I shall try to deal with these points so far as I think that it is appropriate for me to do so.

First, I do not think that I myself have used the prima facie formula. I have regarded my duty to say whether or not I will give priority to the matter. I think that if one says that one accepts a case as being a prima facie case, it implies a judgment on my part on the merits. I have always looked on the duty of the Chair as being to decide whether to give priority to the matter raised. I have said nothing about the wisdom or otherwise of its being debated on another day.

With regard to the position of the Chair on matters of order, I will not accept orders on that from anyone. That has been the position of the Chair of this House for centuries now, whether the orders have come from the Crown, from Another place or from anyone. Matters of order are entirely for me, and what I say with regard to matters of order goes, until the House reverses my decision. That is where I stand.

With regard to matters of taste and the wisdom of people saying what they say in a speech or a Question or an Answer, I have tried to be very careful throughout my time in the Chair not to be drawn into commenting. That is why I have not commented at all on what has been said by anyone during this particular controversy.

Concerning the position between this House and a Member of the House of Lords, I think that it is stated in Eskine May that an imputation should not be made to the conduct or character of a Member of the other place except upon a motion. I say with great respect to those who have edited, or indeed, written that paragraph of Eskine May that I do not think that that passage is altogether clear. But I construe it as really meaning that imputations of a personal nature should not be made as to the conduct or character of a Member of another place except upon a motion. Upon a motion they certainly can be made.