My Lords, I am pleased that additions are to be made to the Armed Forces covenant. I know that the Royal British Legion and other forces charities have raised points of substance and I wish to be helpful in tabling and debating suitable improvements.

As the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, mentioned, as Minister he introduced the covenant in the 2011 Act. It added two sections about the annual report, and they were to be inserted, almost as a postscript, into a miscellaneous part of the 2006 Act. I objected to this de minimis approach. First, it did not seem to accord with the importance that Prime Ministers and many others then attributed to the concept of the covenant. Their fine sentiments deserved better visibility in legislation. Secondly, two new covenant sections followed immediately: Section 359 dealt with posthumous pardons for servicemen executed for disciplinary offences in World War I—an unfortunate juxtaposition of veteran treatment. My proposed Amendment was resisted but, after protracted discussions, by Third Reading the Government decided that the covenant deserved better treatment and should be given its own separate and distinct part, where it now sits as Part 16A. The Government tabled the relevant amendment but, graciously reflecting my persistence, the Minister asked me to speak first to move his own amendment. Clause 8 of today’s Bill builds on that modest beginning.

When the 2011 and 2016 Bills were debated, I commented that they were large, cumbersome Marshalled Lists for the latest version of the 2006 Act. This 2021 Bill is even larger. There are over 85 insertions of substance and five pages of concurrent jurisdiction— no less than 10 for the Armed Forces covenant—and 15 pages of schedules. When it was introduced in 2006, the Bill was over 340 pages long. Now it is close to 400, thanks to the 2011 and 2016 Acts. I asked in 2011 and again in 2016, without answer, why the Government did not introduce the Bill in the form in which they wished it to be enacted, replacing the 2006 Act in toto. It might be a 400-page Act, but the Bill before us is over 50 pages. Future quinquennial reviews could be considering 50 pages of amendments to a 500-page plus, and growing, 2006 Act.

It might be possible, if the Bill were to be a new one, to tidy up the presentation. It has a plethora of parts, chapters and miscellaneous add-ons. The 2006 Act, which was an amalgam of the single service legislation, was a brand new Bill, replacing the single service Acts: a departure from the quinquennial amendments of past Acts. Is there any reason why this legislation, at least in the future, bearing in mind it has passed in the other place, could not be tabled as a complete Bill? It would be more readable and comprehensible, compared with the cross-referencing now required. Maybe this time the Minister will be able to respond.

The thrust of new Chapter 3A in Clause 7, in particular protocols for directors of prosecutions to follow and arrangements to approve their alteration, worry me. I remain concerned that the march of disciplinary legislation for the Armed Forces has the unintended but most unfortunate implication that Parliament and the Government harbour a lack of trust in the higher ranks of the chain of command and the military courts martial system. Yet trust in the chain of command, both upwards and down, is of crucial and overriding importance to the very life and fighting resolve of the Armed Forces. So too there should be no unintended inference that courts martial, which are an essential part of the Armed Forces disciplinary structure, are inadequate or failing. One should look rather at what steps might be taken to counter or dispel any such impression.

These new protocols are ill-defined. Could not different versions be approved for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland? The view of the service prosecutor may be overruled by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Lord Advocate for Scotland or the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, as the case may be. The prosecutors are only required to “consult” the Secretary of State, presumably the Defence Secretary, and other named bodies, which differ in each jurisdiction. Is “consult” strong enough to avoid or prevent different approaches to these protocols? Is there a danger that one or more of the final civilian arbiters of the protocols may be personally averse to courts martial, being inconsistent, in their view, with a fair and efficient justice system? What may not be a worry now might be in the future without some strengthening of the protocol arrangements. Is it right that the disciplinary structure of the Armed Forces should be a devolved matter? Is this Bill not a further diminution of courts martial? I look forward to some reassurances from the Minister in winding up the debate.