Orders of the Day — ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BILL [Lords].

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons am ar 27 Gorffennaf 1923.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Mr William Pringle Mr William Pringle , Penistone

The concluding observations of the Solicitor-General are the finest illustration of the difficulties and embarrassments to which both he and his learned colleague have been reduced in this Debate. In reply to the question of the hon. Member for West Woolwich, as to whether the opinion of Judges or societies could be quoted in favour of this Bill, the hon. and learned Gentleman referred to a statement of the present Lord Chief Justice in 1920 to the effect that the Judges approved of the Act of 1920, and said that therefore they would approve of this Bill. But immediately he said: "You must not quote Lord Justice Bankes, Lord Justice Atkin, or Lord Justice Scrutton, because the Act of 1920 does not apply there." I suggest that when you have a gentleman, who is so acute as the Solicitor-General usually is, reduced to such a position of dialectical imbecility, there is really something wrong with it. A further interesting light is thrown on this matter by the hon. and learned Gentlemen's speech. I am sorry to say I did not hear the speech of the right hon. and learned Attorney-General, but I have heard a good deal second hand of what he said, and I have had the advantage of hearing some of his own explanations or repetitions of what he said, so that I can gather, to some extent, the line he took. There is no doubt that the impression he conveyed to the House in his opening speech was that this Bill was practically a restoration of the pre-War system.

Until my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Shields (Mr. Harney) spoke, I think the majority of the lay Members of the House were prepared to accept that conclusion. Since he spoke, however, and since other hon. Members, like the hon. Member for West Woolwich (Sir K. Wood) have made their contributions to the Debate, it is safe to say that the illusion has been completely dispelled. Further, the hon. and learned Solicitor-General has had to give away the case with both hands. Nobody has ever contended, on either side of the House, that this Bill does not extend the right as compared with the Act of 1920, and, therefore, when the Solicitor-General argues the matter on the basis of the Act of 1920 he is simply darkening counsel. He is endeavouring to minimise the extent to which the former rights enjoyed by His Majesty's subjects are being restricted by this Bill. I am not going to quote the statements of Lord Justice Atkin and Lord Justice Eldon Bankes. They have been quoted often, but I can say this, that practically every criticism which they made on the Act of 1920 applies to the proposals in this Bill. They were a definite condemnation of the taking away of pre-War rights; that was the whole force of them.

Indeed, in the judgment of Lord Justice Eldon Bankes, which I hold in my hand, he sketched the whole history of trial by jury and the various developments of the right. His criticism of the Act of 1920 was that the rights which had been enjoyed before were taken away. He said: If matters are to remain in their present position, it is clear that any right to a jury in an action in the King's Bench Division, except in the enumerated cases, is abolished. … I trust, however, that the other aspect of the case may also be considered, namely, whether the right to a trial by jury is not sufficiently important to be restored and maintained. Restored and maintained!