After section 40CA of the Prison Act 1952 (inserted by section 75 above) insert—

“40CB Throwing articles into prison

(1) A person who, without authorisation, throws any article or substance into a prison is guilty of an offence.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) the reference to an article or substance does not include a reference to a List A article, a List B article or a List C article (as defined by section 40A);

(b) the reference to “throwing” an article or substance into a prison includes a reference to doing anything from outside the prison that results in the article or substance being projected or conveyed over or through a boundary of the prison so as to land inside the prison.

(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for the accused to show that—

(a) he reasonably believed that he had authorisation to do the act in respect of which the proceedings are brought, or

(b) in all the circumstances there was an overriding public interest which justified the doing of that act.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine (or both);

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine (or both).

(5) In this section “authorisation” means authorisation given for the purposes of this section; and subsections (1) to (3) of section 40E apply in relation to authorisations so given as they apply to authorisations given for the purposes of section 40D.”” —(Karen Bradley.)

This New Clause creates a new offence of throwing any article or substance into a prison without authorisation (so far as not already prohibited under the Prison Act 1952). The offence would be triable either way with a maximum penalty (on conviction on indictment) of two years’ imprisonment.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 24—Codes of practice about investigatory powers: journalistic sources.

New clause 4—Investigation of crime: journalistic and privileged material—

‘(1) After section 22(5B) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (obtaining and disclosing communications data) insert—

“(5C) An authorisation granted or notice given under subsection (3), (3B) or (4) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime may not authorise or require any activity which is likely to result in journalistic source information or privileged information being obtained or disclosed, unless a judge has permitted the grant of the authorisation or the giving of the notice in accordance with section 22A.

(5D) For the purposes of this section “journalistic source information” means information which identifies, or might reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of, the source of confidential journalistic material, within the meaning given by section 100 of the Police Act 1997.

(5E) For the purposes of this section “privileged information” means—

(a) information amounting to or contained in matters subject to legal privilege within the meaning given by section 98 of the Police Act 1997; and

(b) confidential personal information, within the meaning given by section 99 of that Act, acquired or created in the course of, or otherwise obtained in connection with, a person‘s acting as a minister of religion, as a healthcare professional or as a Member of the House of Commons.”

(2) After section 22 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 insert—

“22A Judicial protection of journalistic and privileged material

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person wishes to grant an authorisation or give a notice under section 22(3), (3B) or (4) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; and

(b) the authorisation or notice is likely to result in journalistic source information or privileged information (as defined in section 22(5D) and (5E)) being obtained or disclosed.

(2) The person may apply to a Circuit Judge for permission to grant the authorisation or to give the notice.

(3) The application must—

(a) be in writing;

(b) set out the grounds on which it is made;

(c) be made on notice to any person to whom the authorisation or notice would be granted or given or who might reasonably be expected to be required to comply with it, unless the applicant certifies that there is reason to believe that giving notice under this paragraph might seriously prejudice a criminal investigation; and

(d) comply with any other provision, including as to timing, made by rules of court.

(4) A judge may give permission under this section only if satisfied that—

(a) the grant of the authorisation or the giving of the notice is necessary for the purposes of the prevention or detection of serious crime;

(b) obtaining the data in question by the conduct authorised or required by the authorisation or notice is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by so obtaining the data; and

(c) it is right to give permission, having regard to the importance of the public interest in—

(i) protecting the confidentiality of journalists’ sources;

(ii) maintaining legal professional privilege; or

(iii) protecting the confidentiality of personal information in the circumstances specified in section 22(5E)(b).

(5) It is an offence for a person who is given notice of an application under this section to conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except with the permission of a Circuit Judge; and

(a) this subsection ceases to apply if the application is dismissed or withdrawn or if an authorisation or notice granted or given in reliance on this section has been complied with; and

(b) a person who is guilty of an offence under this subsection is liable—

(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine or both; or

(ii) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.”’

This Clause would provide for judicial oversight for police and other authorities’ access to communications data which might involve the identification of journalist sources, as recommended by the Interception of Communications Commissioner. It provides the same level of protection for legally privileged and medically privileged communications and for communications between people and their ministers of religion or their MP.

New clause 5—Code of practice on investigatory powers: journalistic and privileged material—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that any code of practice under section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 that deals (expressly or otherwise) with the use of powers under that Act in relation to the prevention or detection of serious crime, includes provisions designed to protect the public interest in—

(a) the confidentiality of journalists’ sources;

(b) legal professional privilege; and

(c) the confidentiality of personal information obtained in connection with a person’s acting as a minister of religion, as a healthcare professional or as a Member of the House of Commons.

(2) In complying with subsection (1) the Secretary of State must—

(a) consult the Interception of Communications Commissioner appointed under section 57(1) of that Act; and

(b) have regard to any relevant report of an inquiry submitted by that Commissioner to the Prime Minister.’

This new Clause provides that the RIPA Code of Practice includes provisions which protect the public interest in the confidentiality of journalists’ sources and the other privileged communications.

New clause 18—Excluded persons (involvement in serious crime): publication of names—

‘(1) Where the Secretary of State has exercised prerogative powers to exclude from, or deny entry into, the United Kingdom any foreign national on grounds of a reasonable belief that the named person has benefited from, or has a material connection to or involvement in, one or more serious crimes, including but not limited, to the commission of—

(a) an act or acts deliberately undertaken to foster extremism or hatred;

(b) an act or acts deliberately undertaken to facilitate, contribute to, support, encourage or promote terrorism;

(c) an act or acts of torture or any other international crime or serious violation of international human rights law; or

(d) a money-laundering offence or any other offence relating to serious or organised crime or more than one such offence, the Secretary of State shall, subject to subsection (2), publish the name of each such person, and the ground or grounds for exclusion, within one month of the exclusion coming into effect.

(2) The publication of the name of an excluded person under subsection (1) may be deferred by the Secretary of State, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that such publication would present a risk to—

(a) national security or public safety;

(b) enable suspects in a United Kingdom criminal investigation to avoid arrest, or

(c) materially reduce the prospects of a conviction in an existing criminal prosecution in the United Kingdom, for no longer than is required to materially mitigate the risk or risks identified in this subsection and, in any case for no longer than up to a maximum of six months.

(3) In the case of a deferred publication of the name of an excluded person, the Secretary of State shall, on publication of such a deferred name, also publish a statement identifying which risk, or which of the risks, identified in subsection (2) applied in making the decision to defer publication.

(4) This section shall apply to persons already excluded from, or denied entry into, the United Kingdom, on grounds included in subsection (1), from the date on which it comes into force.’

New clause 20—Prevention of firearms offences—

‘In the Firearms Act 1968 insert—

“28B Assessing public safety

(1) When assessing the threat to public safety under sections 27, 28, 30A, 30B or 30C the Chief Police Officer must ensure that a range of background checks are performed.

(2) Where these checks uncover substantiated evidence of violent conduct or domestic violence, the Chief Police Officer should refuse the licence application unless exceptional evidence can be brought forward by the applicant as to their suitability to possess a weapon.

(3) When assessing public safety within this section the Chief Police Officer must follow any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.

(4) The Secretary of State must ensure adequate resourcing of licence applications and consult with Chief Police Officers to ensure the level of fees collected by the Police under sections 32 and 35 are sufficient for the Police to recoup the costs they incur through the administration and assessment of firearms licences issued or applied for under this Act.”’

New clause 21—New psychoactive substances—

‘(1) It is an offence for a person to supply, or offer to supply, a synthetic psychoactive substance, including but not restricted to—

(a) a powder;

(b) a pill;

(c) a liquid; or

(d) a herbal substance with the appearance of cannabis, which he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to be so acting, that the substance is likely to be consumed by a person for the purpose of causing intoxication.

(2) This section does not apply to alcohol, tobacco, or any drug currently scheduled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or the Medicines Act 1968 or any substance, product or foodstuff specified by the Secretary of State following consultation with the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this Part of this Act shall be liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both such imprisonment and fine;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.’

New clause 28—Proceeds of Crime: detection and prevention of money-laundering measures—

‘The Proceeds of Crime Act is amended as follows—

“(6A) Where the National Crime Agency has reasonable grounds to believe that—

(a) activity that gave rise to a Suspicious Activity Report is related to money-laundering; and

(b) there is a realistic prospect of investigating the case effectively, the Agency may seek an order from the court for an extension, for a period of up to a further 31 days, of the moratorium period under section (6).

(6B) An order under subsection (6A) may be granted where the court is satisfied that that criteria in that subsection have been met.”’

Government amendments 1 and 23 to 31.

In the interests of brevity, I will concentrate on new clause 24 and the related amendments, and I will look forward to hearing from right hon. and hon. Members during the debate.

New clause 24 relates to the use of powers under part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—RIPA—to identify journalists’ sources. New clauses 4 and 5, tabled by my hon. Friend Dr Huppert, cover the same ground. I do not believe there is any issue of substance between him and his supporters and the Government on this topic. Indeed, I venture to suggest that the whole House is united on the underlying issue: a free press is fundamental to our democracy, and nothing should be done that might endanger that.

For that reason, when the independent interception of communications commissioner issued a report earlier this month recommending judicial authorisation of requests for communications data intended to establish the source of journalistic material, the Government immediately accepted the recommendation in full. In conducting his inquiry into access to journalistic material, the commissioner did not find widespread or systemic abuse. In fact, the inquiry found very few cases in which police forces had sought to obtain communications data for the purposes of determining journalists’ sources. The commissioner stated that

“police forces are not randomly trawling communications data relating to journalists in order to identify their sources”.

Nevertheless, the commissioner found some cases where insufficient care and attention had been given in applications and where there was not due consideration of the implications for freedom of expression.

Primary legislation is required to give effect to the commissioner’s recommendation relating to judicial authorisation. The issue for the House is how best to give effect to that recommendation. It is an issue that many right hon. and hon. Members feel strongly about, and I welcome this opportunity to pay tribute to John McDonnell, who has been tenacious on behalf of the parliamentary branch of the National Union of Journalists.

We have to accept, however, that we are coming to the end of this Parliament and that the legislative options are limited. The Bill is concerned with serious crime, and amendments are therefore necessarily constrained to that subject. For that reason, I cannot accept new clause 4. Under RIPA, the police and others can acquire communications data in relation to the prevention and detection of all crime, as well as for other purposes, such as in the interests of public safety. Were we to accept the new clause, the police would be permitted to identify a journalist’s source only in a serious crime case. As such, it would not be possible to provide in the Bill for judicial authorisation of the acquisition of communications data for the purposes of determining the source of journalistic information in a non-serious crime case.

Under RIPA, a serious crime is one for which an adult with no previous convictions could expect to receive a custodial sentence of three years or more. This rules out legislating in the Bill on applications for communications data to identify a journalist’s source relating to investigations for relevant offences under, for example, the Official Secrets Act 1989, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Computer Misuse Act 1990. The commissioner referred specifically to investigations under the Computer Misuse Act in paragraph 7.3. It would not be satisfactory to create such a situation, and nor would we be acting on the commissioner’s recommendation were we to do so.

Will the Minister give way?

I hope my hon. Friend will understand if I do not, given the limited time frame and because I know he will make a contribution later. I hope I will cover his concerns in my remarks, and I look forward to hearing his comments.

Our solution is new clause 24, which I freely confess is modelled on my hon. Friend’s new clause 5. It provides that any code of practice issued under RIPA dealing with the use of RIPA investigatory powers in relation to the prevention or detection of serious crime should include provisions protecting the public interest and the confidentiality of journalists’ sources. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult the commissioner and to have regard to any relevant reports that he has made.

As hon. Members might know, we launched a consultation last November on a draft RIPA acquisition of communications data code. We received more than 300 responses, and I am grateful to everyone who took the trouble to submit a response. The draft code included new wording about the requirement for extra consideration to be given in cases involving the communications data of journalists and those in other sensitive professions. However, we were clear that we would not finalise the code until we had had time to consider the consultation responses fully and, equally importantly, had been able to consider the commissioner’s recommendation. I can assure the House that we are keen to finalise and bring forward the revised code as soon as possible. It will require the approval of both Houses of Parliament before it comes into effect.

I recognise, however, that we should do more to give rapid effect to the commissioner’s recommendation. Accordingly, we will require law enforcement agencies to use production orders, which are judicially authorised under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—or the equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland—for applications for communications data to determine journalistic sources. I hope that this will provide welcome reassurance.

Nevertheless, this is not a long-term solution. PACE applies only to indictable offences, is for evidential, rather than intelligence purposes, and has specific access considerations. The ultimate solution, therefore, is legislation that will give full effect to the commissioner’s recommendation. Regrettably, that will have to wait until after the election, but the Government have today published a draft clause for that purpose so that there can be no doubt about how we intend to proceed as soon as the opportunity arises. I hope that the combination of the requirements imposed by new clause 24, the interim use of production orders and a firm commitment to future legislation will reassure those who are concerned, and that on the basis of what I have said my hon. Friend Dr Huppert will not press new clauses 4 and 5.

Will the Minister say something about the time scale? As of when will production orders be required, and will the secondary legislation on the code of practice be in place before the election, so that we can pass it in time?

If my hon. Friend does not mind, I will come back to those points when I have heard all his comments. I will respond to all his concerns together, if that is acceptable to him.

New clause 23 would create a new offence of throwing an article or substance into a prison without authorisation. It is designed to address the significant and increasing problem of the presence of new psychoactive substances in our prisons. In applying to any article or substance, the new offence will also capture wider threats to prison security and good order. It will add to the existing criminal offences in the Prison Act 1952, which make it an offence for a person to convey into a prison certain specified items, including controlled drugs, alcohol or mobile phones without authorisation. The maximum penalty for the new offence will be two years’ imprisonment, sending a clear message to would-be traffickers.

What will the new clause add to what is already in law?

We feel that it is important to have the ability to deal with the problem in criminal law. We have identified it as a problem, and we want to ensure that we can deal with it.

Government amendment 1 does not require much explanation. It is a technical amendment to the provisions in part 4 of the Bill relating to the seizure and forfeiture of substances used as drug-cutting agents. It simply provides that in Scotland, applications to a sheriff under clauses 60, 61, 63 and 64 must be made by summary application, as distinct from other forms of application such as an initial writ or small claim.

I commend the Government amendments and new clauses to the House. I look forward to hearing what right hon. and hon. Members throughout the House have to say about their new clauses, and to responding to them.

The Opposition support Government new clause 23. I want to make some brief comments about Government new clause 24 and new clauses 4 and 5, which, as the Minister said, all relate to how the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is being used to access journalists’ source material or materials subject to legal privilege.

The issue has been around for a while, and Labour called for, and got agreement from the Government on, a broader review of RIPA by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. In the meantime, the interception of communications commissioner has published a report containing two recommendations: first, that access to journalistic source material should require prior approval from a court, and secondly, that when communications data are sought, they should not relate to an investigation to determine a source of journalistic information when, for example, the journalist is a victim of crime or is suspected of committing a crime unrelated to their occupation. It was recommended that chapter II of part I of RIPA may be used, so long as the designated person gives adequate consideration to necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion, including the possible unintended consequences of the conduct. The revised code contains very little guidance about what those considerations should be, and that absence needs to be addressed. As I said, Labour called for the fundamental review of RIPA by David Anderson QC, and it has consistently called for the intelligence commissioners to be given a more prominent role. We therefore welcome the interception of communications commissioner’s report and accept his recommendations. That is an example of the role that the commissioners should be playing.

New clauses 4 and 5 are intended to implemented the commissioner’s recommendations. New clause 5 demands that a new code of conduct be written, in consultation with the interception of communications commissioner. The Government have essentially accepted that point in tabling new clause 24. New clause 4 would amend RIPA to introduce judicial oversight. However, as I understand it, and as the Minister indicated, it has been limited by what can be included under the scope of the Bill. It would therefore apply only when data were sought for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime, which is only one of eight justifications for accessing data. Essentially, the limitations of the Bill mean that we cannot fully implement the commissioner’s recommendations. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why the Government did not seek the leave of the House to extend the scope of the Bill—as I understand it, they could have done so by tabling a motion of instruction.

New clause 21 is about new psychoactive substances. We have tabled it to enable effective action to be taken against the sellers of legal highs. It would mean that legal highs could be controlled in the same way as solvents, making it much easier to prosecute and close down sellers and prevent them from using the excuse that a substance is not for human consumption. A similar approach has been adopted in Ireland, and the number of head shops there has fallen from 100 to six. The new clause was drafted in conjunction with the Angelus Foundation, and we also took advice from the UK Drug Policy Commission.

I know that there have been some attempts to close down sellers through trading standards legislation, but most attempted prosecutions have failed because sellers use a loophole in the law to avoid prosecution by labelling their products as plant food or bath salts, or by saying that they are not fit for human consumption. We believe that new clause 21 could deal with that.

New clause 20 deals with firearms and would strengthen police decision making about the issuing of a firearms licence. The Government have said that they are committed to the general principle of full cost recovery across the public sector, including for passports and driving licences. However, a fishing licence application, which involves no background check at all and is required by nearly half a million anglers each year, costs at least £27, whereas a shotgun licence costs £50 for five years. The Government’s attempt to introduce full cost recovery should be extended to gun licences, which should not be subsidised by funds allocated to policing.

Finally, I wish to comment on new clauses 18 and 28. New clause 18 is intended to facilitate the publication of the names of those who have been excluded from the UK, and is motivated by the legitimate concerns that Mr Raab holds about what we are doing to ensure that those connected to torture and undesirable regimes are kept out of the country. New clause 28 would introduce new powers to tackle illegal money flows connected to a range of crimes and terrorism. We know only too well that ISIL is estimated to be making £3 million a day through flows of money.

As the time available is limited, and because I do not want to pre-empt the hon. Gentleman’s comments about the new clauses, I will be brief. We have concerns that there may be unintended consequences of how they are drafted. We will want to listen to what he has to say about them.

It was widely trailed in the media, when the leader of the Labour party had dinner with the Clooneys, that the Labour party would get behind a UK Magnitsky Act. New clause 18 is the most modest step in that direction. Is it the Labour party’s position to say one thing after a glitzy Hollywood dinner, and then do something entirely different when it comes to having the courage of its convictions?

I will be interested to hear what the hon. Gentleman has to say about new clause 18, because it will be helpful to have the details. What I am saying to him is that we have concerns about the drafting of it. We support the principle of it.

I find the shadow Minister’s response to my hon. Friend quite staggering. She made the same point about new clause 28, which I have tabled. Is it seriously the Opposition’s case that 31 days is sufficient time to investigate multimillion-pound suspicious activity reports such as that in the case of OPL 245?

I want to hear the comments that the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Esher and Walton will make about their new clauses. Time is limited, and on the instructions of Mr Speaker I am trying to keep my comments short. I am pointing out that there may be unintended consequences of how the clauses are currently drafted.

It is a pleasure to speak in the debate. I shall confine my comments to the proposal for journalists to be protected under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, because I think that is very important.

I know that we have to proceed fairly quickly, but it is worth my setting out the facts. There was a great deal of public concern when it became clear that Met police had been using RIPA to look into journalists’ sources during Operation Alice. For instance, they examined the phone records of Tom Newton Dunn, political editor of The Sun. Kent police also obtained records during Operation Solar. According to a report by the interception of communications commissioner, 19 forces made more than 600 requests for information about journalists’ phone records to try to identify their sources., and that has had a very large-scale and worrying effect.

I pay tribute to, in particular, the Press Gazette and the National Union of Journalists, which launched the Save Our Sources campaign. They were right to do so, because this is a fundamental issue. If police and other authorities can gain access to journalists’ records, how can anyone feel safe when contacting a journalist to blow the whistle, in the knowledge that their information may simply be passed on? People would need have to feel an immense amount of trust to do that.

I am pleased that we are making some progress on this important matter, but the extent of the progress that has been necessary has been frustrating. My party has had policies to ensure that we get this right since last year, when my Liberal Democrat colleague Lord Strasburger tabled amendments which were rejected by the Conservative Minister Baroness Williams—not Shirley, but Susan. We made a number of other attempts, and Conservative Ministers said that they wanted to act, but unfortunately it was not until we tabled new clause 5 that we forced something to happen. Not until the Deputy Prime Minister spoke out in favour of the new clause and we managed to persuade three Select Committee Chairs to support it—the Chairs of the Home Affairs, Justice and Culture, Media and Sport Committees—did we secure some partial agreement. Nevertheless, I am pleased that the Government have given way on the new clause, although, as is their wont, they have slightly rewritten it.

I welcome what the Minister said about the code of practice, but will she tell us when it will be introduced? Can she give a clear assurance—I did not hear her give one earlier, although there is such an assurance in the letter that has just been passed around—that it will definitely be in place before the end of this Parliament, having been approved by both Houses? I should be grateful if she could make it absolutely clear that the code of practice will not be delayed, because we need to act.

We hope that the code will be in place before the general election, but that will obviously be subject to parliamentary approval.

I thank the Minister, and I will hold her to at least seeking parliamentary approval in time. I accept that she cannot guarantee that both Houses will vote for the code, but I should be very alarmed if Parliament were not keen to ensure that journalists were included.

The Minister also spoke about the requirement for production orders to be used in the meantime. That is welcome, because the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 currently protects journalists so that their sources cannot be sought without judicial authorisation, but may I ask the Minister whether the use of such orders is a policy requirement as of today, whether it will require legislative change, and what time scale will be involved? I hope she will confirm that she has made a policy announcement that will take immediate effect. She does not seem to wish to intervene at the moment, but I hope that she will give answers to those questions by the end of the debate, so that I can decide whether any amendments or new clauses need to be put to a vote.

The Minister said that legislation would not be possible until the next Parliament. She was right to identify a technical drafting issue. Diana Johnson was also right to say that the Government could have fixed that had they really wanted to, but we are where we are, and I accept that, as things are, we will be leaving serious crime to be treated differently from other issues. I hope that the Minister will confirm that the draft clause—of which I have been handed a copy—will be published so that the whole House has a chance to look at it. It is a welcome step, but it does not seem to be clear about article 10 rights, and I think that it will need to be improved in that regard.

I hope that the Minister make the time scale clear, so that the House can make the right decision. It is important for us to protect journalists, and I pay tribute to those who worked so hard to ensure that that could happen. I hope that we can take a full step now, rather than a slightly small, grudging step.

New clause 18 was tabled by me and by 21 other members of the three main parties, including—I am not sure whether this is a first—seven Select Committee Chairmen. It would inject some transparency into the Government’s exercise of powers to impose visa bans or deny entry, all of which are non-statutory, in relation to people involved in serious international crimes such as torture, terrorism and other kinds of organised crime. It would give the public the right to know whom we are banning from setting foot on British soil, and, by implication, whom we are not.

The new clause was inspired by the this House’s unanimous resolution in March 2012—nearly three years ago—following a debate that I sponsored, along with the former right hon. Member for South Shields. We called on the Government to introduce a British Sergei

Magnitsky law. There is one in the United States, and other models are being touted around the world. Such a law would impose mandatory visa bans and asset freezes on any individual linked to the torture and murder of Sergei Magnitsky, or similar such international crimes, in Russia and beyond.

As the House will recall, Sergei Magnitsky was the lawyer for a British businessman, Bill Browder, and was brutally killed on orders from the Kremlin for disclosing the $230 million tax fraud—the biggest in Russian history—that had been committed by President Putin and his associates. To my regret, the Government have not produced legislation, but I should add, in fairness, that they did affirm a policy of refusing visas to individuals who were suspected of such links. Unfortunately, owing to a long-standing policy in successive Administrations, we are not told who is banned from coming to the United Kingdom when such decisions are made, so we have no way of confirming the extent to which those important powers, and the new policy that was announced by the Government in about 2012, have been exercised in practice. There are legitimate fears—which I have raised with Ministers, and with different arms of Government, on a number of occasions—that such heinous people may be making visits to Britain.

What has been the aftermath of the House’s call for a UK Magnitsky Act in 2012? Sergei Magnitsky was posthumously prosecuted by the Putin regime, and Bill Browder himself has been the subject of various legal attacks by the Russian Government. There are reports, which were documented in the BBC’s “Panorama” in 2013, that UK companies are being used to launder money related to the Magnitsky murder and other mafia-related crimes. Meanwhile, Putin has annexed a slice of Crimea and established himself as a regional menace, and is now directing his gaze to the Baltic states.

Here in the UK, we have seen the mysterious and unexplained deaths of two Russian businessmen, Alexander Perepilichny and Boris Berezovsky, who had fallen out of favour with Putin—not to mention the public inquiry into the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, which Ben Emmerson QC told the inquiry was an “act of nuclear terrorism” on British soil.

I do not know for sure, but I fear that some of those linked to President Putin's nefarious activities—the persecution of Sergei Magnitsky and other dissidents, or his wider bankrolling by the mafia—may be slipping through the net and using London as a comfortable haven, a place free of the perils of living in Russia where they can enjoy their illicit profits in quiet, in peace and in secret. I also believe that, in the 21st century, the British public have a right to know whether the henchmen of despots like Putin—or, indeed, any other international dictator or outlaw—are being granted a free pass to come to this country. The Home Office has stuck to its long-standing line that it does not routinely disclose who is denied entry, but I do not think that that line withstands the slightest scrutiny. Why should the public not be told, as a matter of basic principle, how such important powers are being exercised? During the three years for which I have campaigned on the issue, no one has given me a serious, substantive explanation. Diana Johnson talked about drafting. It seems to me that Home Office officials are burying their heads in a comfortable secrecy and lack of transparency. Why should the public not be told?

In any case, the policy is routinely flouted by the Home Office itself. When they want to make a show of banning characters who have been deemed offensive—for instance, the American radio host Michael Savage, and rappers such as Snoop Dogg—it is trailed liberally in the media. Incidentally, both those cases occurred under the last Home Secretary. At the moment the public may be told if someone who is offensive gets banned from coming here, but not those linked to crimes such as torture or terrorism. There is absolutely no explanation or justification for that double-standard. Equally there is evidently no legal or principled reason not to introduce transparency for those linked to such serious crimes. That would explain why the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs has recommended that the identity of those denied entry on human rights grounds should be made public.

I understand the shadow Minister made some points about drafting. I want to briefly say that this amendment has been checked by external counsel. It has also been cleared with the Public Bill Office and the Clerks to make sure it is in shape so that it is workable. So if the shadow Minister wants to fall back on the easy and, frankly, if I may say so, slightly lazy “We agree with you in principle but not in practice” position, I urge her to explain precisely what is wrong with it, because we looked at this drafting very carefully. Again, I would make the point to her that the leader of her party has made a big song and dance in the media about being behind a UK Sergei Magnitsky Act, and yet when it comes to this very small piece of the jigsaw puzzle, and when push comes to shove, the Labour party is hiding behind drafting technicalities without giving any detail on it.

rose—

I will gladly take an intervention from the shadow Minister.

I am very flattered to be the focus of such attention from the hon. Gentleman, but perhaps it would be wiser at this stage if he were to direct his comments more to his own Front-Bench colleagues as they are in government and can bring forward legislation, which clearly we as shadow Ministers in the Opposition cannot.

I welcome the shadow Minister’s intervention and she has got half a point, but the thing is that I have been nailing those on my Front Bench on this for three years and the difference is that they have stuck to their line fairly consistently whereas literally in the last month the leader of the Labour party has gone on record—his advisers have been trailing it liberally after the glitzy Hollywood dinner with the Clooneys—saying that actually he would go for a UK Magnitsky Act, but when push comes to shove it is nowhere to be seen. This raises a whole question about the Labour party having the courage of its convictions. So I have made this point to Members on my own Front Bench, but I also think the shadow Minister needs to be responsible for her own position and her own party’s position—and, indeed, answer for what the leader of the Labour party has trailed widely in the media.

Coming back to the substance of this, it is also worth remembering that in cases of extradition or deportation there is already a huge amount of transparency over both the policy and who is being removed. As a result, there is intense and legitimate scrutiny of Government policy. So if the public have the right to know whether the Government intend to remove the likes of Abu Qatada, why should they not equally be told whether we are banning such people from coming here in the first place? If we are serious about trying to alter Putin’s behaviour, should we not start by making sure that those who bankroll him cannot enjoy the fruits of their labour here, clandestinely in luxurious comfort? Those individuals who bankroll Putin and his like should know that when they cross the line and engage in serious international crimes, their association with him and support for him will bar their ability to enjoy the luxurious Knightsbridge lifestyle that so many of them crave. To ensure that message hits home consistently and publicly, we need transparency over such visa bans.

This new clause does not single out Russia. It would apply to any individuals linked to terrorism, violent extremism, gross violations of human rights law, money laundering and other serious organised crime, whatever their nationality and wherever they take place.

Is a further reason why we need transparency because there is very little transparency around the beneficial ownership of multimillion pound property in London? For example, a respected non-governmental organisation estimates that 45% of London property valued at above £2 million is owned offshore where the beneficial owner is opaque. If those who have profited through torture and corruption are able to own London property, it is even more important to be transparent about whether they are travelling here.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We need to shine a light on the murky mafia-related activities that are infecting our country through the acquisition of property and also by the physical entry of individuals into this country.

This amendment would also make an important statement about British foreign policy, particularly as inevitably in the 21st century we have to rub along with, deal with and engage with Governments who do not respect the same standards of liberal democracy as we do here in Britain. I am a realist and I recognise that we will have to engage with regimes with a dubious commitment to human rights or the rule of law, but there ought to be some moral red lines here. People carrying dirty money and individuals with blood on their hands should not be welcome on the streets of Britain. This is not just a question of moral principle. Sooner or later, if we keep allowing such unsavoury characters into the UK, bringing all their baggage and vendettas with them, we risk finding that it is British citizens who are caught in the crossfire or worse. After all, the Litvinenko inquiry has already heard that Putin’s thugs were willing to engage in nuclear terrorism here in public, so the threat to the British public is real and serious.

I remain convinced that Britain should enact a Sergei Magnitsky law, like the Americans, with mandatory visa bans and asset freezes imposed on people linked to the worst international crimes. In the meantime, at the very least we need to shine a light on the exercise of existing UK powers to deny entry or visas to the shady characters who prop up Putin, or indeed any other despot around the world.

This new clause does that. It would allow a temporary delay in disclosure of the identity of anyone banned if necessary for national security or law enforcement, and it would not alter the substantive scope of any existing powers, but it would ensure that they are exercised consistently, and it would ensure that the public are told whom we ban from Britain. I commend new clause 18 to the House.

I rise to speak to new clause 28 tabled in my name, which is much more modest than the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend Mr Raab. It is simply about giving law enforcement more time in respect of multimillion pound money laundering cases.

At present around 316,000 suspicious activity reports are filed each year with law enforcement agencies. Those are cases where the banks, the lawyers or the accountants have serious concerns around money laundering. According to the Home Office’s own figures, between £23 billion and £57 billion are being channelled through the UK economy each year, so we know the scale of money laundering is significant. At present, when a suspicious activity report is filed the law enforcement agencies—the National Crime Agency has now taken on this responsibility —have just seven days to say whether they give consent to those multimillion pound transfers going ahead. That is just seven days on a case that might well have been built over many years, often involving jurisdictions where information is difficult to obtain, and if law enforcement decides it does not wish to give consent to these transactions, which the financial institutions themselves have said look suspicious, they have just 31 days to build the case to the satisfaction of the courts. If they fail to do so, they risk the penalty of costs against them, which sets a strong disincentive to law enforcement to take those cases forward. To put that in context, the proceeds of crime unit investigated only 110 cases from the 316,000 suspicious activity reports filed with it, so clearly the system is not working.

I thought I would give just one case to bring this to life. The Nigerian case OPL 245 has a bit of a jargony name, but it involves $1 billion paid by a British oil company for some offshore land in Nigeria with oil assets. To put this in context, $1 billion was paid for this land for drilling—they do drill offshore, I should point out for the benefit of any Members who might be confused as to how they obtain the oil—yet 14 years earlier this land was granted to a company owned by the then Nigerian oil Minister. In essence the land was granted by the Nigerian oil Minister to a company that he owned and for which $1 billion was then paid 14 years later. In investigating that case that had developed over many years involving complex financial arrangements over different jurisdictions, law enforcement has just 31 days to build a case that would block the transfer of $1 billion that is going to a corrupt official and his henchmen.

New clause 28 simply seeks to give law enforcement agencies more time to build their case. I shall not press it to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will tell us whether the Government believe that the current arrangements provide sufficient time, or whether they accept the substance of the new clause, which is that the current arrangements are insufficient and that they load the dice against law enforcement, meaning that corrupt assets can be transferred from the UK to criminals. If the Government accept my proposal, I hope that they will change the law at the earliest opportunity to create a more level playing field by giving more time for these complex, multi-jurisdictional cases to be investigated.

I am in a state of confusion, so am here as a humble searcher for the truth on these matters. I know that the programme motion was not moved, but I am interested in discussing Government new clause 24 and new clauses 4 and 5. As secretary of the National Union of Journalists group in Parliament, I have been trying for the past year to get some clarity on the protection of journalistic sources. We have dealt with this matter under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, and now we are dealing with it under this piece of legislation. I apologise for having bored the House on the matter at times. Sometimes I have been in the Chamber talking about it almost all on my own. We are now coming to the conclusion of this legislation, at least before the general election. I appreciate that the Government have said they will return to the matter after the election.

I am unhappy with all the amendments that have been tabled, from all sides. There are three principles on which the NUJ has been campaigning—in relation to RIPA, DRIPA and this Bill—in regard to applications for access to information on journalistic sources by the police, the intelligence services or anybody else. We have discovered that a large proportion of applications have come from people in that last category—“anybody else”—in recent years, including even local authorities. The first of the three principles that the NUJ has been trying to establish is that there should be an independent process with judicial authorisation to protect professional communications. The second is that there should be automatic and mandatory prior notification of requests. The third is that there should be mechanisms in place to challenge an application, along with the right of appeal.

As I said, I am here as an honest searcher for the truth. As far as I can see, none of the amendments tabled by the Government and others satisfies all three conditions. The first is satisfied, in that there will be at least a form of the judicial authorisation for which we have been arguing for at least 12 months. However, I can see no mention in the amendments of automatic and mandatory prior notification of the requests to the parties involved. With regard to data communication and collection, I see that there has been mention of notifying the company that has collected or retained the data, but there does not seem to be a proposal for a process by which the individual journalist would be notified. Journalists do not seem to be party to these proposals at all. As a result, there seems to be no mechanism for their views to be represented when the judicial authorisation is being sought, or for them to challenge the proposal or the court’s decision on the protection of their sources.

At the moment, none of the amendments satisfies those three criteria. I would welcome the Government’s response, because I know that they are proposing to introduce detailed amendments in future legislation. I would welcome information on whether such amendments would deal with the two other criteria. I can see that judicial authorisation is being addressed, but would the questions of prior notification and the right of appeal also be covered?

The Government have argued that amendments tabled by others related solely to serious crime and not to other matters, and that they do not encapsulate all the recommendations in the recent report. I understand that argument, but the Government are still not putting forward any proposals about the use of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—PACE—in relation to the way in which production orders are applied for. This was how the whole argument started. At the moment, if a production order is applied for under PACE, the journalist is informed in advance about the order. They are then able to put their case in court and, if necessary, appeal it and have it judicially reviewed. That does not seem to be the process that is being suggested here.

The reason that there has been controversy, in relation to Metropolitan police actions in particular, is that the police sought to avoid abiding by PACE by using RIPA, thus avoiding openness, transparency and the ability of an individual journalist to contest a decision. Unless the Government introduce amendments that enable prior notification and a mechanism by which an application can be challenged, they will certainly not satisfy the journalists of the NUJ who have been working on this issue for so long, and nor will they satisfy European legislation. I would welcome information on the process from here on in, and on whether and how those issues will be addressed.

It is a pleasure to follow John McDonnell. I am sorry that he has been misdescribed as my hon. Friend Stephen Barclay on the Annunciator. I do not think that either he or my hon. Friend has any doubt about who they are, and, having listened to the hon. Gentleman speak in the House for the past 20 or so years, I certainly have no doubt as to who he is. Had he been able to be here on time today, his ears would have been burning as the Minister and others praised him for his campaign on this matter. However, it is a pleasure to see him here now, even if he has been described as Stephen Barclay on the Annunciator.

Order. Members do not need to get excited. One of the Annunciators is correct; the other is not working. However, I know what is going on, so we can proceed.

As my father used to say, Madam Deputy Speaker, “There is no point in having two clocks if they both tell the same time.”

I want briefly to respond to what my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire said about his new clause 28. Having spent quite a lot of my time as a Government Law Officer and having subsequently taken an interest in financial crime, I was much taken by what he had to say. My only suggestion would be that, rather than limiting himself to a further 31 days, he should propose—

It was proposed more to make a point.

My hon. Friend is unnecessarily modest in his ambitions. Instead of proposing 31 days, he might have proposed any such other period as the court might think just in all the circumstances. The thrust of his argument is, however, unassailable and I wish him well with his discussions with the Government. New clause 28 makes a good deal of sense.

I am honoured to be a co-signatory to new clause 18, particularly having just heard the speech by my hon. Friend Mr Raab. He has experience not only as an international lawyer but as someone who has prosecuted in some pretty terrible cases dealing with crimes in the former Yugoslavia. When he speaks, we should listen, pay attention and follow what he has to say, and what he had to say tonight was unimpeachable. I stress, as he did, that if we are to exclude people—be they foreign nationals or, under the current legislation, our own nationals—we should know who they are. Secret justice is not justice.

The new clause contains a proposed new subsection that would allow the Secretary of State to defer publication of the name of the excluded person on particular grounds. I suggest that that proposal would deal with any problems that anyone might suggest the new clause could create. The reason he has never received a cogent answer to his questions to Ministers and officials is that there is not one, and he has highlighted that. The Government should therefore have a little think about what he had to say and what is contained in his new clause.

I would say only one thing about new clause 24, and I am sorry that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington probably will not agree with me on it, albeit that we are both pretty keen on the freedom of the press. The code of practice would be an altogether more attractive concept if I could actually read it and see what it said before this thing came into legislation. The Minister properly spoke about the time limits surrounding us as we move towards the general election in May, but I used to complain in opposition, I complained in government and I complain now that secondary legislation, statutory instruments and codes of practice are subsidiary rules that hang in locked boxes from legislative trees and are not a good thing. If we are to persuade people that this measure is a good thing, we should have sight of the code of practice as soon as possible. I know that Ministers never want to commit themselves to time schedules, but this is an example of where, before the general election and before this Bill becomes an Act, we should see the fruits of the consultation process and what the code of practice should look like.

Finally, and with a degree of diffidence, I wish to discuss new clause 23. When I intervened on the Minister to ask what offences the new clause would add to, I was not given an answer—well, I was given an answer, but not to the question I asked. I was not surprised by that, because I, like my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, suspect that there is not an answer. This is what I call an early-day motion new clause. It is what is called, “Government sending out a message.” Governments can send out messages, but they do that on television, on the radio and in the newspapers, and they get their spin doctors to do it; legislation is supposed to be clear, non-repetitive and able to be clearly understood by the prosecuting authorities, the police, the courts and those who might be tempted to commit the offence that the clause hopes to describe.

I assume that an offence of “Throwing articles into prisons” is intended to prevent or persuade people not to throw caches of drugs, razor blades, mobile telephones and other contraband over prison walls or into prison property—so far, so good. We all know that that is already a crime, not just under the Prison Act 1952, but under various other pieces of criminal legislation. To take a ludicrous example, if I were to throw a copy of the Prison Act 1952, as amended, over the walls of Gartree prison in my constituency, would I be caught by this? On the face of it I would and I would be liable, on indictment, to a term of imprisonment

“not exceeding two years or to a fine (or both)”.

Sadly, the magistrates court does not exist in Market Harborough any more and I would have to be carted all the way to Leicester to be, on summary conviction, imprisoned for up to 12 months or given a fine.

It appears from the new clause that if I were to throw not “The complete works of William Shakespeare”, because that is a heavy volume, but a Shakespeare play over the prison wall, I would be committing an offence. I went to 65 of the prisons in England and Wales when I was a shadow spokesman responsible for prisons in the period leading up to the 2010 election, but I never went into or came out of a prison, young offenders institution or secure training unit without being wholly aware of the notices on the gates setting out what it was unlawful to bring into those places. Even though it might be suggested that lobbing a benign article such as “The complete works of William Shakespeare” over the prison wall was something done with an overriding public interest or with some other legitimate excuse, I do wish we could stop passing legislation that already exists just because it feels like a good thing to do. If we are going to take up the time of Ministers and officials in drafting this sort of stuff, why do we not draft something useful like new clause 18, proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, and get that into legislation, rather than this sort of guff?

Given the time and the debates that I know are to follow, I shall endeavour to answer as many points as I can, but it is highly likely that I will be brief in my comments. I will, however, commit to write to right hon. and hon. Members should I fail to address specific points in this quick winding-up speech.

I did refer to John McDonnell and I hope he will have a look at that. He talked about the notification of journalists whose communications data are sought. It has never been the practice in this country for those whose communications data are sought to be notified, and we do not intend to depart from that. However, as he recognised, this matter will need to be dealt with in the next Parliament. We have today published a draft clause which provides for judicial authorisation in cases where communications data are sought for the purpose of determining a journalistic source. No doubt he will take the opportunity that future legislation will present to press his point again. I think we all agree that the solution we have before us today is not the perfect one, but we want to legislate in some way before the election and this is the most appropriate and perhaps only way we have of doing so.

Diana Johnson, the shadow Minister asked why the Government did not seek to extend the scope of the Bill. We took advice from the Public Bill Office as to whether it would be possible to extend the scope through an instruction and thereby enable a Government new clause to be brought forward to give fullest effect to the interception of communications commissioner recommendation. The Public Bill Office advised that the scope of the Bill could not be extended in that way. We tried, but, unfortunately, that was not possible.

My hon. Friend Dr Huppert asked about the timing for the production orders. The code will put in place the requirement to use production orders in cases where communications data are sought for the purposes of determining a journalistic source. The shadow Minister, also asked about the detail of the code of practice. We will shortly publish a revised code of practice that takes account of both the consultation responses and the recommendations of the IOCC. It will contain more detail on the factors to be considered in cases involving journalistic sources.

My hon. and learned Friend Sir Edward Garnier talked about the throwing of packages over the wall. I have to tell him that in 2014 approximately 250 cases of new psychoactive substances being thrown into prison were recorded, compared with just 36 cases the previous year. There has been a significant increase in that number and in minor disorder and assaults in prison over the past year, and increased NPS use has been linked to some of those incidents. New psychoactive substances are not currently controlled drugs, which is why they do not fall within the legislation we would normally use.

rose—

I hope my hon. and learned Friend will not mind if I do not take an intervention from him at this stage, just so that I can ensure we get on to the next group.

New clause 18 was tabled by my hon. Friend Mr Raab and we have discussed this point in Westminster Hall. He will be familiar with the tribunal decision to uphold the Home Office and Information Commissioner’s decision on the neither confirm nor deny response to a freedom of information request on information held by the Department. It is a long-standing policy of this Government not to disclose the details of individual immigration cases, including in respect of those excluded from the UK. New clause 18 would have serious implications for the security of our borders and therefore to the national security of the country.

Will my hon. Friend give way on that point?

If my hon. Friend does not mind, I will not give way, because I need to finish by 8 o’clock, and I know that there are other hon. Members who wish to speak.

Will my hon. Friend give us an illustration of the security problem?

Let me give my hon. Friend this example. There is a further risk that publication of individuals excluded from the UK may undermine international relations and foreign policy objectives. That risk is intensified if the excluded individual has connections with a foreign Government or well known organisation that may be working in partnership with the UK to broaden our interests abroad. That is one example. Also, ongoing investigations into the activities of an individual could be jeopardised if they became aware of the fact that they were on the list. While I appreciate the objective of the new clause and the commitment to transparency, the Home Secretary’s primary objective in the use of her exclusion powers is to protect the UK from those individuals who wish to damage our national security or undermine our values. The new clause would weaken her ability to do so and could possibly put the British public at risk.

Turning to new clause 20 on firearms licensing, I put it to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North that the amendment is unnecessary. The police already have the ability to take into account evidence of violence and domestic violence when considering firearms applications, and rigorous new guidance was issued in July 2013 providing greater detail on how police should handle such cases.

The Government welcome the principle behind new clause 21, but the expert review panel made it clear in its report last October that the ban on the supply of new psychoactive substances needs careful consideration. Our priority is to frame correctly any new offence and ensure that it is robust yet proportionate and embedded in a comprehensive legislative package. The Government are moving swiftly so that the necessary primary legislation is ready to be introduced at the earliest opportunity in the new Parliament.

Finally, let me turn now to new clause 28 on money laundering, which was tabled by my hon. Friend Stephen Barclay. The two of us have had many conversations about this. He knows that we are consulting on the suspicious activity reporting regime, and I urge him to respond to that consultation, as I am very keen to include all of those points.

In light of my explanations, I ask my hon. Friends the Members for Esher and Walton, for North East Cambridgeshire and for Cambridge and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North not to press their amendments, and I commend the Government amendments to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.