Costs of Proceedings Commenced in High Court Which Could Have Been Commenced in County Court

Part of Clause 4 – in the House of Commons am 12:00 am ar 20 Hydref 1969.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Sir Ian Percival Sir Ian Percival , Southport 12:00, 20 Hydref 1969

That would be from £100 upwards. I am glad that the Solicitor-General is able to give us that assurance, but I would like to make one or two comments on the points he has made, if only to place them on record for future consideration.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has referred again to the First Interim Report of the Evershed Committee. With respect, I think that it is a very bad point to take the first interim report of a committee which was issued four years before its Final Report and compare that with the Austin Jones Committee, which published its Report three months before the First Interim Report of the Evershed Committee. Surely, if there is any substance to be found in the Evershed Committee Reports, it is in that Committee's Final Report, to which the Solicitor-General's noble and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor was a party, because he was a member of that Committee.

The recommendation of that Committee, despite considerable pressure that Section 47(4) should be abolished, was that it should not be abolished but, on the contrary, that the cut-off figure in it should be increased. That is precisely what we are suggesting in the Amendment. We are suggesting that the cutoff figure should be increased but that the subsection should be retained. I suggest, therefore, with respect, that if the Evershed Committee is support for either view, it is support for what we are saying in the Amendment.

I must comment on the Solicitor-General's use of the expression that the county court is the natural and economic forum. I do not know what my hon. and learned Friends who practise in the law think about this, but to me "natural forum" in this context does not mean anything. What matters when one is deciding where to bring an action is the most efficient way to do it. There is not a natural way of doing it. All ways are artificial and unnatural; they are devised by man for the benefit of man, and it is misleading to talk in terms of a natural forum. The natural forum is the one which is the better, and there are differences of opinion here as to which is the better.

I am sure that the Solicitor-General will not mind my saying that most of his reply dealt with figures. I was anxiously awaiting the end of the figures to know what inconvenience, if any, had been caused to the High Court in having to deal with that number of debt-collecting cases, but I did not detect anything in his remarks to suggest that any inconvenience had been caused. That is in accordance with all the remaining information that we have on this side of the House. It is pointless for the Solicitor-General to read out a string of figures of the number of debt-collecting cases unless there is evidence that inconvenience has been caused to the High Court, or that its work has been impeded.

The Solicitor-General then dealt with the necessity for some cost sanction. We have never suggested that there is no necessity for cost sanction. This is another example of the Solicitor-General answering a point which we have not made, and this makes debating difficult. We agree that there should be some cost sanction, and we agree that the figure to give effect to this cost sanction must from time to time be brought up to date, and for both those reasons we put the figure of £75 in place of £45. The Solicitor-General has not dealt with the main argument in support of the Amendment, which is the distinction between debt-collecting actions and other actions.

May I take up the Solicitor-General's closing remark that it is wrong in principle for there to be some specially privileged debt-collecting litigant. This is to look at the matter completely upside down. It is no special privilege to a litigant to be able to bring his claim in the High Court. The High Courts of Justice are the Queen's courts, and they have been open to Her Majesty's subjects ever since we have had them. It is no special privilege to bring a certain kind of action in the High Court.

What has happened is that, to encourage people, if I may use the Solicitor-General's word, or to drive them, to use mine, to go to the county courts instead of the High Court, it has been the practice for a considerable time to penalise people for using the High Court if they could use the county courts. It is to stand the thing on its head if, after doing that, we talk about people being specially privileged if they are allowed to have some costs in bringing their cases in the High Court.

When we employ cost sanctions to persuade people to go to the county court, we are seeking to persuade, or to drive, them not to use that which is their right and has been for a long time. Yes, we must do it where there is good cause, but the onus lies upon the Government to justify cost sanctions, and to justify anything which makes it more difficult for a person to use the High Court. With respect, it is looking at the matter entirely in the wrong way to speak, as the Solicitor-General spoke, of it being wrong to allow anybody to enjoy special privileges. The Amendment would not give anybody any special privileges. It would merely recognise a distinction of fact which has for a long time been recognised.

The Solicitor-General knows that normally I have considerable respect for his views, but I consider his answer to be