I accept and believe that it is important that we have some means of protecting people in this House. This is something that we have been trying to do, and the introduction of the ICGS has helped in that process, making people confident that there is a route through which they can complain and where they can have their best interests assured and safeguarded.

The problem with this motion is that it is simply unconstitutional. If we want to go down this route, we need to legislate for it. From time immemorial—actually since 1340—unmolested access to this House has been the right of every Member and that is for a very good reason. These privileges are not for us as individuals, but they are, as my right hon. Friend Sir Liam Fox said, because of the 80,000 people whom we represent.

The ability to take away that right of attendance has always been held exclusively by the whole House. There is one exception I can think of to this and that is in 1648 with Pride’s purge—[Interruption.] We have some chuntering from Sir Chris Bryant as we so often do. Yes, the Speaker may name somebody and ask them to withdraw, but any suspension requires a motion—a divisible motion. We have expelled Members historically. We have suspended Members and continue to do so. That involves a vote of the whole House. If we expel a Member, that Member has the right then to stand for Parliament and be sent straight back again. That is a fundamental right not of us, but of the people who sent us here.

The John Wilkes case is famous. The House disliked an individual Member and expelled him, but he stood and he succeeded and he was returned. Politically, that is of great importance. In this instance, we are suggesting that a small committee will have the power to deny constituents representation. That is not within the power of this House, unless it acts as a whole. A small committee cannot deprive Members of the right of attendance. It is a right, as I have said, that goes back to 1340. The only way to override such ancient rights—this is the whole basis of our system of common law—is by legislation, not by motion.