'(1) In section 393A of ICTA (set off of losses against profits of same or earlier accounting period), after subsection (2D) insert—

"(2E) But subsection (2A) above does not apply by reason of a company ceasing to carry on a trade if—

(a) on the company ceasing to carry on the trade, any of the activities of the trade begin to be carried on by a person who is not (or by persons any or all of whom are not) within the charge to corporation tax, and

(b) the company's ceasing to carry on the trade is part of a scheme or arrangement the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of which is to secure that subsection (2A) above applies to a loss by reason of the cessation."

(2) The amendment made by subsection (1) has effect in relation to cessations of a trade on or after 21 May 2009.'. — (Mr. Timms.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 5— Pre-commencement notification

'(1) Part 7 of FA 2004 (disclosure of tax avoidance schemes) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 308 (duties of promoter) after subsection (5) insert—

"(5A) A person who is a promoter in relation to a notifiable proposal may seek pre-commencement approval from HMRC as to whether the proposal is in accordance with current legislation.

(5B) HMRC shall respond within a reasonable period of time to any request for pre-commencement approval under subsection (5A).'.'.

Government amendments 41 and 42

Amendment 34, in schedule 17, page 202, line 19, at end insert

'or part of a transaction of a value exceeding £100 million'.

Amendment 35, page 203, leave out line 10.

The amendments and new clauses in this group all concern tax avoidance. For the tax system to be effective everyone needs to pay their fair share. Tax avoidance damages the ability of the tax system to deliver its objectives, imposes big costs on society and shifts a greater burden of tax on to taxpayers who do comply with the rules. So the Government are committed to continuing to move quickly and effectively to tackle tax avoidance in all its forms.

What I shall do, if I may, Mr. Speaker, is speak to the Government new clause and amendments in this group and seek to catch your eye later to respond to comments made by others when they discuss the other new clause and amendments.

New clause 8 counters an avoidance scheme that has been notified to Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs. The scheme exploits corporation tax terminal loss relief rules that allow losses arising in a trade in the 12 months prior to cessation to be carried back and set off against profits made in the previous three years. The scheme works by artificially engineering a deemed cessation of trading, which allows the company to access the relief in circumstances not intended by Parliament, and it could be used by a large number of companies and it poses a risk of significant loss of revenue. In order to stop companies exploiting the scheme and, thus, to protect the Exchequer, I made a written ministerial statement on 21 May announcing our intention to introduce this legislation.

The new clause addresses situations in which there has not been, in any real sense, a cessation of the trade, but where it is claimed that the cessation occurs as a result of the trade being transferred to a person outside the scope of corporation tax. The new clause is targeted only at avoidance and applies only where it can be established that the reorganisation concerned is part of a scheme or arrangement, one of the main purposes of which is to access terminal loss relief. In such circumstances, terminal loss relief will not be available to the transferring entity. The new clause provides vital protection to the Exchequer from wholly artificial avoidance schemes and does so in a targeted and proportionate manner. I therefore ask hon. Members to ensure that the new clause stands part of the Bill.

Government amendments 41 and 42 seek to ensure that clause 59, which contains a provision to counter an avoidance scheme that abuses the double taxation relief rules, does not hit any unintended targets. Following representations, Government amendments were tabled in Committee that were intended to ensure that the clause would not have an unintended effect in normal commercial situations. The amendments would have provided that the clause applied only to payments made under the laws of a territory outside the UK. These amendments reflected agreement that HMRC reached with industry legal experts and had the advantage of following existing legal precedent that applies for the purposes of controlled foreign company legislation.

The Government amendments would have covered the overwhelming majority of cases in which refund of foreign tax might arise from commercial contracts. However, after those Government amendments were tabled, further representations were received which showed that they may not go far enough to ensure that the clause does not hit any unintended targets. Although these are unusual circumstances, I said during the course of our debate on this clause in Committee that it is right that we should take account of them and that I would return to this matter with further Government amendments on Report—and I have done so.

During the Committee debate, I made it clear that I accepted the principle of the similar Opposition amendments, but that I wanted to reflect further on the issue to ensure that any amendments were technically correct. The new Government amendments contain one minor adjustment, compared with the Opposition amendments in Committee, in that they refer to a "tax authority" rather than a "taxing authority". This is because a taxing authority might be seen as the legislative body which imposes the charge to tax, rather than the authority that assesses and collects the tax, and makes any necessary payments or repayments—a small but necessary change. The amendment has also been duplicated to cover the situation where the taxpayer is seeking a deduction for foreign tax, as well as where double tax credit relief is sought.

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

I gladly give way to my hon. Friend, whom we greatly missed in Committee.

Actually, I do not wish to press my point —I have reread the provision and I now understand it.

I hope that my hon. Friend will not feel discouraged from intervening later in the debate.

The amendments will ensure that this clause will not affect normal commercial arrangements, and I ask the House to support them. I will seek to catch your eye later, Mr. Speaker, to respond to points made by others about this group.

I rise to speak in favour of new clause 5. I originally had no intention of tabling such a new clause until we had the debate upstairs on clauses 66 and, more importantly, 67. Both of those clauses rightly seek to outlaw the highly contrived tax avoidance schemes that the Minister described in some detail at the time. That was the right thing to do.

Interestingly, the debate on clause 67 almost completely ignored its content and revolved around the issue of principle of retrospective legislation. In general terms, I oppose retrospective legislation, especially when it comes to the tax code, because it delivers uncertainty, but I do recognise that from time to time it might be necessary. One of the reasons why retrospective legislation is necessary when it comes to clamping down on contrived tax avoidance schemes did not become clear until after the debate in Committee.

Let me explain. The process that is followed in such schemes is that tax avoidance schemes are developed by promoters, they commence operating and only then, post-commencement, are they notified to the HMRC, which can—and sometimes does—outlaw the practices and introduce retrospective changes to the law to facilitate that. In the case of clause 66, the scheme was effectively outlawed within a week or so of the Revenue's being notified of it. The Government can act very quickly, but not always, and it can take some time—perhaps a year—to introduce the necessary retrospective legislation. That is precisely what happened in the instances that we discussed in Committee.

It struck me as somewhat peculiar that such schemes were not checked by the Revenue in advance of their commencement to allow the commissioners to rule on their legality or otherwise or even to suggest, even if they were legal, that they were likely to be outlawed quickly because they were simply going to be tax avoidance schemes. I was very pleased, when we probed the Minister, to get his reply. I asked whether he could

"confirm that promoters are able to seek confirmation of the schemes in advance" and the answer was:

"Promoters can seek that clearance as well. They are required to disclose, but they can seek clearance if they wish." ——[ Official Report, Finance Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2009; c. 431.]

However, it was not until two days later that the Minister rather graciously corrected what he had said. His letter said:

"In both cases, the correct answer should have been"—

I shall read out both paragraphs for the avoidance of any doubt. They read:

"HMRC offers a clearance service to businesses covering the tax implications of commercial transactions"—

I do think that there should have been more commas in this sentence—

"where there is material uncertainty as to the tax outcome and the issue is of commercial significance to the business. Under the clearance regime HMRC will not give advice, or comment on, tax avoidance schemes.

In addition to the clearance service for business, HMRC offers a written...service to personal tax customers covering completed transactions where the correct tax treatment is in doubt or where guidance is needed on HMRC's interpretation of recently passed law or its application to a specific proposed transaction, where there is genuine uncertainty. This written advice service does not cover arrangements where tax avoidance is an issue. The scope and terms on which this service is offered is set out in Code of Practice 10."

That is extremely clear, but the implication of that answer is that the Finance Bill, unamended, would perpetuate the status quo, which is that schemes can be developed, promoted and commenced, people can buy into them or use them and they are then notified to the HMRC, outlawed and made subject to retrospective changes. That all risks uncertainty in the tax code, which none of us wants to see, and a potential loss of revenue yield, I am certain. Most importantly, it risks individuals taking tax or financial planning advice or action, thinking that they are doing the right thing and that they are behaving wholly within the law, and finding that they are then subject to retrospective changes to a law that they had no intention of breaking.

It would be much simpler to allow promoters to clear schemes in advance to ensure that if they were illegal, or likely to be outlawed, they simply would not be promoted. That would give us certainty in the tax code and protect those individuals who think they are doing the right thing and end up being subject to retrospective legislation.

I fully agree with the thrust of the hon. Gentleman's argument, but he might be aware that the Select Committee on the Treasury received certain information from Barclays bank about its tax avoidance schemes. The schemes that it developed are extremely complex, and it took them to HMRC and got the staff there to look at them and basically approve them, because it did not have the resources and everything else to go through it all, whopped it back to its clients and said, "We put this to HMRC, they think it's okay and now we have all sorts of ways of trying to alleviate that"—

Order. I gently say to the hon. Gentleman that the erudition of that intervention was equalled only by its length.

Mr. Breed makes an important point about the complexity of some schemes, but it is the very complexity of the tax code that allows highly complex and contrived schemes to operate. There is an argument for simplifying the tax code as a whole, but today's debate is not about that. I want to ensure simplicity, help people avoid illegality and protect tax yields. That seems sensible, and I hope that it is uncontentious—unless there is a hidden argument or a problem in the Revenue that the Minister will tell us about in a few minutes.

Most Opposition amendments are moved to claw back powers from HMRC, or to stop officialdom interfering in people's lives or businesses. Almost uniquely for me, I have moved the new clause because I want to give the tax commissioners more powers and responsibility. It makes absolute sense for them to be able to validate schemes in advance and declare them either legal or illegal. More importantly, even if a scheme is legal, the commissioners should be able to tell its promoters, "Yes, it's legal today, but I suspect that the Minister will come down on it like a ton of bricks in two weeks' time, so it's probably better not to promote it." That would create certainty in the tax code and protect people looking for tax and financial planning.

I look forward to what the Minister has to say. I want to offer more powers to the Revenue, in the hope that we can get certainty and protect people from the dangers of retrospective legislation.

I want to make one very brief central point, and it relates to what Stewart Hosie has just been saying. My right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary has explained that new clause 8 is necessary to block yet another loophole that would open up yet another lucrative tax avoidance mechanism, and I am absolutely sure that he is right. What is significant is that the Government have found it necessary to table the new clause now, and that is because the latest tax avoidance scam surfaced only after the Finance Bill was published.

Similar scams are being invented all the time, by extremely highly paid City accountants and lawyers. As a result, the Treasury has to scurry around trying to block them up as quickly as they are created.

I do not disagree that it is perfectly within the rights of any Government to have a rigorous anti-avoidance regime along the lines that the right hon. Gentleman clearly supports, but does he accept that, commensurate with that, there also needs to be a full and open clearance process? Such a process would help prevent scams being created, and the need to deploy anti-avoidance measures.

The question is what particular transparent and open system the hon. Gentleman would recommend, but I am in favour of something like what the hon. Member for Dundee, East has proposed. As I shall explain in a moment, we need a general provision of the sort that would avoid the House of Commons continually spending its time trying to block one scam after another. I agree that that is not the most efficient way of dealing with the problem.

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it is a great pity that new clause 2 has not been selected, as in a sense it does precisely what he has described?

I was coming to that. The hon. Gentleman and I have had some conversations on this subject, and I entirely agree with him. My question to the Minister has to do with whether the Government are engaged in a labour of Sisyphus. Why do they not seek to break the cycle of endless tax avoidance scams—because, being clearly designed to get round paying tax, that is what they are—by introducing a general anti-tax avoidance principle into the UK tax system? I can think of two or three previous Treasury Ministers who were very much in favour of that course.

I tabled a proposal along these lines two months ago, and I am glad to see that Dr. Pugh has retabled it as new clause 2. I realise that it has not been selected for debate, presumably because it would increase taxes. Of course, that is exactly what the new clause is designed to do, where appropriate, but under our rules only the Government have that prerogative. But I want to ask my right hon. Friend the Financial Secretary why we continually spend our time scrabbling around in the bulrushes trying to block off every new tributary of tax avoidance, when we could seize the high ground and block this ever-flowing antisocial river altogether at one go. There are good precedents for this—

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

I am amazed how popular my speech has become. I thought it would be two minutes, but I always give way to the right hon. Gentleman.

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that one of the prices of liberty is eternal vigilance, and that one has to be very careful about trying to claim that people are guilty unless proved innocent? That is precisely the reason that we do what we do. It is extremely dangerous to start off a taxation system on the basis that people must not be allowed to do anything lest they avoid tax.

I do not often disagree with the right hon. Gentleman, but here I take a rather different line. Of course there must be transparency, as Mr. Field said, and of course we do not hold people guilty until proved innocent. What I am recommending—the hon. Member for Dundee, East said the same—is that there should be a general principle which makes it clear that if the purpose of the device is solely to evade or avoid tax and it has no sensible, practical, obvious economic purpose, it should be ruled out in terms of what the mechanism is designed to do.

I would add that there should be some penalty to discourage such action in future. That is not unfair. It is a way of avoiding an artificial, deliberate and proliferating attempt to avoid tax, which means that the rest of us who are not super-rich and not big corporations have to pay. I do not think that is a very good idea.

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

This is extraordinary. I always give way to my hon. Friend.

I am grateful—it is Report stage. I have been racking my brains, going back a long time. I think my right hon. Friend will find that there is a Court of Appeal case to the effect that he seeks to push for this afternoon. It is a case about artificial transactions from, I believe, 1985, the Ramsay and Cook case, which does much of what my right hon. Friend wants.

My hon. Friend has the advantage over me because I have not looked at that, but I find it difficult to believe that it achieves what I am seeking to achieve. If that is so, I am surprised that such schemes continue to roll on and on.

To conclude the speech, which I am finding difficult, there are good precedents for such a principle—it is not a novel idea—particularly the Australian one and, interestingly, in Jersey, both of which seem to be working perfectly well and have been accepted by all parties in those Parliaments. Will my right hon. Friend the Minister please explain the Government's thinking and when we might expect such a provision to be brought forward? It is sorely needed when the deficit in the public accounts this year is of the order of £175 billion.

I shall speak to amendments 34 and 35 and broadly in support of new clause 5. I do not doubt the Minister's or the Treasury's sincerity and determination in wishing to prevent tax avoidance, I do not doubt the skill and intelligence that they have put to the task and I do not doubt the expertise and knowledge that underlie the Government proposals. I need to be convinced that all this is enough to frustrate a huge, massively rewarded and well financed avoidance industry at the heart of modern commerce.

Mr. Meacher outlined the Government's approach. They seem to advocate general principles and then track and box off avoidance schemes while encouraging notification, but they do not want to introduce a general anti-avoidance law. None the less, the Bill withdraws an important general control—section 765 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. Albeit an anachronistic one, it is a general control. Pleasing though it might be to the City, this approach has failed to convince many people far more knowledgeable in this field than I. My amendments seek to toughen up this approach.

My preference, like that of the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton, is for the introduction of a general anti-avoidance provision. It is in new clause 2, an unselected amendment in my name. A general anti-avoidance provision would reduce tax complexity straight off: complex avoidance schemes father complex tax law. The provision works elsewhere in the world, such as in Australia, Canada and all sorts of places; and with proper Revenue and Customs advisory services available to business, it would not need to gum up business.

Will the hon. Gentleman not also consider that the parentage is the other way around—that complex tax law begets complex avoidance provisions?

That is a fair point, but I was going to say that the Treasury at one stage, in the halcyon days of new Labour, began a consultation on the phenomenon of the desirability of a general anti-avoidance rule, or GAAR. Interestingly, it said:

"The United Kingdom is unusual"— unusual—

"among developed countries in having neither a statute nor an established legal principle to counter tax avoidance in general. Many other countries in the developed world have found such a rule or principle to be a very useful remedy for countering tax avoidance, although not a universal cure."

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on, may I just check something? There are concerns that, if we have specific anti-avoidance rules, having an overriding anti-avoidance rule, too, might be a stage too far. If he were to get what he wanted with a general anti-avoidance rule, would he want to see the removal of the specific rules, too?

We need a belt and braces rule—a specific provision that is assisted by a general rule. Again, the Government's consultation stated:

"A GAAR, applying at first only to the corporate sector,"— this was 1998 or thereabouts—

"would aim to put a stop to many of the complex avoidance schemes which currently cost the Exchequer large sums. In addition, it would be expected to discourage people from devising contrived avoidance schemes in the future."

That was the Treasury, not the Opposition or the right hon. Member for Oldham, West and Royton.

Now we have the repeal of the time-served section, section 765 of the 1988 Act, which ensures that when funds leave the country the Treasury is notified of any detriment to it. It is an old rule to do with the flight of sterling and so on, but it does—or did—a good job. We have the replacement of a clearance and pre-disclosure scheme with a light-touch reporting regime, coupled with a series of attempts to outlaw specific dodges and scams.

However, if we read the legislation, we find that only transactions above £100 million will need to be reported, and not even then if they are said to be

"in the ordinary course of trade"— hence my amendment. If, after six months, there is no report on a £100 million transaction, there will be a ludicrous fine of £300, which I remember made Mr. Binley incandescent in Committee. It is a ludicrous penalty to enforce on a £100 million transaction.

"Incandescent" is a slightly heavy word in that respect!

The hon. Gentleman is a man of most moderate temperament, and I should not wish to malign him.

In the game of chess being played out between Treasury officials and City tax lawyers, the Treasury is agreeing to play blindfolded, and there can be only one winner. What is there to stop a transaction being broken down into segments of less than £100 million to avoid reporting requirements—just wrapping up the transaction differently? What stops a firm declaring any transaction to be in "the ordinary course of trade"—a phrase that, incidentally, has created legal problems in countries where a general anti-avoidance provision is in place?

The Liberal Democrat amendments are simple attempts, like new clause 5, to strengthen the Treasury's arm and powers of intervention—to make exemptions less open to abuse and less user-friendly. The principal argument for user-friendly exemption is the old chestnut, beloved of the CBI, about the anti-competitive dangers of slowing up commerce. At first, I took that argument seriously; I thought it a sound, decent argument. It is the argument against section 765 and the long-standing argument for its withdrawal. Indeed, I thought that it was a serious, solid argument, despite the claims made only four years ago by the then Paymaster General in its favour, saying that it saved

"a great deal of revenue"——[Official Report, Finance Public Bill Committee, 30 June 2005; c. 319.]

However, I had the good fortune recently to speak to a man who actually administers the provision. He told me that it still protects a great deal of revenue, that clearance procedures in the modern Revenue and Customs are very rapid, and that adequate advice is freely and readily available—in hours not days—provided HMRC has the staff to provide it. Understandably, I asked the Government—the Financial Secretary, actually—how many staff at HMRC administered the provisions of anti-tax-avoidance legislation. The answer that I received reads as follows:

"HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) staff use whatever parts of the tax code are relevant to help people and businesses pay the right amount of tax and, where necessary, to tackle tax avoidance, evasion and fraud."

But the right hon. Gentleman went on to say:

"HMRC is unable to provide information regarding the specific number of resources deployed on the separate elements of that work."—[ Hansard, 22 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 670W.]

The Government simply cannot tell us how many people are involved in counteracting tax avoidance.

In summary, I am not confident about the Government's approach, the reporting regime, the exemption or the penalties, which border on the pathetic. I am aware of the dilemma that the Government face: business legitimately needs clarity and speed, and the Treasury needs transparency, fairness and accuracy. However, there is an overwhelming case that a general anti-avoidance provision, coupled with revenue efficiency, can cover most of that. Loose reporting, pathetic penalties and a tangle of tax regulations, however, are unlikely to.

My hon. Friend Mr. Field made an important point: sometimes the complexity of the tax system itself gives rise to opportunities for tax avoidance schemes. When relief is given, tax advisers and planners look to how they can maximise it to reduce their clients' tax bills. From Finance Bill to Finance Bill, we have seen new loopholes being created and closed down—there have been significant revisions to the legislation on film tax relief in the past 10 years, for example.

There is a momentum within tax law itself that creates the loopholes that can be exploited; the loopholes are then closed, creating more complexity. We need to get that rolling process under control. New clause 8 represents an example of when the relief available on the termination of a business has been used to create a new opportunity for tax planning.

I know that the hon. Gentleman has only just begun, but before he finishes I hope that he will comment on the measures advocated by my right hon. Friend Mr. Meacher, which aim to stop the poison from coming into the system in the first place. What Mr. Gummer said almost takes us back to last century's debates on vaccination—did we want people to stop becoming ill in the first place, or were we to deal with the illness only once they became ill? That example has similarities with the issue of tax avoidance, as distinct from tax evasion.

If I got dragged down that line of argument, Mr. Speaker, I would be trespassing into a new clause that was not selected, so I shall be careful about what I say about that general principle.

New clause 8 responds to a specific anti-avoidance scheme. In Committee, we discussed clause 23, which allowed losses to be relieved and extended the carry-back period for losses. During that debate, the Financial Secretary commented on the generous nature of the terminal loss relief, particularly for businesses that had closed down for reasons of economic viability. The scheme sought artificially to use the losses by trying to transfer a business to an entity outside the scope of corporation tax—for example, a partnership in respect of which an individual had a small share of the profits but the original company was entitled to the majority of the profits. That meant that the company was then able to claim terminal loss relief and carry back trading over possibly three years even though trade had continued. The conditions in the clause prevent the artificial abuse of the availability of that loss relief, and we welcome the step that the Government have taken.

New clause 5, tabled by Stewart Hosie, has its origins, as he said, in a debate on new clause 67 that we had in Committee, several of whose members had been lobbied by a company called NT Advisors, which had devised a scheme that was at the core of the provisions in the clause. The new clause has some appeal in proposing a pre-clearance device for such schemes, but I add a note of caution about this sort of mechanism. I understand that tax advisers spend a great deal of money on their clients' behalf in trying to devise these schemes, which are potentially quite lucrative, as the numbers in clause 67 suggested. Clearly, they do not want to clock up fees with no chance of the scheme being viable, so I can see the attraction for them in having a pre-clearance device, which would save them a great deal of time and money. It would also put the onus on HMRC to act as almost a subcontracted or out-sourced arm of the tax adviser in looking at the fine detail of such schemes to see whether they worked. The advisers themselves should bear the principal responsibility of getting schemes right; otherwise, there is a risk of HMRC being inundated with speculative, half-thought-through schemes under which the advisers are looking to HMRC to tie up the fine detail.

The hon. Gentleman's argument is absolutely right. However, advisers and promoters are coming up with schemes right now, and there is a real risk of loss of revenue yield and of individuals so engaged finding themselves subject to retrospective legislation. I am trying to work out where the balance should lie between the Revenue saying, "No, you can't do it—we're about to outlaw it", and allowing people to continue to develop these schemes and then finding that they are subject to retrospective legislation.

Indeed, balance is a difficult issue to get to the bottom of. No one in this House likes to see retrospective legislation, and there are rules that constrain its use. In the debate on clause 67, we discussed the Rees rules and the doctrine put forward by my right hon. Friend Mr. Dorrell when he was a Treasury Minister; we even referred to some principles established by the previous Paymaster General. However, I am worried that we may end up in a situation where HMRC is used as a clearing house for tax advisers and has the responsibility for checking whether the schemes work. The law should be clear enough for advisers to work out whether schemes are legal, and they should not be subcontracting their work to HMRC. Moreover, people who buy into these schemes will need to think carefully about the advice that they have been given and what happens if it turns out to be wrong. I suspect that in some cases, if the scheme does not quite work according to plan, advisers may make some clawback and try to cover their own backs by avoiding having to repay losses to their clients.

I am a little anxious about where new clause 5 would take us. In other areas, it is right that pre-clearance arrangements are in place and discussions can be had with the Revenue, but that arrangement causes me concern in this context. What would happen if HMRC did not reply within a reasonable period of time? Would it be assumed that the scheme has been passed as fine to be sold to a wider public? I am a little sceptical about the new clause, because I do not think it would have the effect that the hon. Member for Dundee, East desires it to have. It could have the consequence of adding burdens to HMRC by getting it to test out the legal aspects of these schemes and checking their detail, thereby adding costs to the taxpayer when we want HMRC to work on supporting the taxpayer.

On the onerous nature of introducing anti-avoidance procedures, I was not entirely persuaded by the arguments made by Dr. Pugh on amendments 34 and 35. My reading of schedule 17 suggests that it already contains the power to tackle some of the abuses that might arise through the more streamlined nature of the reporting rules, and there is provision for secondary legislation to address certain issues, including about the valuation of a transaction or event. We need to get the balance right between promoting compliance through reporting and ensuring that the rules are right in the first place.

On Government amendments 41 and 42, we are delighted to see that the Government have recognised the wisdom of my hon. Friend Mr. Hands. In introducing them, the Financial Secretary gave the sense that it was almost to be expected that they would be tabled on Report, and that we should not be surprised to see them on the Order Paper. In Committee, he gave a slightly different interpretation, saying:

"The Opposition amendment is broader in scope but has some technical difficulties. The reference to a taxing authority would be novel in tax law and its effect is not altogether clear." ——[ Official Report, Finance Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2009; c. 393.]

Clearly between 16 June and the day when the amendments were tabled, the Government recognised the wisdom of my hon. Friend's remarks, and I am pleased to see them form part of the Bill.

We have had an interesting discussion about new clause 5, on pre-commencement notification. Stewart Hosie raised the matter in Committee, and I subsequently wrote to him to clarify the position.

HMRC already operates a clearance regime under code of practice 10, to which the hon. Gentleman referred, in cases in which the application of recent legislation to planned transactions is uncertain. As we can all see, when legislation is new there could well be uncertainty about exactly what it means. In that situation, a clearance regime is appropriate so that people can discuss with HMRC whether the transactions described will work in the way that is intended, particularly in the case of larger businesses. Such businesses have access to a clearance system in wider circumstances, following the implementation of Sir David Varney's recommendations on HMRC's links with them.

However, as the hon. Gentleman rightly said, HMRC will not entertain requests for clearance if it is obvious that the motive behind the application is to avoid tax. That policy is understood and accepted by the various professional bodies, and it is well established. I suggest to him that there is no good reason to change the policy on a situation in which disclosure will, by definition, involve arrangements that are intended to obtain a tax advantage as a key benefit.

I agree with Mr. Hoban that the problem is that if such a facility were offered in practice, scheme promoters would take advantage of it by continually devising variations on schemes and making more changes to them until they eventually found one that worked. We would all agree that avoidance is not acceptable behaviour, and that we should not effectively ask HMRC to become complicit in avoidance by offering its promoters such a refinement service, which I fear is what would happen.

I understand the arguments that the Financial Secretary and Mr. Hoban are making, but is the point not that promoters are already finding schemes that work, and that the Government, the House and the Revenue are having to find and fix retrospectively, rather than saying in advance, "Yes, this may well work, but we're going to outlaw it, and perhaps it would be better if you didn't promote it in the first place"?

The problem is that new clause 5 would help the promoters of avoidance. It would give them advice and help them clarify whether their avoidance product would work. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman accepts that HMRC should not provide such help. However, I am not averse to proposals to tighten up the way in which we tackle tax avoidance. As I shall explain shortly, we have done a great deal on that, much of which has been effective. I am certainly not saying that there is nothing further to do—there may well be—but new clause 5 would have an undesirable impact.

How do Ministers satisfy themselves about the tax affairs of the banks that they own on behalf of the taxpayer? How can they be sure that those large losses are entirely justified on trading and other grounds? Are they sure that the banks need not pay any tax in the current situation?

That is a matter for HMRC, but I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman has seen the code of conduct for bank tax, which we published recently for consultation. Undoubtedly, some of the activities of banks in the UK have involved avoidance—in some cases, significant avoidance. Banks are in a strong position to indulge in that sort of behaviour because they can do it for their own part and then advise their clients on similar approaches. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that it is right to be vigilant about banks' tax submissions, but if he takes the opportunity to read the code of conduct that we have published for consultation, he will see the steps that we are taking to make progress on that.

Information provided by a promoter is often insufficient to tell HMRC whether the scheme will work. In some cases, the scheme will turn on a novel interpretation of the law and, in the end, that can be tested only in the courts. It is not enough in some circumstances for HMRC to examine the scheme and decide whether it will work. Ultimately, it will require a decision by a court. In other cases, a scheme's effectiveness will depend on the specific facts to which it is applied. In those circumstances, HMRC could be in a position to say whether the scheme works only when it features in a tax return. Providing the clearance under new clause 5 could therefore prove difficult.

I have much sympathy with new clause 5. However, as constituency Members, many of us are faced with the problem of planning applications, whereby a planning application is made to the local council, it gets turned down, for which reasons are given, but goes back in a month later, after it has been tweaked. There is wave after wave of planning applications until one gets through. At least the local authority can charge for that. Does not new clause 5 run the risk of causing similar problems for HMRC?

My hon. Friend is right. That is precisely the danger to which new clause 5 could give rise, with the difference that building something or progressing with a development is, in principle, good and laudable, whereas avoiding tax is not. There is therefore an even stronger reason not to follow that route.

New clause 5 states that HMRC will have a "reasonable" amount of time to comply with the clearance request. Again, I agree with the hon. Member for Fareham. What constitutes "reasonable" in that context? It can take a considerable time before HMRC is in a position to make such a judgment and it could easily be impossible to do that in a time frame that might be considered reasonable by the taxpayer. I therefore question the usefulness of that sort of clearance to those who are genuinely trying to pay the right amount of tax at the right time, and I strongly argue against adopting the new clause because it would help those whose purpose is purely and clearly to avoid tax. As I said earlier, however, that is not to say that I want to close the door on tightening the disclosure arrangements. Indeed, there may be opportunities for us to do that.

My understanding is that when HMRC is involved in anything like that, as it is on occasion, it does not charge people. However, if new clause 5 were to be accepted, we could see not only wave after wave of applications made, as I said earlier, but tax-avoiding accountancy firms, as it were, apparently getting free accounting advice from HMRC, a point to which Mr. Hoban adverted earlier.

I share my hon. Friend's concern about what we might find ourselves getting into. On the other hand, however, I suppose that one could argue that charging for the service might add a further degree of legitimacy to activity whose illegitimacy one would otherwise want to underline throughout. However, we should not be giving that kind of advice at all, so for now we can perhaps leave the question of whether it ought to be charged for.

Let me respond to another point that the hon. Member for Dundee, East made. HMRC receives a significant number of disclosures every year, but only a proportion of those lead to legislative measures. He raised the issue of promoters selling abusive tax-avoidance schemes. As he will know, we have announced that HMRC will take forward discussions to improve the avoidance disclosure regime. There may well be things that we can do, and HMRC is consulting on working with tax agents.

That brings me to the points made in this debate, not least by my right hon. Friend Mr. Meacher, about having a general anti-avoidance rule. Let me say to my right hon. Friend and the House that we want to keep that question under review. It was consulted on in 1998, as was said by the hon. Member for Stockport—

Southport.

I beg the hon. Gentleman's pardon—I have made that mistake before.

When we consulted on the idea there were a lot of objections, and they were by no means all from tax avoiders. Those who have pointed out that other countries have such a rule are right in terms of a number of counties, although interestingly, the United States does not have a rule of that kind. Some people have argued that if we introduced a general anti-avoidance rule, we would have to have what is suggested in new clause 5, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Dundee, East, namely a fairly comprehensive clearance system, which would potentially be costly to provide. Another downside would be the uncertainty that such a rule could generate.

We have, of course, introduced a number of effective targeted anti-avoidance rules, and we will continue to evaluate the benefits of going further and specifically consider the possibility of a general rule. However, I want to underline the fact that, in recent years, we have done a great deal to tackle avoidance. We have a strong strategy and a good track record on tackling tax avoidance in all its forms. We reckon that the steps taken as a direct result of the disclosure regime, which has been in place for five years, are so far responsible for closing £11 billion of avoidance opportunities.

We have led internationally on increasing transparency through the G20 and the growing number of tax information exchange agreements, and I have already mentioned the innovative code of conduct for banks that we published for consultation recently. We have also led on modern legislative approaches, such as the new principles-based legislation, of which there are examples in the Bill, in clauses 48 and 49, which give new opportunities for transparency. Also, through the targeted anti-avoidance rules, we are ensuring that businesses and individuals pay their fair share.

My right hon. Friend mentions the code of conduct that has just been published. Does he really believe that a voluntary code of conduct is going to be adequate to deal with the shark pool that is involved in City tax avoidance? Has he looked at the Australian anti-avoidance principle, which has worked for years? I am not aware that it has any significant disadvantages but, if it has, will he tell us what they are?

My right hon. Friend asks whether I think that a voluntary code of conduct for banks will be effective. Yes, I do. I have spoken to some very hard-headed individuals who have looked at these matters, and they also think that it will be effective. Once a bank has publicly committed to the code, it will have certain obligations. Its auditors, for example, will want to take a view on whether it has correctly implemented the terms to which it has signed up. Part of the code that we have been consulting on involves determining what sanctions would be appropriate if deliberate non-compliance were to be found. We have suggested in the consultation document that if, for example, we identified an individual in a bank who was responsible for deliberate non-compliance, we would make a report to that individual's professional body. My right hon. Friend ought not to be misled by the proposal for a voluntary code into believing that it will not be effective. Based on the way in which we have drawn it up, I believe that it will be. We are consulting on this at the moment and we want to listen to the views of everyone who is in a position to comment on our proposals.

We are aware of the Australian rule, and we keep a close eye on developments elsewhere around the world. I am not in a position at the Dispatch Box this afternoon to set out a detailed analysis of the effects of the introduction of that rule, but I underline that we want to keep under review the question whether it would be appropriate to go down the road that new clause 2 would lead us.

The Minister has stated a preference for targeted measures, and I understand the strategy that is being followed. However, there comes a point at which, when we look at all the targeted measures, we find that there are certain principles underlying them. Does not that make a case for some sort of cull—a statement of general principle or general anti-avoidance rules?

We had a discussion in Committee about principles-based legislation, and we have some examples of it in clauses 48 and 49 of the Bill. This is novel; these matters have not been legislated for in this way before. I believe that, as a result of adopting and making acceptable this new approach to legislating, some new opportunities might well arise that could shift the argument somewhat on whether a general anti-avoidance rule would be appropriate. As I have said, this matter is something that we want to keep firmly in our sights.

I do not want to leave the House with any sense of complacency about this. The changes that we are debating in the Bill will raise more than £1 billion in tax, through blocking avoidance, and protect revenues of a further £3 billion by 2010-11. We are looking at further ways of extending and improving the disclosure regime, and we are considering the application of the principles-based approach to other matters.

My right hon. Friend made a point about people devising schemes just after publication of the Finance Bill, and he is absolutely right: there will never be a shortage of inventiveness and energy in terms of avoidance. The Government need to be extremely vigilant in response. However, we can do as we did in this case, which was quickly to announce to the House that we were going to close a particular avoidance opportunity. It might take a while to implement the required legislation, but we can implement it with effect from the date of the announcement made in the ministerial statement. We would not have to wait for the legislation in order for the closure to take effect.

Will the Minister say a little about the Ramsay case—I think it is the Ramsay case—to which I have already referred, which relates to a Court of Appeal decision of, I believe, 1985? It deals with artificial economic arrangements developed solely for the purposes of tax avoidance. As I understand it—this is dragging my memory back more than 25 years—such arrangements were banned by the Court of Appeal.

I must say that, as so often, I am very impressed by my hon. Friend's expertise and memory. Sadly, I am not in a position to present the House with details of that particular case. I certainly think that he is right that decisions like that one have constrained some of the activity that certain companies have wanted to indulge in. Sadly, however, there is still quite a lot of latitude available, which is why we have had to take steps such as those outlined in new clause 8. I will refresh my memory on that particular case; perhaps my hon. Friend and I can discuss it separately.

If we were to go down the road of issuing a general rule or principle, we would have to consider a range of factors: the impact on certainty for people and companies, the issue of whether a clearance system would be needed, the effect on the rest of the tax code and whether we would need to repeal parts of that code. Countries such as Australia that have general anti-avoidance rules often find that they still need some specific rules in addition to support the overall scheme, so we would also need to reflect on that. We would certainly need a full consultation before we opted for such an arrangement. I am nevertheless grateful to those who have raised this important topic—one that we must keep within our sights.

Does the Minister think that big banks such as RBS and Lloyds HBOS in the public sector should be paying corporation tax, and when might they start paying it again?

As soon as they are making a profit, they should undoubtedly pay corporation tax.

Is the Minister therefore saying that all losses incurred—I emphasise all losses—will not be carried forward against future profits?

No, I am not saying that. The hon. Gentleman will know from the context of discussions about the asset purchase scheme that that matter has been debated and arrangements have been made for those two banks that are, in fact, rather different.

Dr. Pugh suggested that HMRC was playing blindfolded, but I do not think that that is right. As I have said, the anti-avoidance steps that we have taken have been pretty effective. The 2004 disclosure regime has been successful—it was pretty controversial at the time and was certainly innovative—in protecting more than £11 billion. HMRC anti-avoidance teams use the information provided to combat avoidance schemes every day.

Amendments 34 and 35 would both widen the scope of the new reporting rules introduced in schedule 17, which we debated in Committee. The schedule repeals existing rules and introduces a new post-transaction reporting requirement for corporation tax targeted at transactions posing a significant risk of tax avoidance. This requirement applies to certain transactions involving foreign investments whose value is in excess of £100 million. Targeting the reporting requirement in this way removes the need for businesses to report comparatively low-value transactions that are unlikely to give rise to tax avoidance, so significantly reducing the administrative burden compared with the current Treasury consent rules. As we discussed in Committee, those rules are rather elderly and in some respects not wholly appropriate to how businesses now operate.

Amendment 34 would make any transaction reportable where it is part of a transaction exceeding £100 million. I well understand the concern expressed by the hon. Member for Southport about the possible use of fragmentation of transactions as a means of getting round the new arrangements. I suggest, however, that that problem has already been effectively dealt with by the regulations introduced by schedule 17, drafts of which I supplied to members of the Public Bill Committee. Those regulations provide that, for the purposes of the £100 million threshold, "transaction" is defined broadly and includes a series of transactions entered into in pursuance of the same arrangement. That means that the valuation of a transaction must take into account a linked series of transactions, although they may be strictly separate. I hope that, on that basis, the hon. Gentleman will accept that his amendment—which addresses a perfectly proper concern—is unnecessary.

Amendment 35 would widen the scope of the reporting requirement by removing the exclusion for trading transactions. Trading transactions have been deliberately excluded because the new reporting requirement, like the previous rules, is targeted at changes to the capital structure of multinational groups, which, by their nature, will not generate transactions of the type that the amendment addresses. The reporting requirement is only one tool available to help HMRC to combat tax avoidance. The removal of the exclusion for trading transactions would be very likely to generate a great many unnecessary reports. I hope the hon. Gentleman will accept that the reporting requirement introduced by schedule 17 strikes the right balance between Exchequer protection and administrative burdens on business.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned that, in 2005, my right hon. Friend Dawn Primarolo, the former Paymaster General, had said that the Treasury consents regime ought not to be repealed because it protected a great deal of revenue. Removing the need for companies to apply to the Treasury for consent before entering into transactions allows businesses to enter into commercial transactions in a way that they see fit, in line with modern business practice. By targeting the new reporting rules at transactions that pose the highest risk of avoidance, we are ensuring that tax revenue is still sufficiently protected. The de minimis limit reducing the amount of information that is reportable will significantly reduce the administrative burden of complying with the rules.

I think that we have got the balance right, but I am grateful to Members who have raised important issues. I hope that the House will agree to the Government new clause and amendments, and that the other new clause and amendments will not be pressed to a Division.

Question put and agreed to.

New c lause 8 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.