Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.

That schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.

That schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.

That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.

That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.

We are opposed to clause 2, and schedules 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, standing part of the Bill. In our view, all those provisions deal with the role of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister in judicial appointments. I wish to make it clear that although the SDLP has never advocated political interference in judicial appointments, we feel it appropriate that there should be some democratic input from the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister.

We have endorsed what is in the criminal justice review, which emerged from the original Belfast, or Good Friday, agreement—namely, a limited political role for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. This involved the Judicial Appointments Commission taking the lead role for all appointments below High Court level, but with the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister having the power to require the JAC to reconsider—once only, I hasten to add—in respect of any vacancy and perhaps come up with an alternative or further recommendation. The criminal justice review gave the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister a more limited role still in the senior appointments—the High Court appointments—but we feel that that struck an appropriate balance in order to provide some democratic or political input without necessarily creating political interference. Clause 2 and schedules 2 to 6 end any sort of democratic input in judicial appointments, and that means that we will not have devolution of the responsibility for judicial appointments. Let us be clear that nothing in schedule 6 means that the useful existing arrangements can be, or will be, revived.

Similarly, the criminal justice review provided for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to be given a limited role in the removal of a judge, should that ever become necessary for whatever reason. Under the current arrangements, they could manage to trigger a tribunal to consider a difficulty associated with a less senior judge who was appointed, but they could not directly remove an individual judge. Again, the opportunity to trigger has disappeared. Although the criminal justice review was implemented by the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 and was extended in the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004, all this appears to be gone. I presume—I do not know—that this has been done somehow or other with the agreement of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, and their respective parties. I, like my SDLP colleagues, believe that this is the wrong way to go. We believe that the criminal justice review struck the right balance, and I believe that is why this House legislated for that balance in 2002 and 2004. Does the Secretary of State really now believe that the balance struck by those Acts and passed by this House got it wrong somewhere or other? I suggest that clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill.

I shall make a small contribution to this clause stand part debate. It was interesting that Dr. McDonnell advanced the argument that it is wrong to remove certain powers from the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, although these powers are limited in relation to the appointment and removal of judges. I say that because time and again we have heard members of his party, and perhaps him too, rail against what they describe as power grabs by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, and the office that they hold. All sorts of arguments have been advanced in the Assembly, and outside it, about how my right hon. Friend Mr. Robinson and others are out to take ever more powers to the centre and so on, yet here we are, in a situation in which they have agreed to divest themselves of certain responsibilities on the basis of removing any hint—

rose—

I shall give way.

Could the hon. Gentleman perhaps distinguish between short-term abuse or mismanagement by the current office holders and the point that I am trying to make, which is the important and all-embracing nature of this issue? This is about the long-term and about what happens whoever the office holders may be. The fact that the current office holders perhaps do not behave in the most appropriate way is no argument for not doing the thing right.

I am not sure that that intervention really clarifies things or helps to advance the case that the hon. Gentleman made. Indeed, the recent Financial Assistance (Northern Ireland) Act 2009 was a long-term solution to a pressing problem to do with a gap in the powers of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, and it was bitterly opposed by the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues even though it will provide hardship relief to many vulnerable people in our communities across the board.

The appointment of senior judges in Northern Ireland is a sensitive and important issue—as is the whole issue of justice and policing devolution, which is why we need to scrutinise it carefully with sufficient time to do so. I agree with others who have said that they are disappointed about the lack of time for proper scrutiny. It is strange that the hon. Gentleman should take the position that he has. I would have thought that most people in Northern Ireland were somewhat reassured by the fact that there should be no suggestion of political interference in the appointment of High Court judges, given the role that they play. The hon. Gentleman talked about a democratic input, but people are concerned that political interference might be brought to bear on such appointments. I have to point out that for positions much less sensitive and important than that of High Court judge, his party has been careful to point out how politicians should be removed from the process of both appointment and removal. I fail to understand the hon. Gentleman's approach in this case.

My party believes that this process is an advance and will provide reassurance. It helps with confidence building, and people across the board in Northern Ireland will be reassured that politicians will not have an input in judicial appointments and removals. There is an important role for Assembly politicians to play in many other areas, but judicial appointment and removal should not be a matter for party politics. We support this clause as it is an improvement on the current position and it is in line with our party policies and our manifesto commitments.

I wish briefly to place on record our opinion that this part of the Bill is actually the most agreeable, largely for the reasons given by Mr. Dodds and especially given the difficult negotiations that have taken place up to this point. It is my understanding that the question of who appoints the judiciary has been one of the sticking points, and it is therefore important that politicians are taken out of the process of selection or dismissal of the judiciary. The principle of separation of powers comes to mind, but, given the sensitive situation in Northern Ireland, this is the best way forward. I am therefore afraid that we cannot support Dr. McDonnell if he presses this issue.

I have a very long speech, but the House will be delighted to learn that I do not intend to use it all.

I thank the hon. Members for Tewkesbury (Mr. Robertson) and for Belfast, North (Mr. Dodds) for their support. The phrase used by the latter to describe this clause was "an advance" and, much as it grieves me, I have to disagree with my hon. Friend Dr. McDonnell on this point. In the discussions that we have had today, the issue of independence has been at the forefront of our minds in relation to other matters. Clearly, in the separation between judicial appointments and removal on the one hand and the political process on the other, there is always a delicate balance to strike. It is important that we strike it in the right place—and in this context, that we strike it in the right place for Northern Ireland.

Clause 2 introduces schedules 2 to 6—in other words, most of the content of the Bill—and makes provision in relation to judicial appointments and removals. In broad terms, the Bill provides that responsibility post-devolution for most judicial appointments will rest with the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission and that the role for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, as originally envisaged under the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, would fall instead to the commission. Let me give an example. New section 12 of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 provides that the Lord Chief Justice and lords justices of appeal shall be appointed by Her Majesty on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. Before making a recommendation, the Prime Minister must consult the Lord Chief Justice or, if that office is vacant, the senior Lord Justice of Appeal who is available, and the Judicial Appointments Commission. The proposed procedure is broadly similar to that set out in the 2002 Act, although the requirement on the Prime Minister to consult the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and their subsequent engagement with the commission are removed.

In terms of removals, the 2002 Act also anticipated that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister would be responsible for the removal of listed judicial office holders after devolution. Paragraphs 5 to 7 of schedule 3 amend sections 6 to 8 of the 2002 Act to provide that the Executive functions that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister would have exercised in relation to the removal of listed judicial office holders will instead be conferred on the Lord Chief Justice as head of the judiciary in Northern Ireland, or on the Northern Ireland judicial appointments ombudsman.

The key point is that amending the arrangements for judicial appointments and removals so as to omit any Executive function for Northern Ireland Ministers has clearly been a key element of the agreement between the parties setting out the process leading to the devolution of policing and justice powers. Indeed, let me refer explicitly to the letter from the Assembly and Executive Review Committee. This was agreed:

"In order to ensure the independence of the Judiciary responsibilities in relation to the appointment and removal of judicial office holders would rest with the Judicial Appointments Commission."

The schedules do exactly that. We are entirely in line with the mood from the Assembly and Executive Review Committee and with the will of the Assembly as a whole. The clear separation and the removal of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister from their advisory and appointment functions is broadly supported and is the right way forward.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly orde red to stand part of the Bill.

The Chairman:

We now come to amendment 18.

With the permission of the House, I should like to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

The Chairman:

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but silence would have effected the same result.