The hon. Gentleman, who has a special interest in this matter, must be aware that the first information on the Iraqi contract came through a leaked letter and not directly from UKAEA. Although Members of Parliament are constantly in contact with that organisation, we do not have the opportunity to explore the matter in detail or to discuss openly what is taking place. We are learning now about contracts because information has been leaked.

It was confirmed in September 1990 that Dounreay had secured its first new contract for reprocessing with the Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt research reactor in Braunschweig to reprocess 39 spent fuel rods. So far 20 of them have been sent to Dounreay, with a further consignment due.

We are told that Dounreay has held preliminary discussions with the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation about reprocessing spent fuel from the High Flux Australian reactor. However, any commercial negotiations would require Australian Government approval. In February 1991, ANSTO confirmed that talks had not progressed beyond the preliminary stage. With the United States removed, at least temporarily, from the reprocessing marketplace, the possibility of the 450 spent fuel elements coming to Scotland should not and cannot be dismissed. It was announced in 1985 that the 450 were destined for the United States, but they have fallen victim to the moratorium operating in the USA.

The past record shows that a consignment of 40 spent fuel elements from a research reactor in Bombay arrived at Dounreay in February 1991. The flask arrived at Felixstowe and then travelled by road to Dounreay. Traces of radioactive contamination were found on the flask when it was being washed after arrival. The UKAEA insisted that that contamination was not caused by a leak. That has aroused a great deal of fear and was referred to in a recent Health and Safety Executive report.

Unlike most of the other research reactors from which Dounreay is hoping to attract business, the Indian reactor bought its fuel from Dounreay initially. The contract was signed in 1964. Neither the enriched uranium extracted during reprocessing nor the waste will be returned to India.

It has also been suggested that Dounreay is on the brink of signing contracts with reactors in Canada. Dounreay has been involved in discussions with Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. about the possibility of reprocessing spent fuel rods from AECL's NRX, NRU and Slowpoke-2 research reactors, five more Slowpoke-2s from universities and colleges—from Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, Edmonton and Kingston—and yet another Slowpoke-2 at the Saskatchewan research council in Saskatoon. All of these reactors use highly enriched uranium, unlike Canada's production reactors. Greenpeace estimates that fresh fuel can be turned into a nuclear weapon in only seven days, and that spent fuel can be converted for use in as little as one month. Dounreay has apparently given AECL a quotation and AECL is now considering it.

"Return to sender" clauses are constantly cited by the Government to try to allay fears. The clauses, which were introduced under the 1974–79 Labour Government, were no doubt designed to reassure people that the dangers would be minimised, as the spent nuclear fuel would be returned to the country of origin. But what certainty is there?

The contract which was signed between NUKEM in Alzenau in Germany and the UKAEA concerning the storage of this question. One hundred and fifty storage places have been reserved for NUKEM at Dounreay, and article 3.5 of the agreement states: If NUKEM decide not to reprocess, all the fuel in storage at Dounreay shall be removed from the UK by the 30 September 1996". However, if NUKEM decides that it wants the fuel to be reprocessed, article 18.4 provides that: This waste, conditioned for transport and subsequent storage will be removed from the UK not later than 25 years after reprocessing and be returned to the FRG". In other words, Dounreay has agreed to store the spent fuel from research reactors for four years. If the client decides that it does not want the fuel reprocessed it must be removed from Dounreay within six years. If the reprocessing goes ahead, waste, conditioned for transport and subsequent storage, will be removed from the United Kingdom not later than 25 years after reprocessing. This is not a question of, "Here today, reprocessed tonight and gone tomorrow".

Research institutes seem to have found at least a temporary solution to their problems. The main motivation in signing reprocessing contracts will simply be to offload spent nuclear fuel on to someone else. No wonder that the whole process has been referred to as short or medium-term dumping.

There is also the question of what will happen to the nuclear waste if the client country does not have the facilities to accept it when Dounreay is ready to return it.

Dounreay has claimed, and no doubt the Minister will concur, that there is to be no increase in the level of reprocessing. Dounreay has in the past reprocessed just over 250 spent fuel rods annually, and a maximum of 758 in any one year. If Dounreay intends to use the MTR plant up to its maximum capacity of 900 spent fuel rods per year, discharges will inevitably increase.

As there is such a high incidence of leukaemia clusters around Dounreay and Sellafield, we should be trying to reduce, not increase, the level of reprocessing. No satisfactory response has been made to that research.

I now turn to the question of transport, one of the aspects which most worry the people of Scotland. Experience suggests that spent fuel will arrive on non purpose-built ships at ports in the south of England and then travel by road to Dounreay.

The International Atomic Energy Agency requires flasks used for transporting spent fuel to be designed to survive the impact of a 9-m fall—equivalent to an impact of 30 mph—and to survive being engulfed by fire for 30 minutes at a temperature of 800 deg. C and immersion at a depth of 200 m for one hour. Freight trains often exceed 30 mph and trains pass over viaducts and bridges considerably more than 9 m high—sometimes as high as 42 m.

Where will the waste come from? I want to deal in particular with the Iraqi waste controversy. On 6 October the Scottish Sunday Mail revealed in an excellent piece of investigative journalism that, in a draft letter to the Secretary of State for Energy, the Secretary of State for Scotland had made it clear that he would not object to fuel from an Iraqi nuclear reactor, damaged during the Gulf war, being sent to Dounreay for reprocessing. In his letter he stated: Such a development will cause me no little difficulty—especially from the SNP! … if you and Douglas Hurd judge that the UK's overall interests will be best served … then I would not want to stand in the way of UKAEA's involvement. I believe that the Government would have kept the matter secret for much longer if the draft letter had not been leaked.

Against that background, what assurances can the Minister give that contracts are not being pursued with other east European countries such as Bulgaria and the Ukraine to take in spent fuel and nuclear waste—given that the Iraqi contract was shrouded in secrecy for four months? Can he state categorically that no such contracts are being considered, particularly in the light of the decision by the Ukrainian Parliament to shut down Chernobyl as soon as possible?

I do not believe that Scotland can or should avoid its international obligations, but I object to the fact that we are apparently being singled out as the one country that will be the nuclear laundry for everyone else.

I believe that the genuine fears that exist in my part of Scotland and throughout Scotland are justified. I hope that the Government will clarify their stance and reassure the people of Scotland that we are not to be the nuclear dustbin of the world.