I certainly agree with that. Obviously, what is required of a TAVR soldier is not just technological competence. The old days of simple weapons, where a man was given a rifle or pike or bow and pointed in the direction of the enemy, are regrettably gone. Today, fighting is a highly complex process requiring technical skills as well as bravery. The bravery to face a Russian tank at 50 yards is perhaps something to which not every hon. Member would ultimately be able to aspire. However, the point raised by the hon. and gallant Member for Eye (Sir H. Harrison) concerned mobilisation. There is no point in having, if we are able, soldiers with wonderful equipment and courage if we are unable to get them to the battlefield quickly enough.

Full-scale exercises are, I believe, highly disruptive but nevertheless desirable. Certainly, far more small-scale tests should be feasible to ensure the strict mobilisation and transportation of our forces. Here, once again, there is an obligation on employers to co-operate. Paragraph 207 of the statement on Defence Estimates reads: The improvement of procedures for the recall of regular reservists is currently under study, with the aim of further reducing the time required for the mobilisation of our forces". I hope that we shall receive a report on that review very quickly, and that we can be reassured that our troops can be transported swiftly.

Transportation obviously constitutes a complex set of arrangements and official documents are filled with asterisks, just like a President Nixon tape, so we are not fully able—quite rightly so—to know what all the problems are. However, the importance of getting troops mobilised quickly cannot be over-exaggerated, and I hope that the Shapland committee will, in subsequent Ministry of Defence discussions, consider this urgently and act.

If the whole idea of a citizen army is based on a concept of swift mobilisation of people who are normally in productive work, and not hanging around doing important but non-productive jobs, in policing frontiers, some problems emerge. The threat of mobilisation can be seen by the enemy as either showing great resolve and providing a deterrent or as an act of aggression. The First World War is testimony to how the enemy can often see one's own mobilisation as an act of aggression which, indeed, can precipitate a conflict. However, I should like to say that the confidence-building measures as laid down by the Helsinki final act will certainly minimise those dangers.

In conclusion, I believe that, although technology has increased very considerably over the last 20 or 30 years, and the quality of equipment has improved enormously, strategic thinking has not kept apace. An eminent thinker on this subject, Edward N. Luttwak, said in a recent article: NATO's doctrine is one which still presumes a net superiority in material, a style based on the methods of attrition rather than manoeuvre. I believe that Luttwak's argument is that the strategy of Douglas Haig and First World War tactics have still not died, and that what one needs is not just good equipment but new thinking—strategy, manoeuvring to outflank the enemy, not simply to wear him down. Certainly, highly mobile and qualified TAVR units can play a major part.

What I want to see is a rejuvenated TAVR as an alternative to the dilemma facing the Government of choosing between a massively expensive, large conventional force and a suicidal reliance on nuclear deterrents. The TAVR can go a long way to providing Britain with a credible defence at an acceptable cost.