Then does the Solicitor General suggest that, under the Act of 1918, which was intended to limit the right of trial by jury, and to dispense with juries as far as possible, the Legislature actually extended the right to trial by jury? That is a contention which will not impress anyone. On the basis of the 1918 Act and of the 1920 Act—which the Judges described as stereotyping the temporary Act of 1918—you have a right in cases where fraud is alleged and that right is withdrawn in this Bill. Even on the contention that you are giving an extension compared with the law as it is now, in this matter of cases of fraud the arguments both of the Solicitor-General and the Attorney-General are unsound. In any case where fraud is alleged there is an indefeasible right to trial by jury under the law as it stands. If this Bill passes that right will no longer remain absolute but will become subject to a discretion. The hon. and learned Gentleman again showed the difficulties in which he is plunged. Having, to the best of his ability, put forward the contention that this is a paltry change, he goes on to enumerate a large number of advantages which are going to accrue to the subject result of the change. First of all, it is not a change at all, then it is a minor change, then, having got the length of a minor change, he goes on to say that there will be large advantages to the subject. First of all, you are going to relieve the jurymen, who will not require to be summoned, and they will save their expenses. We did not know that this was a Bill to relieve juries.

But much the best thing of all was the great case in which the hon. and learned Gentleman was interested, the case whereby his client became bankrupt and he became Solicitor-General. I do not think this is going to do much to temper the misfortunes of that distressed client. It seems to me that, so far as that distressed client is concerned, it is a case of locking the stable door after the horse has been stolen. However, he will be relieved to know, I have no doubt, that his unfortunate, or perhaps I should say his fortunate, counsel, who decided at the wrong time to take the Majority vote—