Part of the debate – in the House of Commons am 12:00 am ar 4 Rhagfyr 1973.
I start by associating myself warmly and sincerely with the good wishes expressed to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on the assumption of his important office, particularly so because I have followed his political career with affection and admiration since he started upon it all those years ago in the Department in which I was then serving. As Leslie Hore-Belisha remarked in a note which he was kind enough to send to me in somewhat similar circumstances, whether that be found to be a a matter for encouragement or otherwise is quite another question.
The motion is a compendium of criticism—criticism of the Act and of the court and its methods of enforcement. I propose to restrict my observations to that latter aspect. In that context, to see whether there is substance in the criticisms contained in the motion, we have to find the answers to three questions.
The first question is, was the order of the court a lawful order within its jurisdiction and duty to decide? The second question is, if it were so, was it disobeyed by a party under a legal duty to obey? The third question is, were the steps taken to correct and contain such disobedience lawful steps? If the answers to those questions are all "Yes". as I shall submit they are, there can be no legitimate criticism of the action of the court. That does not mean that there will be no criticism. I meant that there will be no justifiable criticism. After all, it is no surprise if unsuccessful litigants express dissatisfaction with the operation and even the institution of courts. I gather that the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. John Mendelson) disagrees. He is much too intelligent to try to present his observations from a sedentary position and in an incoherent way. If he can resist the temptation to rise I shall be grateful ; but if he insists, I shall give way.