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Where a prosecution is possible, that will be the action undertaken, rather than the imposition of an STPIM. As I have said already, if we can prosecute, we will.

I turn now to Amendment 76, which seeks to place a maximum limit of 14 hours on the number of hours an individual can be required by the Secretary of State to remain in their residence under the residence measure. It is important to note that, in each STPIM case, the facts will be different, and the specific measures will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Flexibility is therefore key to ensure that the most appropriate suite of measures can be imposed. Protection against interference with the rights of individuals under Article 5 of the European convention, as was referred to by the noble Baroness, is already provided for under the residence measure. Condition D, which must be met to impose an STPIM, outlines that the Secretary of State must reasonably consider that the individual measures applied are necessary to prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity. That covers not just the imposition of the measure but the exact terms of the measure. In the case of the residence measure, that would include the number of hours an individual must reside in their residence. I hope I have therefore addressed the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in relation to the time requirement.

In addition, the court must agree at both the permission hearing and the review hearing to the number of hours, set by the Secretary of State, that the individual must remain in their residence—thus providing a good measure of accountability for the number of hours provided for in the order. The number of hours a person must stay at home will therefore be determined by the facts of the individual case. It is also worth noting that the individual subject to a notice has the right to apply for a variation of measures imposed both in the short term—for example, if there is a reason why they need to be out at different times on a particular day—and generally in the long term.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked who would oversee the imposition of the measures in this regime. Under Clause 54, there will be an independent reviewer of STPIMs, in the same way that there is a reviewer for TPIMs under the other terrorism legislation.

On whether the individual will know what they are accused of doing, they will have access to special advocates who will be able to access the sensitive information in a manner similar to that for TPIMs. The special advocates will have access to the sensitive information that builds the case against the individual and justifies the measure. There will also be a duty on the Government to share the information, as far as reasonably possible, with the individual themselves. With all these points in mind, the Government cannot accept these amendments and I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 76.

Can the Minister help the Committee by giving us an estimate of the scale of the problem? Do the Government expect a number of STPIMs which is roughly the same as the number of TPIMs in existence at present or do they expect more than or fewer than a handful? An assessment must have been made of these numbers.

I am afraid I do not have that information to hand. My conjecture would be that it is fewer, but I will confirm the position and write to the noble Lord.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for calling these amendments simple but important. I am grateful for his support.

On Amendment 77, I note the Minister’s assurance that he believes that the current drafting would achieve the aim of pursuing the possibility of prosecution, but obviously that incorporates not only a static but a dynamic possibility. I think the fear of the JCHR is that the wording, certainly in Clause 44(5), does not really imply any ongoing investigative mission, as it were. Saying “If we can prosecute, we will” has to mean that a certain re-evaluation takes place. But that is not all that Clause 44(5) says. It says that the chief officer of police must

“secure that the investigation of the individual’s conduct … is kept under review”.

It does not actually require any investigation, or any periodic investigation, so I am not really persuaded, despite the Minister’s reassurances, that that sense of a dynamic possibility of keeping the potential for prosecution under if not a permanent but certainly a periodic review is incorporated into the drafting of the Bill. We may come back to this at a later stage, but I am not entirely persuaded by the Minister.

On Amendment 76, I say simply that the fear, certainly within the Joint Committee on Human Rights and very much shared on these Benches, is that the Bill of Rights Bill, if pursued—and we wait with bated breath to hear any more news on that topic—could weaken the scrutiny and accountability of the Government under human rights obligations. So there is a fear around whether there is to be an ongoing sense of commitment to the possibility of moving from a PIM to a prosecution, which must be the objective of us all because PIMs, like TPIMs, however necessary they might be at a certain point, are far from ideal. The chance of prosecution is much more satisfactory from a legal and human rights point of view, but for the time being I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 76 withdrawn.

Schedule 7 agreed.

Clauses 38 to 41 agreed.

Schedule 8 agreed.

Clauses 42 and 43 agreed.

Clause 44: Criminal investigations into foreign power threat activity

Amendments 77 to 79 not moved.

Clause 44 agreed.

Clauses 45 to 49 agreed.

Schedule 9 agreed.

Clauses 50 to 52 agreed.

Schedule 10 agreed.

Clause 53 agreed.

Clause 54: Reviews of operation of this Part