I was endeavouring to ascertain whether the hon. and learned Gentleman was indicating agreement with me, for, if he had, I should have been able to cut the matter short. However, having interrupted my train of thought in that way, I must endeavour now to return to it.

I believe, as I say, that our Amendment states the law as it is, in accordance with the law as stated by the permanent secretary to the Lord Chancellor in the letter to which I referred. It may be asked: if that be so, why bother further? The reason we ought to bother in this case is that, even if that is the law, there are a good many people who do not know that it is. The point has been raised by solicitors in various parts of the country. It has been raised by the under-sheriffs through their association, who, after all, are fairly knowledgable in these matters. If everyone knew the point, one would imagine that the first people to be well aware of it would be the under-sheriffs and their association.

I have been looking at the Final Report of the Evershed Committee. Again, the matter is far from clear, it looks as though that Committee may not have appreciated that costs of execution are not costs of the action.

4.15 p.m.

Finally, I turned to the case relied on by the permanent secretary, the case of Armitage v. Jessop, in which, apparently, the Chief Justice said specifically that the costs of execution are not costs of the action. That was a case in 1866. I have no doubt that it is still the law, and I am sure that the permanent secretary was right when he said that he apprehended that there could be no doubt that that decision would be followed in construing Section 47(1). But there are not many people who know about that case at present.

I did what I suppose any practising lawyer would do when in doubt on a question like this. I looked up Section 47 to see whether Armitage v. Jessop was noted at that point in the county court practice. In my edition, which I believe to be the latest, it is not referred to. I looked, therefore, at the next practice book, the White Book, and I did not find it referred to there.

I then wrote to the Solicitor-General, who, with his customary courtesy, replied—I summarise it in this way—that it was his view that the law was sufficiently well established in the terms set out in the Amendment as to render the Amendment unnecessary. As I understood his letter, he did not quarrel with my proposition that the Amendment was merely declaratory of the law, but, on the contrary, he said that the law was so well established that it was unnecessary to declare it.

That was a source of some comfort to me, but I remain concerned that people should know what the law is. It is no good the law being clear unless people know it. I hope that our short debate on the matter will have a good result in this sense. If, as I suspect will happen, the Solicitor-General confirms what I have said, as he did in his letter, that the law is well established, that statement will carry weight with solicitors practising in these matters, with under-sheriffs and, perhaps, even with registrars. Although one cannot quote what is said in the House, there is reason to believe that it sometimes becomes known to people in the courts.

For all those reasons, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be able to make a clear statement on the matter, removing for the future any doubt on the point among practitioners.