– in the House of Lords am 3:50 pm ar 11 Ionawr 2023.
Moved by Baroness Manningham-Buller
That the Report from the Select Committee The conduct of the Earl of Shrewsbury (2nd Report, HL Paper 120) be agreed to.
My Lords, I will also speak to the three other Motions in my name. The four Motions refer to two entirely separate investigations and I do not imply any direct connection between them, but the issues are similar and by speaking to all the Motions I hope to avoid repeating myself.
I also remind the House that the proceedings on these Motions are governed by Standing Order 68, which requires that the reports arising from investigations and Motions on sanctions be decided without debate. I shall therefore be brief.
The first report relates to the conduct of the noble Earl, Lord Shrewsbury, and the second to the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. These investigations have been conducted independently by one each of our two commissioners for standards. Both noble Lords have been found to be in breach of the prohibition in paragraph 9 of the Code of Conduct on the provision of parliamentary advice and services in return for payment and reward.
It has been some years since any breach of paragraph 9 has come before the House, and one of the features of both today’s cases is the extent to which noble Lords appear to have misunderstood or completely overlooked this rule. I served on what was then the Sub-Committee on Lords’ Conduct in 2009 and chaired it from 2010, when the reputation of this House was gravely damaged by media allegations that noble Lords were willing to influence Ministers and the House in return for payment, so these rules matter. In fact, the House adopted the present code largely in response to the 2009 allegations. This House was motivated above all by a desire to clamp down on what the Leader’s Group on the Code of Conduct, chaired by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, described as the phenomenon of
“‘peers for hire’ or ‘peers on the cab rank’”.
That is the essence of this issue. The code clearly states that noble Lords must not accept payment in return for either assisting or advising outside organisations on how to influence Parliament, Ministers or officials.
The rationale for that rule is equally clear. Membership of this House is an honour and a duty, not a source of profit. Noble Lords have a wide range of skills and experience, and the code acknowledges that most Members’ primary employment is or has been outside Parliament and that such diverse experience is to be encouraged. Indeed, one of the strengths of this House is that it can draw on such a wide spectrum of experience. But making money from membership of your Lordships’ House per se risks bringing the whole institution into disrepute.
The Conduct Committee does not attribute any conscious dishonesty to either noble Lord, but their breaches of the code are inherently serious. That is why the sanctions imposed for such breaches have historically been severe, involving suspensions of up to six months. The two commissioners who looked at these cases in detail have proposed suspensions broadly in line with these precedents. The fact that they are slightly more stringent—a recommended suspension of nine months in the case of the noble Earl and six months in the case of the noble Baroness—reflects the key difference that in both these cases, unlike previous cases, the noble Lords actually entered into agreements, received substantial payments, and in return provided parliamentary advice and services.
I am well aware that, in following these precedents, the commissioners have recommended suspensions, which the Conduct Committee has agreed to and supported, that are much longer than those imposed in the House of Commons in response to comparable breaches. While superficially it is hard to defend this, there are good reasons. The first is that any suspension of a Member of the other place affects not just the individual Member but the interests of that Member’s constituents, who lose their representative in Westminster for the duration of any suspension. As a result, suspensions in the other place have historically been short. This convention was reinforced by the Recall of MPs Act 2015, under which any suspension of an MP of 10 days or more can trigger a recall petition and potentially a by-election. In effect, any suspension of more than 10 days could lead to expulsion.
The length of the suspension in the other place needs to be understood against a backdrop which does not apply to this House. As I have been reminded from all corners of the House since I made the mistake of assuming this job, we are very different from the Commons. That is why, when the Commons introduces changes to its code of conduct, we do not import them wholesale into ours. It may be quite inappropriate to do so, and I fully expect differences between our codes to continue.
Before concluding my remarks, I wish to correct one small error of fact in the commissioners’ report on the noble Earl, which describes him as a Government Whip. I am sure that the noble Baroness the Government Chief Whip would wish me to be clear that although the noble Earl, Lord Shrewsbury, has served as a party whip, he has never held a government position.
It gives me no pleasure to move these Motions and, as I said on a previous occasion, I hope to appear as infrequently as possible at this Dispatch Box. I hope that my brief remarks, along with the reports themselves, which Members have had an opportunity to read, explain why I and the Conduct Committee dismissed the appeals of the two noble Lords and upheld the findings and recommendations of our independent commissioners for standards. I now invite the House to do the same. I beg to move.
Motion agreed.