I accept what the hon. Gentleman said, and I shall be mentioning that matter shortly.

More important from the point of view of Members of Parliament was our recommendation in the same report that the Defence White Paper should include more information about policy and strategic matters, as well as costs, in addition to the largely rather backward-looking matter which is currently published. I recall that when I first became a Member of the House, thick volumes for each Service were published. In those days interest in defence matters was so great that debates often continued all night. Now it is a rather slim paper that is presented. For the ordinary Member who wishes to study these matters in some depth, it is by no means as useful as it could be.

We requested from the Ministry of Defence comments on the practice of the United States Government of publishing considerable detail of the costs and performance of individual weapon systems. We were informed that whereas the deterrent value of the United States' abundance of weapon systems was increased by disclosure, the weaknesses as well as the strengths of our much smaller British efforts might be revealed if as much information were published about our armaments. Even if we accept this constraint, we do not accept that the White Paper is wholly adequate.

The White Paper should be the basis of the main defence debate of the year, and should provide all Members of Parliament with the information necessary for an informed debate on the Defence Estimates. We should like to see a clear statement of defence policy in the White Paper, with the costs of weapon systems demanded by that policy and the expenditure committed in future years to those projects. Until more financial detail is disclosed, the House will not be in a position to judge the wisdom or otherwise of these commitments. We should also like to see included in the White Paper some comparison with the expenditure of our allies, an assessment of the threats which Britain might face, and the strategic balances of manpower and armaments.

In view of the lack of published material on which the House can make its own assessments of procurement policies, my sub-committee is currently investigating several high-cost projects from each of the Services. We have received papers on the Royal Navy's new through-deck carriers and their armaments, on the multi-rôle combat aircraft which we saw earlier this year in its building stage at Munich, on the future main battle tank and on helicopter-borne anti-tank missiles. We hope to publish unclassified versions of these papers before the next debate as we did on the nuclear deterrent, which last year stimulated a lot of interest in the main defence debate.

Even without further expenditure on nuclear weapons, these projects will account for a very substantial part of the defence budgets in the late 1970s and 1980s, and we estimate that they will cost many hundreds of millions of pounds. From the first, the Defence Sub-Committee has been concerned that commitments for long-term projects such as these may pre-empt future resources. If we are committed to all these projects, the bulk of expenditure will fall due in the years ahead. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State is aware of this prospect, but can he be certain that our resources will be adequate to meet these demands? By 1978, the Government of the day may well be faced with the stark alternatives of an unduly increased defence budget or the need to make arbitrary cuts.

As regards the management of procurement projects, we were much reassured by the impact made on us in the sub-committee by the first head of the Procurement Executive, Mr. Derek Rayner, now Sir Derek Rayner, in instituting reviews of projects every six months. I believe that the previous practice was to review them every two years. I hope my right hon. Friend can assure me that there are similar reviews of all these projects. It is important to look at major projects most vigorously in the development stage, to establish the estimated incidence of expenditure for some years ahead in the production phase, the overall effect on the defence budget as a whole and—perhaps even more important when considering whether projects should continue—to see whether, in spite of changes in the world situation, they will achieve the purpose for which they were designed.

We hope that in future the minor cuts inflicted on the defence budget in recent months can be avoided. We recently considered the defence cuts made this year as part of the Chancellor's package of 21st May, and the more recent economies announced with phase 3. The Government's policy seems to be to make small cuts, mainly by way of deferments, on many projects. This policy seems likely to lead to higher costs in the long run and may be an illusion if some of those cuts are really shortfalls in expenditure which would have occurred anyway. Moreover, the Ministry is still unable to say where all the cuts will fall and £10 million-worth of cuts, although approved, are not yet allocated. May I suggest that it is sometimes wiser to cut out a whole project, than to tinker a little with a great many?

Another problem arises in considering procurement objectives. How effective will these weapon systems be in the 1980s? The recent unfortunate Middle East war has shown that some tried and tested weapon systems may be rendered less effective by newly developed missiles. It is too early to be certain, but there are some preliminary lessons which our planners should consider, as the Minister of State said. We do not want to take quick decisions, but in the light of the recent war we should study these lessons in estimating the demand for the MRCA and the future battle tank. Moreover, our missile systems and the means of delivery need to be closely examined to assess the best means of deployment in a battlefield situation, and consequently the number of weapons required.

The Israelis' British and American-built tanks effectively outgunned the Soviet-built tanks, so far as we can gather. I would remind the House that the British Centurion tank used by Israel has been superseded in our own British forces by the more effective Chieftain. But even the most advanced tank may be increasingly vulnerable to anti-tank missiles, and indeed in the fighting many tanks were lost through hits by relatively unsophisticated Russian anti-tank missiles operated by the Arab forces.

The anti-tank missile has thus made its first real mark on the battlefield, and the infantry—of which I was a member during the last war—clearly has a weapon which is effective against the heaviest tank, at both short and long ranges. That does not mean that the day of the tank has ended. These missiles are defensive weapons, and tanks are still needed for offensive operations. But the balance has swung against the tank, which has dominated the battlefield for many years. What may be needed now is a mixture of missiles and tanks, possibly with some missiles mounted on tanks, according to tactical requirements. The conflict may have some bearing on the number of new tanks which will be required.

In the air, I feel that the lessons are not so comforting for Western observers. Although American-built Phantoms proved superior to any Soviet-built planes, the emergence of effective ground-to-air missiles, the SAM defences, markedly reduced the effectiveness of Israel's air operations. Many planes were lost not only through direct hits from SAM 6 missiles, but also from anti-tank guns or man-portable or vehicle-mounted SAM 7 missiles, because to avoid the SAM 6 missiles the planes flew low. The balance may therefore have shifted against the fighter-bomber. Yet—and very rightly—we are pursuing an expensive development programme on the MRCA, in part to produce an aircraft of this type. The task of the fighter-bomber is now more difficult, which may suggest that in future some of its targets will have to be taken over, in the face of dense SAM defences, by surface-to-surface missiles or artillery. The introduction of precision guidance for missiles and artillery makes it more likely that such systems might cut sharply into the rôle of the fighter bomber in a European battlefield.

Helicopters were little used in the Middle East battlefields. In forward zones helicopters were easy targets and could not operate. That may have implications for the tactical handling of antitank airborne missiles carried by helicopters. It may be that vehicle-mounted or hand-held launchers may be more effective. We do not yet know the answer, but that matter must be considered. At least the inventory of armaments deployed in Europe will have to be reassessed in the light of recent experience.

In seeking to assess the effectiveness of our defence expenditure and in reviewing the complex weapon systems needed today, account must still be taken of the quality of training and organisation of our forces. We were encouraged from recent visits to RAF Strike Command Headquarters, to RAF Wattisham and to Headquarters Eastern District Colchester by the efficiency of the headquarters and the local organisation of our services. If our costly procurement programme can be managed as effectively as our manpower, I should be more confident of value for money from our defence forces.

I have tried to put shortly before the House the complex problems posed by defence hardware. Costs continue to increase. The Minister said that we must increase the pay of the Service personnel. That will leave us with less room overall for hardware. It is vital that all hon. Members should thoroughly understand the position facing any Government in this sphere over the next 10 years.