If my hon. and learned Friend did not say so, then I say it for myself.

If there is anything wrong in that Statute, then the Statute must be amended by Parliament, and until it is amended by Parliament it is binding upon everybody. No man has a right to say, "My illegal act was committed by inadvertence. I have been committing it by inadvertence for 16 years. I have been committing it by inadvertence through five or six General Elections. The inadvertence of other people in the same circumstances has been continually brought to my attention during that period by Select Committees of the House and by indemnity Acts passed in their cases, but I went on doing it, and now I am entitled, as a right, to ask the House of Commons to pass a special Act of Parliament in my personal case in order to secure, not merely that the Act which applies and continues to apply to every other citizen of the country shall not apply to me, but that the Act shall be deemed never to have applied to me for 16 years."

Nobody has a right to demand that of Parliament. Parliament may think it right in some cases to do it and in other cases not to do it, but it is quite improper to suppose that anyone who thinks that in any particular case the indemnity should not be given is committing something unworthy or not quite fair.

One general ground on which many of us welcome the Bill is that it makes clear once and for all that Parliament remains responsible in these cases and can act in any particular case as it thinks fit. The reason I say that is that the proposition seems to have been doubted or almost frowned upon by the Attorney-General on Monday. On that occasion we were dealing with the case of a man who, like these two men, had been declared by Statute—a different Statute—to be incapable of being elected to the House of Commons or of sitting here. One appreciates the difference between the two Statutes and one appreciates the difference between the kind of breach of Statute involved in the two cases, but what is common to the two cases is that in both of them men were elected here, or seemed to have been elected, by having attained a majority of the votes, although they were men who by Statute could not be elected.

What the Government are doing today and what many previous Governments have done in similar cases is to say, "The circumstances in these cases are such that we will invite Parliament to pass an Act of indemnity not merely relieving the people concerned of the penalties which they have incurred but, more than that, declaring that the incapacity which attaches to them shall be deemed not to have attached to them." I think it is right that Parliament should declare that it has the power to do that, that it will exercise that power in suitable circumstances and that the only question is not whether there is an Act of Parliament which makes the election invalid but whether the circumstances are such as to persuade Parliament not to insist on the penalties or on the invalidity.

I am sorry that the House did not take that view in the other case. We are not debating that now, and as there was a majority otherwise, that is the opinion of Parliament and we must all accept it; but what I regretted on that occasion and what has been put right on this occasion is the doubt which the Attorney-General appeared to be casting upon the proposition that, by whatever Statute and in whatever circumstances a man's election was invalid, Parliament could, if it chose, take other action than merely to declare the election invalid and to move for the issue of a new Writ.

We are being asked in these two cases to go a very long way—no further, no doubt, than we have gone in other cases, but the other cases were less serious than either of these. I regard the case of Mr. George as a very serious case indeed. Here is a man who is directly appointed by the Crown as a director of a company and, having been appointed, becomes chairman of the company. The company is a State-fostered institution. It employs State-loaned capital. It is enjoined to put itself into a sound economic position and to make a profit; that is the object—to make the industry profitable and to make the company profitable.

The chairman of the company may get a salary even when the company is losing money, provided the Minister agrees. In other words, if the Minister agrees, this nominee director, Mr. George, who becomes chairman, may receive a capital out of fees loaned by the Government. If the company succeeds, gets on its feet, becomes self-supporting and makes a profit, the chairman may get a salary from it without asking the Minister at all.

A clearer case of an office of profit under the Crown is scarcely imaginable. I should have thought it clear beyond argument that a man who held that office ought not to be a Member of this House of Commons at the same time, or, if he is, let us abandon the pretence—by amending legislation generally—that we want to keep some distinction between those who hold offices of profit under the Crown and those who sit as hon. Members in the House of Commons.

If we want to retain the distinction at all, obviously it must apply to the chairman of this company. Whatever the House does with this Bill, Mr. George ought clearly to make up his mind whether he wants to be a Member of the House of Commons, or chairman of this company, because it would be publicly indecent for him to be both at the same time.