Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Just by looking at the clause, I note that its origins and inherent problems clearly involve questions of terrorism, because it deals with section 18 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which applies to matters that are dealt with under the Bill. Subsection (2) also deals with section 17 of the 2001 Act, and there are very big problems. The Minister will understand what I am saying, because many issues that arise in relation to cluster munitions in Afghanistan, for example, are affected by activities on the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, it so happens that there are Afghanistan matters relating to fundamentalists, who also have operations that could and, as far as the intelligence services are concerned, certainly will have implications for the United Kingdom.

There is a question that we need to bear in mind, therefore, but I shall not go any further than this at the moment. The clause states:

"(1) This section applies to information if-

(a) it was obtained under, or in connection with anything done under, this Act or the Convention, and

(b) it relates to a particular business or other activity carried on by any person."

There are qualifications about disclosure and the exceptions to that disclosure; again, there is an issue about the seriousness of the offence in question; and there is also the context of the uncertainty that, I believe, the Bill itself creates.

I understand the objectives and, like my right hon. Friend Mr. Redwood, I happen to support the Bill. It has good intentions, but the Minister is making a discovery or, at any rate, will do so, because he has been rather impervious to the arguments this afternoon. I understand why: he has nowhere to go and is in a cul-de-sac. I simply make the point that although he puts forward a series of assertions that, "The Opposition are wrong and, in particular, the hon. Member for Stone is wrong," it does not alter the fact that he cannot answer the questions and there is no time in which to do so. I understand the dilemma and the problem, but we will simply watch the clock tick and see whether in due course some of those issues arise.

The Minister has had to make an acknowledgement in the course of these proceedings. He started out by suggesting that any opposition was all nonsense and nothing that anyone would say would make any substantial difference, but the Liberal Democrats, my Front Benchers, my right hon. Friend Mr. Drew and I have all been raising issues, not just to be difficult, but because there is uncertainty.

The uncertainty is inherent in the mismatch between the convention; the European Union; British domestic law; the whole question of the interaction of criminal activities, international operations, alliances, and command and control; and the fact that the people who will get caught up in this are those whom we least want to get caught up-in particular, soldiers on the ground. This is not just about some kind of theoretical exercise, and it is not even about land mines: it is about cluster munitions, which are part and parcel of tactical weaponry that has been used and that some countries intend to continue using. When British soldiers, who should be our main concern, are given orders, or when such information is made available, they will get caught up in this complex web of legal conduct.

Is the Minister able to tell us that very clear guidance will be given, in a manual, for the services-not only the Army but the Navy and the Air Force? However persistent and tenacious I may be on this subject, my prime concern is to protect the British soldier, and the Minister has an obligation to tell us that there will be a manual that accurately describes the relative responsibilities and duties in the very complex web of military operations that will arise from this legislation.

The hon. Gentleman must have slipped out of the Chamber when I answered a similar question from Mr. Redwood about what guidance will be provided for our personnel. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that it is imperative that we produce unambiguous, clear, straightforward guidance for our personnel so that they know how to avoid moral and legal peril. That is also why we have tried to construct the legislation in a way that ensures that our British personnel, although they may frequently be operating alongside personnel from countries that still retain cluster munitions, are not imperilled. He said that I was in a cul-de-sac, but I am afraid that in relation to clause 23, on the disclosure of information, he is in a cul-de-sac. He has not tabled any amendment, so I am not sure why-or whether, for that matter-he disagrees with the clause standing part of the Bill.

We are debating clause stand part. It was my intention, in line with the remarks of my hon. Friend Mr. Lidington, to conduct these Committee proceedings, and indeed the Report stage to come, on the basis that we have supported the Bill and that we want it to work, but we expect the Minister to answer our questions, which is his responsibility in an accountable Parliament. We are not just probing; we are challenging, but it is not necessary to table an amendment to achieve that objective. The Minister may be slightly out of order in suggesting that I should have tabled an amendment on clause stand part.

I would not dare suggest that the hon. Gentleman table an amendment, or do anything in particular. My point was that I find it difficult to know precisely the nature of his question about disclosure of information. We believe that it is important, in line with the provisions of the convention, to protect information that may be gathered in the process of implementing the Bill and the convention, and that is why the clause is in the Bill. I did not understand from his remarks that he was opposed to that provision, which we believe to be important.

I shall try to be helpful so that I am not chided for missing something. If I understood correctly what Mr. Cash said, I certainly concur with it. He was saying that British forces must have very clear rules of engagement, which must be understood by any allied force with which we are involved. They must preclude the use of cluster munitions, even if that other allied force is willing to use them. Otherwise, British service people could be subject to the will of the Bill.

I am afraid that that has nothing to do with clause 23, which is about the disclosure of information. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say-I have tried to make this point a couple of times now, and I will take a third stab at it-that there have to be clear and unambiguous guidelines for British personnel. Those guidelines have to be available not only to our personnel, so that they fully understand the position that they are in and what they can and cannot do, but to forces of other nationalities with whom we are operating.

As I said earlier-I think my hon. Friend missed it-it is right that we should ensure that where British personnel have exclusive control over what munitions are used, they do not seek the use of cluster munitions. However, it would not be right for British troops to refuse to use an American aeroplane in Afghanistan, for instance, because they knew that it had been or might be used for cluster munitions at some point. That is a clear distinction that is laid down in the convention and the Bill, although not in clause 23, which I hope will stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.