Orders of the Day — ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BILL [Lords].

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons am ar 27 Gorffennaf 1923.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Mr William Pringle Mr William Pringle , Penistone

This somewhat alters the construction to be put upon this matter. I am surprised that the results should have been so fortunate to the right hon. Member for Spen Valley (Sir J. Simon). Apparently the real pathway to success at the Bar and to law office in the Ministry is to come to a wrong decision as to the views of a jury. But this is a very narrow ground on which to base this Bill, that there has been a dispute about a ditch, and that, in spite of the eloquent advocacy of the Solicitor-General reinforced, as we now know, by the right hon. Member for Spen Valley, reinforced further by three summings up by Judges—probably it would have been better without the summings up, for in the slender experience I had at the Bar, what I often found was that I got on best with the jury when the Judge summed up against me, and that is one reason why I am speaking to-day. Of course, the whole of this argument is based on the fallacy that the Judges were right, that because the Judge summed up strongly, therefore it was right, and because the Judge did it three times, it, was all the more right. I should lament very much, after what I have seen in the Courts and read of the Courts, coming to any such conclusion. In fact, it is really because of the fallibility of Judges that English law throughout has laid stress upon the value of a jury. It has believed that the ordinary citizen, on questions of fact, is usually a better judge than the man who lives a sequestered life on the Bench, cut off from all the ordinary associations of mankind. That seems to me to offer the most adequate explanation of certain judicial aberrations which have been brought to my attention. It is obvious that Judges are, to a large extent, men withdrawn from the ordinary walks of life. Of course, they have made mistakes, probably, in testing the opinions of Judges, like the Solicitor-General and the right hon. Member for Spen Valley, when they were at the Bar, but when they have got to the Bench they are withdrawn from all these things, and they sit apart as Olympians, looking down upon common men, and are not subject to the same conditions. Consequently, that is why the commonsense of the English people has always insisted on the value of a jury in the past, and, in this matter, I am not impressed by the hon. and learned Gentleman who sits on the National Liberal benches. He, I think, was not likely to give the traditional view on a matter of this kind, even although his party name has the word "National" in it. I rather appeal to the old traditions and the old instincts of this House in this matter.

When the Act of 1920 was passed, it was done in a hurry. It was done, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Middleton (Sir R. Adkins) said, in the silent watches of the night. The Lord Chief Justice, who was Attorney-General at that time, did not speak more than two minutes, and did not say anything about the importance of the provisions that were being passed. The Solicitor-General had some doubts, although, having consulted the OFFICIAL REPORT, I find that he expressed implicit faith in the judgment of the Attorney-General, which was perfectly appropriate in a learned Gentleman with expectations. But he was somewhat critical. The Committee stage was taken right away. It was reported without Amendment to the House, and was read a Third time. That was penny-in-the-slot legislation. We have got away from those automatic methods in the present Parliamtnt. We can get these things discussed in the light of day on a Friday afternoon, and when there are a good many in the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] Yes, it is better than it was when the Attorney-General spoke, and, if I may say with regret, when my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Harney) spoke, because there could be nothing more complete than the exposure he made of this provision.

We are all agreed that there are many admirable things in this Bill. There are only one or two provisions which have been mildly criticised in the course of the Debate. The provision now under criticism is the provision which most nearly and intimately affects all classes of His Majesty's subjects. The other things are technical, matters of legal reform, which concern mainly those engaged in the practice of the law. This is a matter which goes to the roots of the rights of the subject, and when you have a pro vision, although in a single paragraph of this kind, which deals with a great Constitutional right, the proper time to challenge it is on the Second Reading of the Bill. The Solicitor-General suggested that if we succeed, the whole thing will go, the great reforms will be held up, and we shall be in a worse position than we were before. I hope the House will not be impressed by any suggestion of the kind. The Government would be compelled by the vote of the House to accept the provision we are now advocating. They dare not allow the situation to remain as it was under the Act of 1920, after the vote of the House, which not only condemned the Act of 1920, but condemned their own reform on that Act. They would be bound, at the peril of their lives, to accept the decision of the House, and I ask the House, therefore, not to be impressed by the warnings of the Solicitor-General. The fears which he cherished have no reality. No Government, still less a Government so weak as the present—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear!"]—I am not referring to the legal talent—