It is a real pleasure to follow the maiden speech of Lee Pitcher. It is also a great pleasure to have another Yorkshire Hammer in the House, but let me give him some friendly advice: he might not want to have my neighbour, Richard Burgon, sitting behind him next time. If the hon. Gentleman does give him any trouble, he should just ask to compare their teams’ European cabinets.

As the current leader of the UK delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I want to say something about defence in an ever-changing world. I hope there is not too much of a pause in the defence reviews that have already taken place, and there has been some debate about that. I understand why a new defence review is taking place under a new Government, but I think it worth noting that we have moved to a 360° view of NATO and the threats that it faces.

We may well see a change of Administration in the United States, and with any change of Administration it takes time to work out the direction that the new Administration want to take. I do not feel as fearful as some about President Trump returning to the White House, because during his last tenure he invested heavily in NATO and did not undermine it. We know that while his habit is to create great upset and make big statements, the reality turns out to be somewhat different, and he works towards building on that. Nevertheless, this is something that will have to be considered. What Trump did succeed in doing was getting European allies to build their defence strategies and budgets, and we cannot escape the fact that the demands on the defence of Europe are growing and growing, not just on land but at sea.

We know that Russia has mapped the bed of the North sea. It has mapped the fuel pipelines and the data cables, and obviously the surface platforms are at risk. We know that the Royal Navy and our allies spend a great deal of time counteracting that, and I am proud that the Conservative Government established a huge shipbuilding programme the likes of which had not been seen for very many years. It provides long-term contracts that allow the shipyards and the companies to invest, and, crucially, allow the Royal Navy to be the capable force that it needs to be. That must be key not just to the maintaining of a maritime nation, but to where the maritime interests lie in the world.

Climate change has already been mentioned today. An undeniable fact in that connection is the opening up of the High North and the north-east passage. Another undeniable fact is that the Russians have been rebuilding and revamping bases along their northern shoreline, and yet another undeniable fact is that the Ukraine war that Vladimir Putin illegally started, thinking he would be able to walk in and dominate that country in a very short space of time, has decimated his economy in the long run. Going to war will always decimate an economy, but this war has decimated Russia’s military, costing it a huge number of military personnel, and has made Putin reliant on other countries, such as China. It is notable that before the Ukraine war Chinese vessels never really went into the High North, but they do now because Russia lets them in.

Tension will build in the High North, and we have to be ready for it. I think we are ready for it—we have taken part in vital exercises in the area—but that just goes to show how vital the Royal Navy is. It is, of course, also vital that we have a functioning air force, and that we continue with the procurement of F-35s. Russian jets try to violate our airspace—certainly NATO airspace—on, I think, a daily basis, and they need to be met with confrontation. NATO is a deterrent rather than an aggressive force, but deterrence can only happen if those concerned feel the consequences of the balance of power. I believe that NATO is strong enough at the moment. No other combined maritime force in the world constantly has at least 36 ships patrolling the sea; that is what NATO is able to bring together. However, it is vital that when we carry out the strategic defence review, we analyse not just what we need in maritime terms today, but what will come in the future; not just how we patrol the airspace today, but what will come in the future.

We must also address the position of the Army, which has been under discussion for decades. It is all very well to talk about hollowing out the armed forces and going for the lowest number of personnel. This was, in many ways, the post-cold war dividend, and that dividend has gone, as a number of us warned that it would before the conflict in Ukraine, and it will not come back. That leads to some tough choices. There has to be honesty in the conversation about how much of our GDP we should be spending, because it will add up to 100%, and that means that the budget must be cut somewhere else. I am proud that we have the track to get to 2.5%, but, as I was trying to ask in my intervention on the Secretary of State, if this review adds up to more than 2.5%—if it says, “This is what we need to be able to defend a changing arena”—will the Government spend that money? We cannot on one the hand say that we aim to get to 2.5%, rather than giving a specific date, and on the other hand say, “We are going to have a strategic defence review, but what if it costs 3%?” Will this actually be achieved? That is an important question.