I beg to move,

That this House
insists on its disagreement with the Lords in their Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88, insists on its amendments 88C, 88E to 88P, 88R, 88S and 88W to the words restored to the Bill by that disagreement, does not insist on its amendments 88A, 88T, 88U and 88V to the words so restored to the Bill, but proposes further amendments (a) to (j) to the words so restored to the Bill.

It is obviously disappointing to see that not every Member in this Chamber wishes to stay for a detailed discussion of the Pension Schemes Bill, but it is not the biggest disappointment ever. It is good to see our regular engagers on this Bill in their place. I thank in particular those Members for helpful discussions on the Bill in recent days.

I do not intend to detain the House for long. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That is the reaction we are always looking for. Members will be aware that there is one outstanding issue between this House and the other place when it comes to the Bill, and it relates to the reserve power on asset allocation. Today the Government return to their previous amendments on this issue. They spell out the intended purpose of the reserve power to underpin the industry’s own commitments in the Mansion House accord and to rule out other uses, such as a focus on any specific asset or asset class.

We are also bringing forward a final set of changes that aim to do justice to the points made in this House and the other place, while retaining the original policy intent. They have three elements. First, there is a new requirement on regulators—in this case, the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority—to make an assessment of barriers to the delivery of private asset investment, including the extent to which those barriers reflect the collective action problem, which we have discussed extensively in our exchanges on the Bill. That assessment would be required to be incorporated into the ex-ante report that the Secretary of State must produce before any use of the reserve power that the Bill provides for.

Importantly, our amendments also place on the Government a duty to have regard to this regulatory assessment before any use of the power. That will ensure that a Secretary of State behaving reasonably—as they are required to do—must place weight on the assessment of the regulators on this matter. It was always the Government’s intention to evaluate progress against the Mansion House accord commitments in terms of the broad direction of travel over a substantial period of time, rather than looking at short-term movements in private asset exposure. To reinforce that, we propose to add to the Bill that the power cannot be exercised any earlier than 2028.

Our second set of changes builds on the savers’ interest test to reinforce the central role of trustees and providers. Our amendments in lieu would change the bar required to engage the savers’ interest test. Rather than having to demonstrate that meeting the asset allocation requirements would be likely to cause material financial detriment, a scheme would instead have to show that meeting the requirements is

“likely not to be in the best interests of members”.

That reflects language regularly used when considering trustees’ duties. In addition, we have more tightly specified the regulators’ role, confining it to ensuring that the trustee or provider’s own assessment of what is in the best interests of members is “reasonable”, rather than replacing that assessment with their own.

Thirdly, our amendments address worries about the differential treatment of particular investment vehicles by allowing for consideration of direct or indirect holdings in the six asset classes named in the Mansion House accord.

I remind the House that the Bill has its roots in much work that was under way for some time in Government, but also in the commitment in the Labour party manifesto to ensure that workplace pension schemes take advantage of scale and invest in a wider range of productive assets. That is why one of the first things that the Government did on taking office was to launch a comprehensive review of pensions investment. That review found clear evidence that the defined-contribution pensions market is operating with an excessively narrow focus on costs, to the detriment of saver outcomes. That is where the reserve power comes from. It exists because the review found—and the industry itself has told us this, publicly and privately—that competitive pressure focused on cost minimisation is the single biggest barrier to diversifying in savers’ long-term interests.

However, things can of course change over time, and a range of other factors may come into play. We have discussed them with, in particular, Mark Garnier. The changes that we propose today address directly that worry and others. They require regulators to assess whether these competitive pressures remain a material barrier to more diverse private asset investment before any use of the power, and they put trustees’ or providers’ own assessments of savers’ best interests centre stage.

On that basis, I commend the Government’s position to the House.

I call the Shadow Secretary of State.

Let me begin by welcoming the Minister back to his place—we missed him last night, and it is good to see him back in the Chamber.

Throughout our many debates, we have broadly agreed on the policy intent behind most of the Bill, but as I have said time and again, agreement on the principles of a Bill is not the same as offering the Minister unqualified support for every measure in it, particularly the power contained in Clause 40, the power of mandation—or the reserve power, as the Chief Secretary calls it—which enables Ministers to instruct pension funds where to invest. When the Bill was first introduced, that mandation power was truly breathtaking in its scope. It was extraordinary—an unconstrained power that would have allowed the Secretary of State access to 100% of at least £400 billion-worth of auto-enrolment default pension funds. It would have allowed Ministers to direct their investment in whatever way they saw fit.

What happened the moment that became clear to people? Members sitting opposite and, indeed, behind me—not least those in Reform UK—were already queuing up with pet projects and struggling sectors. They thought that savers’ money should be used for net zero schemes, steel and renationalising water. They were not proposing those measures on the grounds of the return on investment for savers, and the income that they would generate for people’s later life; that much is obvious. But we said no—no to politicians having that power, no to Ministers directing pension savings into their pet projects, and no to overriding the interests of savers in favour of politicians desperate for access to capital.

I was clear from the outset that the power was dangerous and had no place in the Bill. After sustained pressure from the industry, from the other place and from this side of the House, the Government have, very slowly, been forced to row back. They have rowed back from a power grab that threatened trust in auto-enrolment pensions and risked damaging savers’ retirement incomes. Let us be clear about what those concessions amount to. First, on allocation limits, the original Bill contained no cap whatsoever on how much of a saver’s pension could be mandated into specified assets. Now, after pressure, the Government have imposed hard limits. No more than 10% of a default fund may be directed into qualifying assets, and no more than 5% may be directed specifically into UK assets. That is a major retreat from the original proposal.

Secondly, on sunset and single-use restrictions, the Government have brought forward the expiry date of the reserve power to 2032, if unused. They will repeal the whole regime by 2035 unless it is renewed by fresh primary legislation, and have limited the core mandation power so that it can be exercised only once—another retreat. Thirdly, the scope has been narrowed. Mandation can now apply only to the main default auto-enrolment fund, not the entire pension scheme or every pot—again, another retreat.

Today we have had further concessions. The Government now accept that before this power can be exercised, regulators must conduct an independent assessment of whether a genuine collective action problem exists—whereby no one wants to be the first mover—and whether that problem is inhibiting investment in private markets. We have been consistent in our view that mandation is not the right solution, but we accept that requiring independent assessment before the power can be exercised is a safeguard against ministerial overreach, and I appreciate the Pensions Minister’s assurances from the Dispatch Box on the weight of evidence required. The Government have also accepted that the reserve power cannot be used before 2028—again, another retreat.

The Government have further strengthened the savers’ interest test following yesterday’s Amendment. Schemes will no longer have to prove that compliance would likely cause “material financial detriment”. Instead, they need only demonstrate that compliance is likely not to be in the best interests of members, thereby aligning the test with trustees’ existing fiduciary duties. That matters, because fiduciary duty is sacrosanct and must be protected. Nothing is more important in a modern pension system than the duty to act solely in the best interests of savers. That duty is the foundation on which trust in our pension system rests. This amendment means that in a conflict between mandation and fiduciary duty, fiduciary duty wins—again, another important retreat. Finally, the Government have agreed to remove discrimination between investment vehicles by clarifying that both direct and indirect holdings in the relevant asset classes count towards compliance—the final retreat.

Every one of those changes tells the same story: the Government introduced a power that was too broad, too vague and too dangerous. Step by step, and under pressure, they have been forced to narrow it, constrain it and hedge it with safeguards. Why? Because the original power was indefensible, and because the Government knew that the concerns were real. The work that we have done has obliterated the Government’s original proposal. As it stands now, the mandation power looks nothing like how it was first imagined. What began as a sweeping ministerial power grab has been stripped back, pared down and boxed in on all sides. Only now, after our Intervention, has it become at least palatable. It is a vestige of its former overmighty self—a shrivelled husk.

Let me be clear: we do not believe that the Government should direct private capital, or that Ministers should interfere in investment decisions that are properly left to trustees and markets. Here we have Labour doing what it always does: thinking that the Government are the answer, with the state going where it has no place to go. When the Conservatives return to government, we will remove mandation from the statute book entirely, because at the heart of this policy lies a dangerous assumption that Ministers in Whitehall know better than trustees, fund managers and markets on how to invest the public’s pension savings. I have yet to meet anyone who wants a politician managing their pension, and pensions belong to the people who earn them, not Government Ministers. It is as simple as that.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

The Liberal Democrats have opposed mandation from day one, and we have continued to oppose it throughout the passage of this Bill. The challenge is that once we cross the Rubicon, we change the dynamics of pensions significantly. Crucially, people need to have confidence that contributing to pensions is a good way of saving for their retirement. If we undermine that through Government interference, it will reduce people’s confidence in saving for their pensions. That would be a complete reversal of what this Bill is all about, because it is mostly about making sure that our pension system is fit for the future and fit to serve those who are looking to have a good retirement. That is to be celebrated, and the vast Majority of this Bill is to be welcomed. However, although the Liberal Democrats welcome the significant concessions—those steps in the right direction—the Rubicon has still been crossed. We continue to have grave concerns.

The hon. Gentleman makes a powerful point; I am sure that the Minister will reflect on it when winding up. The Liberal Democrats continue to oppose mandation, and we plan to vote against the motion tonight.

The House divided: Ayes 335, Noes 158.

Question accordingly agreed to.