Orders of the Day — Defence Estimates

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons am 12:00 am ar 12 Rhagfyr 1973.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Mr Edward Leadbitter Mr Edward Leadbitter , Hartlepools, The 12:00, 12 Rhagfyr 1973

One of the great difficulties of analysing the United Kingdom's defence position is in trying to understand the factors which have directly and indirectly impinged upon it. It seems clear to me and, I am sure, to hon. Members on both sides of the House that for more than 20 years at least three fundamental factors have impinged upon our thinking and brought about trends in defence that I suspect now alarm the House of Commons and the country.

The first of those factors is a profound change in our social habits and attitudes which, at different times in the past two decades, have amounted to a social crisis.

The second factor is the growing generation who have no experience of the meaning of a just war with conventional arms or, apart from news broadcasts and television, of the types of war that we associate with the term "conventional arms".

The third factor has affected Governments more than the House of Commons. It is well known that in the House we discuss defence matters on approximately six days in the year—two days on the White Paper, one day on each of the Services, and a day such as this on the Supply Estimates. Therefore, the Government in their executive position are affected by this third factor of increasing military costs accelerating to astronomical levels.

These three factors have impinged greatly on defence policy. Their combination has recently brought about such policies as Willi Brandt's Ostpolitik, less recently our withdrawal from east of Suez, and, more recently, President Nixon's talks in Peking and Moscow. In consequence, we have been lulled into an assumption of security which in reality does not exist.

We have been brought face to face with reality from our experience in the Middle East. Another reality which we must face is the impending and inevitable withdrawal of more troops from Europe.

Taking all these matters into account, we have a new political and defence position to assert—namely, that on the paramount issue of the defence of the realm the House of Commons should be united. It does not matter what is said at the party conferences. What matters is what we say here as Members of Parliament when we exercise our constitutional rights. We are faced with the facts of life and must have the courage to say what should be done.

We should bear in mind our recent history and learn from the trends of the past two decades. We must guard against being lulled into a situation in which we take too much for granted and find that perhaps once more we are not ready to deal with a situation effectively. That does not mean that we should start war-mongering or an arms race. It means considering how best we in the House of Commons can ascertain whether this country is properly defended.

I believe that at the moment it is not and I have some pertinent statistical facts to show why. Unlike the situation in the United States, the House of Commons is kept horribly misinformed on defence matters and, although the House has tried to provide some remedy for that in the last two or three years through the Select Committee system, that remedy is still in its infancy and does not possess the power to get for the House the information it requires.

We must look at Europe in the light of recent history, in the light of what can happen in the Middle East and in the light of American intentions. We must ask whether we can withstand a conventional weapons attack, and I believe that the answer to that question at the moment is that we could not stand such an attack in Europe for more than three or four days, or three or four weeks at the most. That raises a most important consideration. In the last few years we have enjoyed what we thought was a state of security beneath the nuclear umbrella. If, as I suggest, we cannot stand a conventional attack, we must consider whether that weakness does not present the threat of the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the corollary of that would be whether there was not also a threat at a later point of the use of strategic nuclear weapons.

Perhaps I may give some indication of the dilemma we are in. There are three sets of talks going on. First are the European Conference on Security and Co-operation talks; second are the MBFR talks in Vienna; and the third are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. All three are in some way related to security and defence and of conventional weapons. These talks are completely unco-ordinated.

A week ago Senator Jackson in Washington, considered to be an authority on defence matters, announced that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks had come to an impasse. He is reported as proposing as a way out of this deadlock that each side be limited to 800 intercontinental ballistic missiles and no more than 560 submarine-launched missiles. The SALT No. 1 agreement of a year ago allows the United States up to 44 nuclear missile submarines containing 710 launch tubes and the Soviet Union up to 62 submarines with 950 launch tubes.

The arithmetic of that is alarming. The two supreme Powers are using that kind of language about strategic arms. Russia, we know, is developing sophisticated conventional equipment in addition for low-level attack to avoid our detector and interceptor systems. And Europe does not have the fullest co-ordination in defence matters. So, whether we are talking in terms of conventional weapons or strategic weapons, we are falling far behind America and Russia, and the hopes of progress in SALT are fading.

We in Europe must try to divert our minds from the political machinations of the Common Market. We must cease assuming that we must plan our defence according to where the ball is being played.

Experience tells us that if they cannot find agreement on economic matters they cannot do so on military matters. We have the situation where France is not a member of NATO and where for political reasons we may at some time be involved in an unholy nuclear marriage with France. But that would not be a solution.

There is a need for the NATO Powers to remove themselves from the philosophy of the line of defence and to revert to a more mobile position of defence in depth. Such a move would produce financial advantages, flexibility and modern methods of anti-tank warfare such as the use of helicopters. A whole string of other advantages would follow. But for this we need a new European Defence Agency.

Ponder on the question of Britain's position and contribution. I promised to return to "alarming facts" about our defence position. There are gaps in our communications system and in our radar coverage of a most serious nature. There is considerable delay in the application of the most up-to-date computerised systems of co-ordination. But when it comes to military hardware in the Army, Navy and Air Force equipment, the House might be alarmed to know that 20 years ago the Royal Air Force had 700 jet fighters. At the moment it has about 70. There are no anti-aircraft missiles in our aircraft strike force. Britain has no fighter of any kind under production in this country. Indeed, we have to resort to foreign manufacturers for our strike force aircraft production.

Ten years ago our effective warships numbered 230; at the moment we have about 170. Ten years ago we had five aircraft carriers; now we have one. The hon. and gallant Member for Winchester (Rear-Admiral Morgan-Giles) referred to this position earlier and has done so on previous occasions. He has expressed his concern that we should have only the "Ark Royal". Unless a new policy decision is made, its life is limited. The "Ark Royal" has a squadron of Buccaneer strike aircraft and a squadron of Phantom fighter bombers. It is the only weapon in British hands capable of striking targets beyond 25 miles. That is a dangerous situation for us. I repeat the "Ark Royal" is the only weapon of its sort that we have, the only warship at sea with the capacity to strike a target at 25 miles. I suggest that we should consider these facts with some care.

What is the effect on Britain of the SALT talks? Russia and America have ignored the first agreement while we have kept ourselves nicely in agreement. In the same way we bend over backwards to keep in agreement with every silly regulation in the Common Market. We have four Polaris submarines. Everybody knows that they are expected to be sufficient until the early 1980s at the latest. But we are not even in a position to introduce the multiple independently targetted re-entry vehicle system of Poseidon. America has the system; Russia has advanced on it.

In America the work in that area is due to end possibly next year. Unless the Government make a decision we shall be without MIRV. It is a serious matter because, as the Minister knows, the anti-ballistic missile programme was limited by the SALT talks. We had hopes of replacement through the MIRV system. If we need it, a decision should be made early. If there is anxiety about it, then it is the Government's fault because the House of Commons has been kept rather misinformed and lacking in information.

I stress the importance of this problem to those who presume to be pacifists and who presume that our social and economic future is best enhanced by cutting down on defence expenditures. Our social and economic situation has never in our history been enhanced by overindulgence in pacifism. On each occasion that the pacifists have had their way, the House has eventually at some point reasserted itself and saved the day.

Now, when space and time scales have considerably changed, when we have supersonic flight and pictures can be brought back from Jupiter at the speed of light, science has introduced a new spectrum into political and scientific thinking.

The House must charge the Government, any Government, to remember that we cannot afford and must not try, on the grounds of protecting our social and economic future, to afford a reduction in arms expenditure. The defence of the realm must come first and when that first charge is met, we can feel secure to get on with the job of earning our living in peace.