Orders of the Day — Defence Estimates

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons am 12:00 am ar 12 Rhagfyr 1973.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Mr Frank Judd Mr Frank Judd , Portsmouth West 12:00, 12 Rhagfyr 1973

I certainly would not add them, but if the Government wish to do so it is up to them. But we on this side of the House believe that the delay in coming to a decision about the Harrier is becoming intolerable. We feel that we owe it to the men of the Fleet Air Arm that, as soon as possible—it should have been done long ago—they should have a clear indication of what the Government intend to do, because they need to be able to think with certainty about then-future. Let us have a decision, whatever it is, at the first possible moment.

We must also examine the suitability of our defence forces to meet the real dangers which I have described—for example, their suitability to cope with internal as well as external threats, with unorthodox as well as orthodox dangers within the context of a free and democratic society, their adaptability in protecting oil rigs, fishing fleets or survey teams, their ability to contribution to international policing operations where appropriate.

In this connection, it is necessary to ask whether much of modern military and naval technology is in danger of becoming muscle-bound. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman) made this point very effectively. We have to learn the lessons of the Middle East war.

In naval policy, I sometimes wonder whether we are beginning to find ourselves concentrating on too many individual boffin showpieces, as it were, at the expense of overall versatility and an overall viable force. It was interesting to hear the comments of the Minister of State on future policy about ships operating in groups. I do not think that that completely overcomes the doubt which exists, and this is something at which we must look very critically in the light of recent international experience.

I should like to say one or two words about defence policy and defence expenditure. Obviously, we have to work within alliances. In our post-imperial era, it would be impossible, even if we wanted to do so, to police our own interests all over the world alone.

I argue that the story of the NATO alliance since the late 1940s has been one of success in maintaining relative stability. The rationalisation of the Western and Eastern communities into the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact is the key to any chance of progress in talks on mutual and balanced force reductions and a meaningful implementation of détente.

The key to the power balance which has been established, whether we like it or not—some of my hon. Friends have sincere and genuine misgivings about it—seems to be related to the inextricable inter-relationship of the American deterrent and the integrated American and European land forces on the European continent. We can no doubt understand the domestic pressures that may have developed in the United States, if need be, for a unilateral reduced US presence in Europe. But we must put two points to our colleagues in the United States.

First, they must ask themselves how a unilateral withdrawal by America will affect the willingness of the Russians to make significant or meaningful concessions in the context of mutual and balanced force reductions. It would surely make a nonsense of all that is under way in Vienna at the moment.

The second point that we must make is that a unilateral American withdrawal would probably lead to increased emphasis on an independent European defence force, perhaps with its own deterrent. Some of us would at least argue that this would have an acute unbalancing impact on the international situation as it now stands.

While making that point, I believe that we should mention the British deterrent. If we accept the analysis that I have just indicated, there does not seem to be a case for a new generation of a British so-called independent nuclear deterrent. We should be careful to avoid drifting into such a commitment. In any case, in the context of the SALT talks the Russians have made it perfectly clear that in their view any increase in our nuclear capability in this respect would be regarded as an increase in the United States capability. We must treat that point seriously.

There is much cynicism—perhaps in this House as well as outside—about the cause of disarmament. But surely effective policed disarmament is still self-evidently the best form of defence, especially with the development of chemical, biological and even crude nuclear weapons which might be used in a guerrilla context. Lestor Pearson, the previous Canadian Prime Minister, once commented that we prepare for war like prodigious giants and for peace like retarded pygmies.

We must not despair on this course. We should use the new realities as an incentive for unceasing efforts on the disarmament front. I suggest that to give up would amount to criminal neglect of the interests of those whom we claim to represent.

Similarly, the Middle East and the crisis in world resources have demonstrated more than ever the relevance of an international security agency with teeth if this could but be established. This would clearly be as much in the interests of the super-Powers, who can still be drawn into confrontation against their better judgment, as in the interests of the weak who need guaranteed access, for example, to their fair share of limited world resources.

I should like to commend something that was said by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian. If we are concerned about world stability and peace in future, we should already be debating in some depth in this House our policy at the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference.

Meanwhile—here I want to say something which may be regarded by some hon. Members, even on this side of the House, as a little contentious—we must recognise, in the age of guerrilla warfare and terrorist techniques, the importance of intelligence operations in defence policy. But in our kind of democratic society we must be careful about potential sinister developments in any strong emphasis on intelligence. We must be clear about the way in which we at all times guarantee the political accountability of the intelligence machine.

There are two other matters that I shall mention briefly. First, in our concern about achieving value for money in our defence programme and defence expenditure, we must remember the large body of civilian industrial and non-industrial staff which is employed directly by the Ministry of Defence. I suggest that in the midst of our grave energy crisis there is an urgent need to utilise a growing proportion of our research and development programme in an onslaught on the energy crisis itself. There must be research into alternative sources of power and less energy-intensive means of production. In other words, we must consider relevant technology for survival, which is more intimately related to the concept of defence than might at first seem obvious.

Second, there are large civilian establishments employing considerable numbers of industrial and non-industrial staff. They include the naval dockyards. At a time when hon. Members on both sides of the House like, at times, to moralise about the responsibility of industry for devising up-to-date techniques in industrial relations and management, it seems extraordinary that we should tolerate so much antiquated and thoroughly archaic organisation in the naval dockyards. They are large units of industrial activity which are directly under Government responsibility. It seems that there is an urgent need for a sensible and competitive pay structure for all civilian employees, with an emphasis on decent basic pay.

There is a need to revise drastically, if not to eliminate, the incentive schemes which, with their present dependence on individual incentives, are inappropriate for the sort of work that is undertaken. There is also a need for decentralisation of management control, with far more responsibility delegated to individual yards and units for running their own affairs, and for negotiation on the spot between workers and local management, which should have real authority.

We should endeavour to achieve significant economies by drastically pruning all unnecessary, expensive and top-heavy bureaucratic overheads in the yards themselves, at Bath and at the Ministry of Defence, Civil Service Department and the Treasury at Whitehall level. They serve to put an unfair burden on productive management and workers in the front line. It is important that we should have a determined drive to increase revenue to the defence budget by utilising fully their capital equipment and manpower. If necessary, that could be done by operating a 24-hour day on a shift basis and taking on far more engineering work, for which the yards are ideally suited for outside industry, especially the public services and public enterprises.

A good deal of attention has been paid by hon. Members from both sides of the House to the downturn in recruiting for all three Services. Naturally, this is not a matter for partisan point scoring. It is a matter that concerns us all.