Orders of the Day — ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BILL [Lords].

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons am ar 27 Gorffennaf 1923.

Danfonwch hysbysiad imi am ddadleuon fel hyn

Photo of Sir William Adkins Sir William Adkins , Middleton and Prestwich

As one who has urged in every possible way that this Bill should be discussed in the light of day, I desire to thank the Solicitor-General for having put it down now, instead of attempting to smuggle it through the House in its darkest hours. This Bill contains provisions which those in any way connected with the legal profession are very glad to have submitted to Parliament. Many of those provisions are wanted because they will economise and strengthen the administration of the law. In a Bill of this kind, which contains a variety of provisions, it would be more than human to expect all of them to be good. As to Clause 1, I have grave doubts about a discretion which is given to the Lord Chief Justice about the holding of Assizes, because I think that is going too far. I know it is a Committee point, but it is one of the first magnitude, and I desire to say that while it is perfectly right where there are no prisoners for trial, or causes set down, that Assizes should not be held at all, I think you require more careful restrictions before you leave the settling of this substantial point to the discretion of any Judge. Many things are considered substantial to litigants and the people of the neighbourhood who do not appear so important to people who have other things to do.

With regard to Clause 7 surely it is desirable that where ex-Judges are available to try cases they should be allowed to do so. This will increase the efficiency of the Courts and prevent much of the embarrassment which arises at the present time. With regard to Clause 2 what on earth is it that the Attorney-General really means? Does he mean to go back to the pre-War practice or not? If he does, why does he not say so distinctly; and if he does not, will he give us a reason or instruct the Solicitor-General to do so? This Clause, though very carefully worded, does not substantially alter the position to-day. I know it puts the onus of the Judge's decision the other way, but does it touch the point that whereas before the War the right to a jury was absolute it will in future depend on judicial discretion, and is it a fact that under this Clause it depends on judicial discretion still. If a Judge takes the view, unlike the Court of Appeal, that the less jury cases he has the better is he able to express that view, or does my right hon. Friend say that he cannot do so.