I admit that it is a question of opinion which nobody can prove, but I still feel that the words added by an earlier Amendment will be more effective than will this Amendment. However, I rise to address my hon. Friend on another point. I raised a similar question in Committee. I may be far too simple in these matters, but if an issue is taken before a court one gets either confirmation or denial. That seems to be the whole foundation of justice. The Amendment says this: Where the county court on an appeal against a control order, or on an appeal under the last foregoing section, revokes a control order". Those are the operative words. The court revokes a control order; it says that the control order shall no longer be so.

9.0 p.m.

The Amendment continues: …the court may authorise the local authority under section 69(2) of this Act to create interests which expire, or which the dispossessed proprietor can terminate, within six months from the time when the control order ceases to have effect,…". Odd though it may seem, I do not object to those interests being created. But it may be practicable and possible, and probably more desirable, that these interests should be created from other powers we have now put in the Bill, bearing in mind the fact that, firstly, the court would be turned into a judicial tribunal to decide how much should be given to one side or the other—which is not the function of a county court—and, secondly, the court would have to decide how far it should go in length of time with the creation of a lease. I cannot see the motives involved here, and there is no explanation in the Clause about the actual creation of those interests.

What will happen if it is discovered that a control order should never have been made or that one was made wrongly or without due consideration? Is it possible that the court will, in that event, still have power to grant a six months' lease to enable the local authority to get back its money? I hope my hon. Friend realises that justice applies to all and not to just the local authority. It applies, equally, to the dispossesed proprietor, although he may have been extremely wicked in one way or another.

I referred to this matter in Committee, and I do so now because, although I may have been in a minority of one—which does not worry me in the least—I cannot understand why, if a court is being asked to adjudicate, it should have to say, "You cannot have this but you can have something else in its place". This is not like a court making probation orders. It will be concerned with making a decision about whether or not a control order has been rightly or wrongly made and what should then he done in the event of the decision to make a control order having been wrongly made.

I agree with the powers implicit in the Amendment, but I do not accept that this is the best way of effecting them. I do not consider it justice. County courts have enough to do without having to worry about what degree of leases should be given, and I am convinced this is not the best method of trying to administer justice between local authorities and individuals.